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ABSTRACT
The regional coordination toward financial integration o f the ASEAN economies 
started in the aftermath o f the 1997 Asian crisis. Along with banking structural 
reforms in individual countries, several regional financial integration initiatives were 
launched to promote regional financial stability and economic growth. This thesis 
investigates the impact o f national banking structural reforms and ASEAN regional 
financial integration on bank efficiency and performance. It examines the similarity 
and convergence properties o f the banking systems across the major ASEAN 
economies from two aspects, namely bank efficiency and bank competitiveness. This 
thesis contains three empirical essays; Chapter 3 examines the cost efficiencies o f  
ASEAN banks by using Battese and Coelli (1995) Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA). The cost efficiency scores are then used to test for efficiency convergence 
properties. The ASEAN banking markets have been found to be converging at the 
aggregate level, but lack convergence at the micro individual bank level. The 
importance o f individual banks is further proved by a single country bank efficiency 
study on Indonesia in Chapter 4, using an alternative method known as 
non-parametric DEA with Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap method. In 
Chapter 5, the banking market competitiveness is modelled by the new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO) non-structural approach, Panzar-Roasse (PR) 
reduced-form revenue model. The degree o f similarity in banking market 
competitiveness across major ASEAN countries is assessed by comparing the 
estimated //-statistics. The ASEAN banking markets have been found to differ a lot in 
terms o f competitive structures and have experienced very different evolution 
processes o f market structure with a weak convergence tendency. However, certain 
degree o f contestability has been found by examining the relationship between market 
competitiveness and market concentration. The research o f  this thesis does not find 
strong evidence for improvement in bank performance and banking market 
convergence, although some positive aspects are discovered. The degree o f banking 
market integration for ASEAN countries is still relatively low.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
The Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 
August 1967 in Bangkok by the 5 initial members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Another 5 countries, Brunei Darussalam, 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Myanmar, joined in the following years. After more than 4 
decades o f development, ASEAN now is an important area for the Asian and the 
world economy, and has achieved significant progress in regional cultural, political 
and economic co-operation and integration. ASEAN has experienced similar 
characteristics to that o f  the European Union before the adoption o f the Euro as a single 
currency, such as the high degree o f flexibility o f production factors and shock 
symmetries between countries. However, the substantial macroeconomic differences in 
income and output levels between countries and weak macroeconomic convergence 
requires further policy direction for deeper regional coordination in both real and 
financial aspects. The regional coordination toward financial integration started in the 
aftermath o f the 1997 Asian crisis. Together with the significant banking structural 
reforms in individual countries after the 1997 financial crisis, several regional financial 
integration initiatives have also been launched to promote regional financial stability 
and economic growth. Especially when the Euro was launched as a single currency 
since 1999, the notion o f a similar currency union in ASEAN was emerged and became 
a long-term strategy for the ASEAN policy makers.
The regionalism and economic integration also exist to large extent in larger 
geographical areas, for example, the East Asia area, including all ASEAN countries
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plus People’s Republic o f China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; or even the Asia as 
a whole. However, in the present thesis, ASEAN is chosen as the only objective for 
the reason that, among the alternative geographical areas, ASEAN has the most 
possibility for a regional currency arrangement, primarily because o f the political 
wills. ASEAN is the only area in which the policy makers have expressed their strong 
interests in the possibility o f moving toward a currency union (Bayoumi and Mauro, 
2001). Also based on the current economic development levels o f the Asian countries, 
a greater region would have greater economic and political asymmetries which are not 
in favour o f successful financial and monetary integration.
Arguably, one o f  the benefits o f financial integration is that it will promote 
competition in the financial markets by eliminating cross-border barriers, and therefore 
improve the economic welfare through greater efficiency in production and allocation 
of credit. This thesis examines the impact o f national banking structural reforms and 
ASEAN regional financial integration on the performance in financial markets, 
particularly, in the banking market. The first question to be answered is, has the 
financial integration improved bank efficiency and competitiveness in ASEAN? 
Secondly, this thesis also contributes to the literature o f financial integration indicators, 
by evaluating the degree o f banking integration through the convergence properties 
from the institutional and operational perspective, i.e. convergence in bank efficiency. 
Regional convergence in bank operational efficiency levels signals that the inefficient 
banks are catching up with the efficient banks trough adaption o f superior technology, 
which is one o f  the desired outcomes from financial integration. Declining dispersion in 
operational efficiency levels is also an indicator for financial integration.
2
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Rather than presenting all the empirical analyses straight away, some background 
information about ASEAN is given in Chapter 2. Significant degree o f strategic 
economic co-operation and integration are evidenced by dramatic increases in total 
trade volume and gradual increase in the intra-regional trade, as well as the political 
willingness for further regional integration. From a macro perspective, the ASEAN 
economies appear to exhibit some characteristics o f the European Union at the time o f  
the Maastricht Treaty. However, empirical evidences on real and financial 
convergence provides mixed results, and more investigation on various aspects, such 
as the research has been done in the present thesis on banking industry, are necessary.
Chapter 3 examines the differences in bank cost efficiencies across the 5 major 
economies in ASEAN, using the Battese and Coelli (1995) Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) model. A common best-practice frontier based on 1889 bank-year 
observations in 5 countries over 16 years (1994-2009) is estimated to facilitate the 
cross-country comparison on bank efficiency levels. Chapter 3 does not only compare 
the general efficiency level across countries, but also utilise the concepts o f  
p-convergence and o-convergence which are borrowed from the growth-convergence 
literature to examine their convergence properties, which are typically only done for 
nominal macroeconomic variables in the literature. The ASEAN banking market has 
been found to be converging at aggregate level, but the institutional level convergence 
is weak.
A well-integrated banking market requires banking system to converge not only 
at the aggregate level, but also at the institutional level, i.e. convergence tendency 
from individual banks. The important role played by individual banks has been
3
Chapter 1 Introduction
noticed in Chapter 3 and has been further investigated in Chapter 4, which is a 
single-country study on bank efficiency and its convergence properties for Indonesia 
only. The main contribution o f this chapter is to check the robustness o f the results 
found in the previous chapter using an alternative efficiency estimation method, and 
also to investigate bank efficiency and the policy implications for a single country in 
more details. A relatively new method o f estimating banking efficiency, the 
non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with two-stage semi-parametric 
bootstrap method o f  Simar and Wilson (2007), is used to check the consistency o f the 
results from different methodologies, and similar convergence tests as in the previous 
chapter are carried out in a single country context too. The same estimations are 
conducted for three models with different specification o f banking outputs, and the 
results show that both the level o f bank efficiency and its convergence properties are 
sensitive to output choice. Main findings in this chapter indicate a major structural 
change in the aftermath o f the 1997 Asian crisis in Indonesia banking industry, with 
small banks and foreign banks become more efficient in the post-crisis period.
The last empirical chapter, Chapter 5 examines the differences in banking market 
competitive structures o f ASEAN-5. The degree o f competition in one particular 
market is measured by the //-statistic, obtained by using a non-structural approach, 
known as the Panzar-Rosse (PR) reduced-form revenue model, which is based on the 
new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) theories o f contestable markets. After a 
cross-country comparison on banking industry competitiveness, the //-statistics are 
then used to test the relationship between market competition and concentration. It 
was found that the ASEAN banking market as a whole could be described as a 
contestable market.
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Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, highlights the main findings and discusses some 
policies implications. The degree o f integration in the current ASEAN banking 
markets is still relatively low. Substantial differences exist in terms o f bank efficiency 
levels and the degree o f competitiveness o f each country’s banking market. The bank 
efficiency levels show some degree o f convergence at aggregate level; however are 
lack o f convergence at individual bank level. The national banking structural reforms 
and the regional financial integration projects have not effectively improved the 
convergence in banking market. Therefore policy encouragement from regional 
coordination is still needed for deeper banking integration and future monetary 
integration in ASEAN.
5
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1. Introduction
Applied economics and empirical analysis on any particular country/countries 
would be meaningless without a thorough awareness o f the context. In order to help 
understand the empirical analyses in the rest o f the thesis, this chapter will serve as a 
preface and give the necessary background information about the Association o f  
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly about the 5 core initial member 
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, 
which are the 5 countries used as a sample for all following empirical analyses.
In this chapter, the general information about ASEAN from different perspectives 
is reviewed in section 2, including the history o f formation and development o f  
ASEAN, the member countries and major macroeconomic indicators. The relative 
position o f ASEAN to the world and the relative positions o f member countries within 
the region are also compared. Section 3 outlines the roadmap o f ASEAN’s economic 
and financial integration within the region and with the outside world. Section 4 
discusses the achievements o f the regional integration efforts, and comparison with its 
peer groups, such as the European Union. Section 5 outlines the central role the 
banking system plays in the process o f financial integration and highlights the primary 
motivation o f the research carried out in this thesis. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
6
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2. ASEAN and ASEAN-5 in Perspective
2.1 ASEAN and the world
The Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 
August 1967 in Bangkok, with the initial aim o f promoting political co-operations, by 
the 5 original member countries which are also known as ASEAN-5, namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Another 5 member 
countries joined the association in the following year. Brunei Darussalam joined on 7 
January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and 
the last member, Cambodia, joined on 30 April 1999. During more than 4 decades o f  
development, ASEAN has achieved many dramatic accomplishments in regional 
co-operations on economics, social security, cultural development, education, regional 
peace and stability and other fields. The present study will mainly focus on the 
impressive economic achievements and potentials.
As o f 2009, the ASEAN has 10 members in total, with a combined gross domestic 
product (GDP) o f  US$ 1,496.34 billion, a total population o f about 591 million and a 
total area o f 4.4 million square kilometres1. If ASEAN was treated as a single entity, it 
would rank as the ninth largest economy in the world. The main focus o f ASEAN has 
been shifting gradually from political co-operations towards economic integration and 
co-operation. Figures 2-1-2-4 provide some general visual comparisons on ASEAN’s 
economy with its near neighbours in Asia, namely, China, India and Japan, and other 
major economies in the rest o f the world.
1 “Selected basic ASEAN indicators”, ASEAN Secretariat. http://www.aseansec.Org/l 9226.htm.
Retrieved 26 June 2011.
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Compared with the rest o f the world, ASEAN is a relatively small economy, the 
10 member countries together only counts for 4% o f the world total (PPP adjusted) 
GDP in 2009. Also the recent rise o f their Asian neighbours, such as China and India, 
has made this region overlooked somehow. As shown in Figure 2-1, the GDP o f a 
single country, India, is already greater than the sum of ten countries in ASEAN. 
However, by no means the ASEAN countries should be ignored, since they have 
much potentials and opportunities to offer to the rest o f the world, and has been 
playing an increasingly important role in the world economy.
The ASEAN domestic market is o f great potential. The total population o f  
ASEAN-10 countries is around 591 million in 2009, which is nearly twice the size o f  
Euro area or the USA. The purchasing power measured by per capital GDP in some of  
the ASEAN countries are quite high, such as in Brunei and Singapore, which are even
•y
higher than the US and average level o f Euro area , although the relative economic 
sizes o f Brunei and Singapore are much smaller. The income indicators o f ASEAN 
countries are also comparable to their Asian developing neighbours, in fact, the 
average income levels o f  China and India could only be ranked as middle or low level 
comparing with most countries in ASEAN.
2
Composed o f 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain.
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Figure 2-3 GDP per capita based on PPP in perspective (2009)
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ASEAN is also one of the fastest growing emerging markets. The economies of 
ASEAN were badly hit during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but recovered quickly
and the economies have kept on growing at significant speeds. Even in the recent 
years of the world-wide economic recession, when the major advanced economies,
such as the US and Euro area, have been experiencing zero or even negative
10
Chapter 2 ASEAN and Regional Integration
economic growth, the ASEAN countries still maintain an average GDP growth rate of 
almost 5% during 2005-20093. Although the average growth rate is still lower than 
those o f its regional neighbours, i.e. China and India, who are claimed to be “miracle 
economies”, it is significantly higher than the world average level o f 3.51% and 
“among the brightest spots in the emerging market world”4.
For the outside world, ASEAN is also an attractive place for investment and 
business. Cheap labour costs in most countries in the region have been attractive not 
only to the labour-intensive manufacturing industries, but also to the services sectors. 
In fact, with the human capital has been acquired during years o f education and 
training efforts in the ASEAN countries, as well as the dramatic developments in 
computer technologies and telecommunications, the ASEAN people now are capable 
to do all kinds o f jobs that use to be done only by workers in the advanced countries, 
but still at lower costs. One obvious example would be that various kinds o f services 
providers, such as mobile phone companies and credit card providers, in the 
developed countries with relatively higher labour costs have moved their calling 
centres and telesales teams to those south-east Asian countries. The ASEAN region is 
also famous for its immense natural resources, particularly the large oil production in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and other countries, and Singapore is the largest oil rigs 
exporter in the world. In terms o f finance, Singapore is a well-established financial 
centre in this region, due to its strong infrastructure o f financial system and sound law 
and governance standards. The Singaporean financial institutions also have close
3 The figure is calculated as a weighted average growth rate of ASEAN-10 countries weighted by each 
country’s real GDP.
4 Deutsche Bank Research, 2006.
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connections with other international financial centres and could facilitate convenient 
and swift channelling o f funds world-widely.
2.2 ASEAN-5
The ASEAN-5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, which are the 5 original members and initiators o f ASEAN, and the 5 
foreign ministers who signed the ASEAN Declaration5 to form the organisation, 
Adam Malik o f  Indonesia, Narciso R. Ramos o f the Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak o f  
Malaysia, S. Rajaratnam o f Singapore, and Thanat Khoman o f Thailand are hailed as 
the “Founding Fathers” o f ASEAN, which is “probably the most successful 
inter-governmental organization in the developing world today”6. These 5 countries 
are also the 5 largest economies in this sub-region, and together counts for 80-90% of  
the total GDP (PPP adjusted) o f the ASEAN total. Figure 2-5 shows that, in 2009, the 
ASEAN-5 occupies 86% o f the regional total GDP, and their economic sizes are 
many times larger than the rest o f the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN-5 is also where 
most o f the residents are located; the population o f ASEAN-5 is more than 70% o f the 
total population o f ASEAN in 2009.
Given the dominating economic powers o f ASEAN-5, their attitudes on regional 
co-operations and integrations, would be consequently crucial for the current and 
future developments o f the entire ASEAN. The economic importance o f them has 
made the 5 countries together a reasonable representative for the whole region in 
many aspects. Therefore, in this thesis, cross-country empirical analyses in Chapter 3
5 Also known as Bangkok Declaration.
6 “The Founding of ASEAN”, ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/20024.htm. Retrieved 26 
June 2011.
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on bank efficiency comparisons and in Chapter 5 on banking competitiveness are 
based on
Figure 2-5 GDP based on PPP as % of A S E A N  total (2009)
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Figure 2-6 Population as % of the A S E A N  total (2009)
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samples o f the ASEAN-5 countries. The results obtained and inferences drawn from 
them are served as general indicators for the situation in the whole region. In Chapter 
4, Indonesia is chosen for a more detailed single country study on convergence 
properties o f bank efficiency. The reason is that within the ASEAN-5, Indonesia has 
the largest population, 38% o f the total ASEAN population in 2009, and the largest 
GDP, 34% o f the ASEAN total in 2009, as well as the best data availability on bank 
balance sheet and income statement.
The levels o f economic development and the distribution o f wealth are very 
uneven in the ASEAN region, and this is also true for the ASEAN-5. The living 
standards, income levels and the extent o f economic maturity differ significantly 
across countries, and these asymmetries in economic fundamentals may affect further 
economic integration in this region. Figure 2-7 plots the evolution o f the per capita 
GDP o f ASEAN-5 over the two decades. The continuous improving trends in average 
income levels are obvious, and apparently have not been distorted significantly by the 
1997 Asian crisis. Having adjusted by purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP), 
the numbers are comparable both across time and across countries. The value o f per 
capita GDP o f Thailand in 2009 is US$ 8,489, which is almost 3 times o f that in two 
decades ago, US$ 2,909 in 1990. The least improvement happens in the Philippines, 
but still doubled from US$ 1,752 to US$ 3,516 in a 20 year time span. However, the 
cross-country differences are substantial. The per capita GDP o f the highest income 
country, Singapore, is much higher than the income levels o f other countries in this 
region, and is more than 10 times higher than those o f the relatively low income 
countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, in 2009 alone, the
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average income level of Singapore is US$ 49,764, and the average income levels of 
Indonesia and the Philippines are only US$ 4,155 and US$ 3,516 per year.
Figure 2-7 GDP per capita (PPP) of ASEAN-5 (1990-2009)
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Figure 2-8 Real GDP growth rate (%) of ASEAN-5 (1990-2009)
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The cross-country differences in average income and living standards are largely 
determined by the nature o f national economic structures. However, the ASEAN 
countries are closely connected through political, economic, cultural and geographical 
links, therefore, their reactions to major economic shocks are somehow similar. 
Comparing with the substantial differences in per capita GDP shown in Figure 2-7, 
the economic growth rates o f ASEAN-5 exhibit similar time patterns in Figure 2-8. 
The average annual real GDP growth rate is around 5% for the past two decades. 
Before the break out o f the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the economies in most 
countries are maintained growing at high speed just below 10% for a long time. The 
Philippines were way behind the others, but has caught up eventually. The ASEAN 
economies were devastatingly badly hit by the 1997 financial crisis, and economic 
contractions happened to different extents in all ASEAN countries with no exception. 
The worst case was in Indonesia, as it was the only country that experienced both 
economic and political regime collapses, and a deep economic contraction o f more 
than 30% in just one year from 1997 to 1998. In the aftermath o f the financial crisis, 
the economic growth rates are generally lower than those in the pre-crisis period, but 
are still above the world average level and among the most fast growing emerging 
countries. One o f the major criteria for an optimal currency union is the correlations 
of macroeconomic disturbances. The economic growing paths o f the ASEAN 
countries clearly show high correlations among themselves, which could be a positive 
aspect for further economic and financial integrations.
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3. Roadmap of ASEAN Economic and Financial 
Integration
The regional co-operations among ASEAN countries have been emphasised on 
three different aspects, including security, socio-cultural and economic integrations, 
and the economic integration is where this bloc has made the most progress. The 
efforts on regional economic integration have been made all the time since the 
establishment o f  the association, and have been intensified during the 1990s. In order 
to reduce intra-regional tariffs and promote the free flow o f goods and services in 
ASEAN, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme was introduced 
and actually acted as a framework for the later agreement o f  the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), which was signed on 28 January 1992 in Singapore. At the time when 
the AFTA agreement was signed, there were only 6 members in ASEAN, namely the 
ASEAN-5 plus Brunei Darussalam, also known as ASEAN-6. The remaining 
members who joined the association later are also official members o f the AFTA, 
however are given longer time frames to fully implement their CEPT commitments. 
The leaders o f ASEAN members have agreed to eliminate all import duties by 2015, 
and to create an ASEAN Community by 2015 . So far, the tariffs on more than 99% 
o f the products in the CEPT Inclusion List (IL) o f ASEAN-6 have been brought down 
to the 0-5 %  range, and tariffs on 60% o f the listed products are already in this range 
for the other 4 countries o f ASEAN8.
7 “Overview”, ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm. Retrieved 26 June 2011.
8 “TRADE”, ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.0rg/l 2021 .htm. Retrieved 26 June 2011.
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The most recent progress o f the regional integration towards the ASEAN 
Community is the signing up o f the “ASEAN Charter”, which was signed on 20 
November 2007 and entered into force on 15 December 2008. The charter has 
officially turned ASEAN into a legal entity which is a big step towards a similar 
EU-style community, and is a “very historic occasion for ASEAN”9. The Charter 
emphasises the centrality o f ASEAN, and enhances members’ commitments on new 
legal framework and new functional bodies to boost the process o f community 
building.
Arguably, further economic integration and acceleration o f intra-regional single 
market and trading activities require a stable financing framework for the region. The 
trend towards financial integration in the region started after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. The 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed the inherent weakness o f the financial 
system in ASEAN countries, especially in the banking systems. The crisis was 
triggered by the decision o f the Thai government to float its currency, baht, while the 
country has acquired large amount o f foreign debts, and eventually led to the collapse 
of its currency. The crisis quickly spread to most Southeast and East Asian countries 
and led to significant real economic losses. The crisis was characterized by extremely 
high interest rates (+13% in Indonesia), huge drop in stock price indexes (-55% in 
Thailand; -52% in Malaysia), massive real exchange rate depreciation (-87% in 
Thailand), declines in net capital inflow and in gross domestic products (Sufian, 
2009).
9 “ASEAN Charter”, ASEAN Secretariat. http://www.aseansec.Org/21829.htm. Retrieved 26 June 
2011 .
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The outbreak o f 1997 Asian financial crisis has made the member countries 
realise the importance and necessity o f further regional integration in both real and 
financial aspects to maintain the growth and stability. According to the European 
Central Bank, a well integrated financial system would improve the efficiency o f the 
economy through lower cost o f capital and better allocation o f financial resources10, 
and deeper financial integration could also improve the financial stability o f the 
region. Several financial co-operation projects were launched since the 1997 crisis. 
The first major step, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is a multilateral 
economic/financial co-operation and currency swap arrangement framework between 
ASEAN and another 3 East Asian countries, China, Japan and South Korea (known as 
ASEAN+3). The CMI was initiated by a series o f bilateral swap arrangements in 2000 
and has been expanded to a multilateral structure in the past decade, and the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement was formally signed on 28 
December 2009 and took effect on 24 March 2010. The main purpose o f the CMI is to 
establish a co-operation framework o f liquidity support among member countries 
during the economic/financial distress, and help avoid future recurrence o f the 1997 
Asian crisis. There are also other free trade agreements have been established with 
various countries in recent years, such as the ASEAN-Australia New Zealand, 
ASEAN- China, ASEAN-India, and ASEAN-Japan Free Trade Areas. The free trade 
agreement with the European Union is currently under negotiation11.
Another notable financial co-operation project involving broader geographical 
region is the Asian Bond Funds (ABF), which are initiatives from the Executives’ 
Meeting o f East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). The EMEAP consists of
10 European Central bank, 2005
11 “AFTA & FTAs”, ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/4920.htm. Retrieved 26 June 2011.
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11 countries12, o f which the ASEAN-5 are important members. Indirect financing, i.e. 
offshore and onshore borrowing through financial intermediaries, such as banks, was 
the main financing channel for most investments in this area. However, as the 
economies have been experiencing dramatic expansions and structural transitions, 
indirect financing becomes limited and ineffective while the bond markets are still 
underdeveloped in this area. This also has been claimed as one o f the main reasons 
that caused the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as huge accumulation o f foreign debts 
raised banks’ leverage risk and interest rate risk. The mismatch o f short-term 
borrowing from abroad and long-term lending to domestic projects also raised the 
maturity and liquidity risk for banks13, and further risk such as exchange rate risk in 
the event o f currency depreciation14.
The primary aim o f the ABF is to promote the development o f bond market in 
this region and to improve the diversity and efficiency o f financing channels. This 
initiative was launched in two stages: ABF1 was launched in June 2003 to set up 
actual bond funds in Asia, and raised funds from the 11 EMEAP central banks for a 
total value o f US$ 1 billion that were invested in dollar bonds issued by 8 EMEAP 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign borrowers15. ABF2 was launched in 2005 with initial 
seed money o f US$ 2 billion, with the aim to accelerate the bond market development 
and to reduce cross-border settlement risks16.
12 Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand.
13 Sufian, 2009
14 Chang and Velasco, 1999
15 Excluding Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
16 Deutsche Bank Research, 2006
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The 1997 Asian financial crisis had raised the question about appropriate 
exchange rate regime for countries in this region. Particularly, when the Euro was 
launched as a single currency in European countries since 1999, the notion o f a 
similar currency union in ASEAN had emerged and been paid more and more 
attention to. Unlike other currency unions that were formed based on a solid 
foundation o f strong political unions, member countries in the Euro zone are still 
independent states and maintain a high level o f internal political independence, 
including fiscal policy. Therefore the EU experiences can be particularly valuable for 
ASEAN, as they provide a similar parallel (Bayoumi and Mauro, 2001).
The main attractiveness o f a currency union is its usefulness in promoting trade 
and investment among the member countries, by reducing the cross-border transaction 
costs and the risk o f exchange rate volatilities, which would eventually improve the 
welfare and economic efficiency in the whole region. As a final stage o f economic 
integration, the realisation o f a currency union in the EU has gone through a long 
process o f economic and political integration o f more than 4 decades. Compared with 
the EU currency union, ASEAN has still a long way to go; however, a currency union 
for ASEAN could be a possible long-term objective for the ultimate community.
4. Regional Integration Achievements to Date
4.1 Trade volumes
As a result o f the successful implementation o f the CEPT-AFTA scheme and the 
co-operations with other countries on trade and financial integration, both the
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intra-regional and extra-regional trade o f ASEAN countries have grown significantly 
during the past two decades. The total trade volume o f all ASEAN countries has 
reached the peak o f US$ 1,710 billion in 2008, which is almost 4 times o f the value in 
1993, US$ 430 billion, indicating an average annual growth o f nearly 10%. The 
average annual growth rate o f the total trade from 2001 onwards is as high as 14%, 
which is double the figure o f previous years, thanks to the series o f free trade area 
agreements launched in the last decade. The increasing trends are also significant 
when distinguish the directions o f trade. All trade figures reached their peaks in 2008, 
with the intra-regional trade volume o f US$ 458 billion, which has grown by 456% 
from 1993 with an average annual growth rate o f 11%. The trade volume with the rest 
of the world has also increased by 260% from US$ 348 billion in 1993 to US$ 1,252 
billion in 2008. The intra-regional trade growth rate has been kept at a high level o f  
16-17% per annual before the 1997 crisis and after the recovery, since the 
CEPT-AFTA scheme launched in 1992. The intra-ASEAN trade average growth rate 
during the whole period is 37.5% higher than the growth rate for extra-ASEAN trade. 
Figure 2-9 plots the trade volumes o f total trade, intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN 
trade, which illustrates the significant improving patterns.
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Figure 2-9 Trend of ASEAN trade
Value in billion US$
1800 n
1600 i
Total Trade, 15371400 -I
1200 -1
^  "^Extra-ASEAN, 11611000 H
800 -
600 -
400 -
Intra-ASEAN, 376200
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source of data: ASEAN Statistical Year Book 2003 & 2008
Figure 2-10 Intra- and Extra-ASEAN trade
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In Figure 2-9, apart from the general increasing trend in trade activities o f  
ASEAN, it also should be noticed that the ASEAN’s economy remained heavily 
dependent on external trading partners and the global economic climate. Three major 
declines in total trading volume appeared during the two decades. Apart from the 
1997-1998 Asian crisis period o f which the main reason is Asian countries’ own 
currency deprecations, the other two declines happened in the period o f 2001-2003 
and from 2009 till now which are mainly because o f the global economic downturns,
1 7especially the economic slowdowns in the US and Europe and the recession in Japan . 
The ASEAN economy is still vulnerable to shocks in global demand. Given the 
increasing global economic uncertainty, strengthen the regional domestic market and 
create a domestically sourced sustainable growth through further economic 
co-operations and integrations is an important goal for the region. In fact, the 
increasing importance o f the intra-regional trading activities is a recognised evidence 
for the effort made towards greater intra-regional integrations. Figure 2-10 compares 
the share o f intra-ASEAN trade in total trade volume in 1993, 2001 and 2009. 
Although the trading volume with external countries still dominates, the share o f  
intra-ASEAN trade has increased from 19% in 1993 to 24% in 2009.
17 “TRADE”, ASEAN Secretariat, http://wvm.aseansec.org/12021 .htm. Retrieved 26 June 2011.
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4.2 Potentials for a monetary union and macroeconomic convergence
A number o f studies have assessed whether ASEAN is an OCA18. These studies 
also highlight the progress and achievements o f ASEAN regional integration, relative 
to the EU and other currency unions. Firstly, the extent o f labour and capital 
mobility19 has improved significantly in the ASEAN region, and is actually higher 
than those o f the EU at the time o f the Maastricht Treaty20. Madhur (2002) presented 
an example that, within the ASEAN-5, 10% o f the employment in Singapore is from 
the remaining 4 countries, and the emigration rate is as much as 2% of the labour 
force of the migrating countries.
01Secondly, the degree o f openness , which is measured by its trading activities 
with other countries, o f ASEAN economies has also improved markedly. The trading 
patterns shown earlier in Figure 2-9 and 2-10 have clearly shown the significant 
increases in both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trading volumes. It is also pointed 
out by Bayoumi and Mauro (2001), that although the intra-regional trade share in 
ASEAN’s total trade (25%) is relatively lower than that o f the EU (40%), it is 
significantly higher than the intra-regional trade shares in some o f other currency 
unions. The intra-regional trade only counts for about 10% in the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union and the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union, and the 
share for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community is only 3%.
18 If a geographical region containing more than one country uses fixed exchange rates or a common 
single currency, and the welfare and economic efficiencies o f the region are maximised through the 
adoption of this currency arrangement, this area is called an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). Horvath 
(2003)
19 The importance o f production factor mobility in the selection of appropriate exchange rate regime 
was raised by Mundell (1961).
20 See Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) and Moon, Rhee, and Yoon (2000).
21 The degree o f openness o f the OCA candidate economies is argued by McKinnon (1963).
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Thirdly, ASEAN countries exhibit a high degree o f shock symmetries, which are 
evidenced by both GDP growth rate figures in Figure 2-8 and the trading patterns 
shown in Figure 2-9. High similarities in responses to economic shocks among these 
countries are observed in many occasions, such as the region-wide economic 
contraction during the 1997 Asian crisis, the regional economic slowdown around 
2001 due to the economic downturn in major advanced economies, and the similar 
reactions to the current global financial crisis. Similar conclusion has been drawn by 
other researchers as well, for example, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) stated that 
the symmetry in shocks among the countries in the region is comparable to the EU, 
and the underlying macroeconomic disturbances have a similar pattern that was seen 
in Europe in the 1980s.
In fact, when European Monetary Union (EMU) selected its participating
members, they used some quantitative criteria, which are called the “convergence 
00criteria” , to ensure that the member countries have achieved a sustainable economic 
similarity and convergence. The first criterion is on inflation rate, which requires the 
country to have an inflation rate that is no more than 1.5% higher than the average o f  
the best three countries in the EU. The second criterion is that the government budget 
deficit should be below 3% o f its GDP and the government debt should be less than 
60% of its GDP. The third criterion is a stable exchange rate and the country should 
have joined the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) for two consecutive years. The 
last criterion is that the long-term nominal interest rate must not be more than 2% 
higher than the average o f the best-three countries.
22 Also known as the Maastricht criteria
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Obviously, the ASEAN countries are still far away from satisfying those 
convergence criteria o f the EMU, but any convergence tendency towards a common 
level o f those macroeconomic indicators would be considered as favourable to a 
future monetary alliance. Empirically, the convergence tendencies in economic 
variables are examined by the concepts o f “/?-convergence ” and “a-convergence ” 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996), which are originally initiated in the economic growth literature. 
The basic intuition o f the existence o f “/?-convergence ” is that the income level, 
measured by per capita GDP, in a low income country is growing faster than that o f  
the high income country. In other words, the low income country is catching up with 
the high income country. “/?-convergence ” is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition23 for “a-convergence ”, which is saying the dispersion in income levels o f  
different countries are diminishing over time. Both o f them are considered as 
evidence o f  economic integration between countries.
A large number o f economic convergence studies have been conducted for the 
EU countries, both before and after the adoption o f the Euro. However, this kind o f  
study for the ASEAN countries, or even the greater region o f Asian countries is still 
limited. Only a few studies have been found in the literature. The classic 
unconditional and conditional “/?-convergence ” and “a-convergence ” tests were 
applied by Chowdhury (2005) to per capita income for 9 ASEAN countries, excluding 
Myanmar, during the period o f 1960-2001. Unfortunately, no evidence was found for 
any type o f the convergence concepts, and he imputed the non-convergence in per 
capita income to the low, although growing, volume o f intra-regional trade and weak 
governance in some o f the ASEAN countries.
23 This issue is explained in details in Appendix A.
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Other studies, notably, Ong and Habibullah (2007) examined the long-run 
macroeconomic relationship and the time-varying convergence in real GDP across 
ASEAN-5, but using econometric method o f co-integration which is different from 
the typical convergence studies in terms o f methodology. They found that all 
ASEAN-5 are compatible, and Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are relatively 
more co-ordinated. They also suggested more intra-ASEAN trade should be boosted 
to incorporate other ASEAN countries besides the 5 major economies.
4.3 Financial integration indicators
To assess the degree o f financial integration in Europe, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) firstly published a set o f financial integration indicators in September 
2005, which are regularly updated in the annual reports on “Financial Integration in 
Europe” since then. Those reposts provide overall assessments on integration 
indicators o f the main segments o f the financial markets, namely the money, bond, 
equity and banking markets, and have been useful in monitoring the progress o f  
financial integration in the euro area.
The “price-based” indicators are either computed or model-based measurements 
of (evolutions of) dispersions in assets returns based on their geographic origin, and a 
declining trend in dispersions are signals for financial integration as the assets returns 
should be more influenced by common factors rather than country-specific factors. 
For example, integration in money market is indicated by narrowing “dispersion o f  
lending rates offered by different banks in each market segment”. A smaller standard
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deviation o f the “yield differentials with respect to a benchmark bond” indicates 
degree o f integration in bond markets. In the case o f equity market, a larger 
“cross-sector” dispersion o f equity returns comparing with “cross-country” dispersion 
indicates higher degree o f integration, since the country-specific factors should be less 
influential in a well-integrated market. The banking market integration is indicated by 
a narrowing dispersion o f  “interest rates on consumer credit, lending for house 
purchase and deposits with agreed maturity. “Quantity-based” indicators are also used 
as a complement to “price-based” indicators, for example, increasing cross-border 
lending activities are also indicators o f banking market integration, and increasing 
share o f investors’ holding o f non-domestic assets in total holdings is an indicator o f  
capital market integration24. At the time o f 2005, it has been evidenced that high 
degree o f integration exist in the EU money markets and bond markets, but lesser 
degree o f integration in the equity markets, and the banking markets are generally 
much less integrated (ECB, 2005).
Similar indicators for financial integration have also been applied to Asian 
economies recently. The existing studies show mixed results, with the degree of 
integration in ASEAN financial markets improving since the 1997 Asian crisis, but 
not as strong as the real integrations. Intra-regional financial integration is outweighed 
by external integration with other major economies and sustainable long-term 
convergence is still weak. Boresztain and Loungani (2011) calculated the 
cross-country standard deviations o f equity premia (1980-2008) and government 
interest rates (1984-2008) for 12 Asian countries25. In their study, a visual comparison
24 Empirical studies on EU financial integration, using either price-based or quantity-based indictors, 
emerged long before 2005, e.g. Centeno and Mello, 1999; Fratzscher, 2002; Manna, 2004.
25 Including all ASEAN-5 plus China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan.
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clearly shows that a significant declining trend in the cross-country dispersions 
starting around 1998, which is the wake o f the 1997 Asian crisis. This visual 
impression was further validated by a-convergence estimations. However, they also 
presented the indictors o f financial integration between Asia and the major economies, 
and pointed out that the degree o f financial integration for Asian countries with major 
countries outside the region was also significant and in some cases was larger than the 
intra-regional integration. Another very recent paper by Rizavi et al. (2011) 
investigated the degree o f integration in the financial market by examining the 
convergence properties o f the stock market returns. The study was conducted for 10 
Asian countries26, over the period o f 1999-2009. They found some evidence to 
support the integration o f the Asian stock markets, but the short-term convergence 
was not accompanied by overall long-term convergence.
5. Financial Integration and Bank Performance
In most ASEAN countries, capital markets remain underdeveloped and the 
banking system is still the principal vehicle o f financial intermediation and the 
principal channel o f monetary policy pass-through. Arguably, the ongoing process of  
financial integration and regional market liberalisation should lower the cross-border 
barriers to capital flows, and lead to a more open capital market. National protections 
in many industries will become less effective. The financial markets, particularly the 
banking markets, are opening up to the regional competitors from other member 
countries as well as competitors from outside the region. Foreign banks within the 
region could enter other countries’ domestic market more easily through many ways,
26 including all ASEAN-5 and China, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan and South Korea,
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such as direct establishment o f branches, acquisition o f local bank to make it a 
subsidiary, or even direct investment in a local bank to form a joint venture bank. One 
of the main benefits o f financial integration would be the reduction o f cross-border 
transaction costs, therefore even without a direct local representative, cross-border 
lending may also be an attractive option for raising funds to finance investments. In 
theory, the regional integration would expand the market and promote competition by 
eliminating cross-border barriers, and improve the economic welfare through greater 
efficiency in production and resources allocation.
As argued by Karim (2001), the increased competitive pressures will “affect 
banks (differently) depends in part on their ability to adapt and operate efficiently in 
the new environment”. Banks, from countries in which the financial intermediaries 
are operating in a more competitive market environment, and those in which the 
financial intermediation are conducted in a more efficient manner would be more 
productive and profitable given the available resources. Superiority in effective use of 
technologies would allow those banks to operate on lower interest spread than that of 
the weaker banks in other countries. The less competitive and less efficient banks 
would lose market shares through the competition and will be driven out o f the market 
or be taken-over eventually.
Therefore, understanding the current operational efficiency and competitiveness 
structure in banking industries is important for policy-making in the process of 
integration. A well-integrated banking market should impose encouragement to 
promote bank efficiency and competitiveness through the pressure o f intensified 
competition. One o f the main research objectives o f this thesis is to investigate
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whether the regional integration processes has improved the operational efficiency 
level and competitiveness in member countries’ banking markets, by evaluating the 
evolution o f the bank efficiency and competitiveness measurements over time.
Improvement in bank performance and market competitiveness is one o f the main 
desired outcomes from regional market integration; therefore the magnitude o f the 
improvement itself can be used to assess the effectiveness or success o f the 
integration efforts. As discussed in the previous section, the degree o f integration in 
the financial markets is usually assessed through indicators derived from the 
price/return information, or from the volume o f cross-border business.
To the best o f my knowledge, no research has been done for ASEAN on the 
convergence properties o f bank operational dispersions, e.g. dispersions in bank
7 7  •efficiency levels . Regional convergence in bank operational efficiency levels is a 
clear sign for the adaption to superior technology by inefficient banks, and they are 
catching up with the efficient banks. This convergence at institutional level is also a 
valuable indictor for the degree o f banking market integration, although has been 
typically ignored in the ASEAN financial integration literature. The present thesis 
aims to fill this gap by providing a detailed convergence analysis on ASEAN bank 
efficiency over a long period (1994-2009),
27 There are few recent studies of this kind for EU countries, for example, Weill (2009), Casu and 
Girardone (2010).
32
Chapter 2 ASEAN and Regional Integration
6. Conclusion
The present chapter is a context chapter aiming to provide some background 
information o f ASEAN region, particularly the ASEAN-5, which are the 5 largest 
economies in the region. The relative economic importance o f ASEAN in the world 
and the relative economic positions o f each individual country within the region are 
shown by presentations and comparisons o f the macroeconomic indicators. Through 
decades o f efforts towards a well-integrated regional community, the ASEAN 
countries have achieved dramatic accomplishments in regional co-operations on 
economics, social security and cultural development_The ASEAN economies have 
exhibited a common set o f characteristics that were experienced by the European 
Union before the adoption o f the Euro as a single currency. Specifically, these are the 
high degree o f flexibility o f production factors and shock symmetries between 
countries. However, the substantial macroeconomic differences in income and output 
levels between countries and weak macroeconomic convergence requires further 
policy reinforcement for deeper regional coordination in both real and financial 
aspects.
The interest in deeper financial and monetary integration o f the ASEAN policy 
makers have been deepening since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the launch o f  
Euro in 1999. Several financial integration initiatives have been launched in the 
aftermath o f the 1997 Asian crisis. Existing empirical studies on the degree o f  
ASEAN financial integration has been sparse and provide mixed results. This thesis 
will contribute to the literature from the following aspects: 1), To evaluate the 
effectiveness o f the national banking reforms and financial integration process
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through the evolution o f bank efficiency and competitiveness. To answer the question, 
have the national banking reforms and financial integration process improved bank 
efficiency and banking market competitiveness level? 2), To investigate the 
convergence properties o f ASEAN bank efficiency, which is used as an indicator of  
banking market integration at the institutional level. 3), To identify the weakness and 
strengthens o f  the current ASEAN banking market, and draw policy implications for 
further regional integration toward the ultimate ASEAN community 2015.
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Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of 
Selected ASEAN Countries
1. Introduction
In this chapter, the impact o f the national banking structural reforms and the 
regional financial integration after the 1997 Asian financial crisis will be assessed 
from the perspective o f bank cost efficiencies. Opening up the cross-border barriers 
would lead to intensified competition from banks o f other member countries. Without 
effective national protective policies, domestic banks’ market shares can be eroded by 
foreign banks which operate in a more efficient way in terms o f production 
maximisation and cost minimisation. Therefore, incumbents need to adapt and operate 
efficiently in the new context to survive. In theory, intensified competition through 
regional market integration should help improve the industry’s efficiency level as 
inefficient banks catch up with the efficient banks, and the dispersion in operational 
efficiency levels declines overtime.
Bank cost efficiencies are modelled by using Battese and Coelli (1995) Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) under a common frontier framework. A common 
best-practice frontier based on 1889 bank-year observations in 5 countries over 16 
years (1994-2009) is estimated to facilitate the cross-country comparison on bank 
efficiency levels. Asymmetries in bank efficiency may imply insufficient degree o f 
financial integration among member countries. However, whether banks are catching 
up with each other, and the dispersions in bank efficiency narrowing over time 
seemed also interesting questions that are worth emphasising. A converging tendency 
towards a common steady-state level o f bank efficiency and a decreasing magnitude
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of dispersion would also be indicators for banking market integration. Therefore, I 
apply the concepts o f /?-convergence and o-convergence, which are borrowed from 
the growth literature, to bank efficiency analysis. In the hope that efficiency o f  
banking system across countries are improving and converging over time, which can 
be seen as an indicator for banking market integration.
The rest o f the chapter is organised as follows. Since the general background of 
ASEAN countries and the incentive for a currency union have been reviewed in 
Chapter 2 already, section 2 o f this chapter starts directly with the review o f literature 
in bank efficiency studies which are relevant to this study. Section 3 outlines the 
methodologies and modelling strategies used for both bank cost efficiency estimation 
and efficiency convergence properties investigation. Section 4 describes the data and 
variables used in estimation. The empirical results and discussions are reported in 
section 5, and finally, section 6 concludes this chapter.
2. Related Literature
2.1 An overview on bank efficiency studies
In the last two decades, the efficiency o f the financial sector has received an 
increased attention by researchers and policy makers around the world. According to 
Farrell (1957), a firm is said to be technically inefficient if  it produces less than 
maximum output using a given level o f input, and it is allocatively inefficient if  it uses 
the wrong mix o f inputs given the input factor prices. Either o f them could result in 
cost inefficiency, which indicates the firm does not produce at minimum (optimum)
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cost level. The frontier efficiency methodologies measuring efficiencies relative to 
some benchmark have been developed dramatically these years. Frontier 
methodologies measure individual firm’s efficiency relative to a “best-practice” 
frontier for the industry. Compared with the conventional financial ratios which are 
only partial productivity measures, such frontier efficiency measures are superior 
because they take all inputs and outputs into account and measure the “total factor 
productivity”. These frontier efficiency methodologies could be classified into two 
broad categories , either in a non-parametric way, like Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), or in a parametric way, like Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The 
non-parametric methods generally employ mathematical (linear) programming or 
other non-parametric methods to estimate efficiency without specific assumptions 
about the functional form o f the specific production, cost, revenue or profit functions; 
therefore suffer less from the problem o f misspecification. By contrast, parametric 
methods are normally econometric techniques with certain assumptions made on the 
functional form o f the objective functions and distribution o f firm-specific effects 
(inefficiencies), but with the advantages o f allowing random noise and the capability 
o f statistical inference. Each o f the two techniques has advantages over the other, and 
each o f them has its own problematic aspects waiting to be resolved. According to 
Banker et al. (2010), “although much has been written about the relative merits o f the 
two methodologies, both have gained a firm foothold in the efficiency estimation 
literature”.
The majority o f early papers are based on North American financial markets, 
largely due to the widely available data. An early survey by Berger and Humphrey
28 More recently, new innovations like “semi-parametric” bootstrap method (Simar and Wilson, 2007) 
have been developed, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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(1997) reviewed 130 studies that have employed frontier analysis in 21 countries. 
Studies on US financial institutions were the most common, counting for 66 out o f  
116 single country studies, and only 8 were o f developing and Asian countries 
(including 2 in Japan). More recently the single country studies have been expanded 
to Asian and other regions, such as Hong Kong (Drake et al., 2006), Greece 
(Pasiouras, 2008), Singapore (Sufian, 2007), Ukraine (Kyj and Isik, 2008) and studies 
focusing on countries in transition, like India (Ataullah and Le, 2006; Bhattacharyya 
et al. 1997) and Malaysia (Sufian, 2009).
Early cross-country studies are mainly on developed counties too, using various 
methods. Berger et al. (1993) studied bank efficiency in Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland by using the DEA approach, and concluded that Swedish banks were in the 
best position to expand on a future common Nordic banking market. Fecher and 
Pestieu (1993) evaluated technical efficiency using SFA method for financial services 
o f 11 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, 
and found that the Japanese financial services sector was the most efficient among 
others. Allen and Rai (1996) used SFA to compare cost inefficiency across 15 
developed countries grouped into either universal banking countries, in which the 
functional integration o f commercial and investment banking is permitted; or 
separated banking countries, in which banks can only carry out one type o f business. 
Pastor et a l  (1997), compared bank efficiencies and productivities o f banks from 
several European countries and the U.S, using DEA method. Both o f Allen and Rai 
(1996) and Pastor et al. (1997) found that financial institutions in the United Kingdom 
were among the least efficient.
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Cross-country comparisons on developed economies are still popular nowadays, 
for example, Lozano-Vivas et a l  (2001) on a sample o f banks from 10 EU countries 
with the non-parametric DEA approach; Vennet (2002) on cost and profit efficiency 
of banks from 17 European countries. A more recent cross-country study o f  
Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) investigated the impact o f non-traditional 
activities on bank efficiency using SFA method, and compare bank efficiency o f 752 
publicly quoted commercial banks from 87 countries around the world. They found 
that non-traditional banking business increased cost efficiency but its impact on profit 
efficiency was mixed.
This stream o f study has grown in complexity and has given greater insight into 
potential problems that banks and financial system can face. One o f the important 
issues is the impact o f a currency union on bank efficiencies. Most studies o f this kind 
are based on the European Monetary Union (EMU). For example Ali and Gstach 
(2000) showed that joining the EMU improved Austrian banks’ cost efficiency. 
However, other studies found negative effect o f joining the EMU, such as in Greek 
banks due to Tsionas et a l  (2003). Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) used a so-called 
“complete DEA” model to investigate that how environmental conditions affect the 
cross-country banking activities within the integrated EU financial market, and they 
found that the adverse environmental conditions could be a fundamental deterrent for 
cross-country competition, and could be a good competitive factor for the home 
banking industry.
More closely related to the present study, some researchers apply the 
convergence concepts which are borrowed from the growth literature to bank
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efficiency studies and investigate the convergence properties o f bank efficiency cross 
countries. Few ex-post studies o f bank efficiency convergence across European 
countries after the adoption o f European currency union are found in the literature. 
Weill (2009) tested p-convergence and o-convergence o f cost efficiency o f banks for 
10 EU countries between 1994 and 2005, using SFA to estimate efficiency. Weill 
(2009)’s findings support the view o f a convergence in the cost efficiency o f banks 
across European countries, and that European integration had a positive impact on 
banking efficiency. Casu and Girardone (2010) applied the same concepts o f  
convergence to non-parametric DEA cost efficiency o f banks from 15 EU countries in 
the period 1997-2003, and the results provided supporting evidence for convergence 
o f efficiency levels towards an EU average rather than the best-practice. The potential 
gains brought about by increased integration have been offset by a decrease in the 
overall efficiency level. Another convergence study on EU bank efficiency is 
Mamatzakis et al. (2008), who tested the convergence o f cost and profit efficiency o f  
banks from 10 new EU members over 1998-2003, and the results indicate some 
convergence in cost efficiency, yet no convergence appears to have been achieved in 
terms o f profit efficiency.
2.2 Single country Bank efficiency studies on ASEAN countries
Recent works in this research field have extended the geographic coverage, and 
increasing attentions have been given to emerging markets, including China, Taiwan 
and Greece. Specific studies on ASEAN countries are still relatively limited but 
growing, and only start to appear from the beginning o f this century. Single country
40
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
studies have been done for almost all member countries o f ASEAN, some examples 
have been selected for the 5 countries used in this chapter.
For Indonesia, Margono et a l  (2010) was one o f the first to estimate bank 
efficiency by using SFA, over the period 1993-2000. They concluded the average cost 
efficiency o f all banks is nearly 30% lower in the post-Asian crisis period comparing 
with the pre-Asian crisis period. Working papers by Hadad et al. (2008; 2011a, b) 
examined non-parametric, slacks-based DEA with Simar and Wilson’s (2007) 
bootstrapping methodology to monthly/quarterly supervisory data within a relatively 
short period 2006-2007. They found that bank efficiencies are positively related to the 
JCI index o f the Indonesian Stock Exchange, and state-owned banks are the most 
efficient. Another working paper by Besar and Milne (2009) studied the effects of 
ownership changes during the re-privatisation program after the Asian financial crisis 
by estimating SFA model over 2000-2007. They found that the re-privatisation 
program has contributed positively to Indonesian banks’ efficiency and competition.
Matthews and Ismailb (2006) compared technical efficiencies and productivities 
o f domestic and foreign commercial banks in Malaysia over 1994-2000, using the 
DEA method. They found that foreign banks were more efficient. Using the same 
method, Sufian (2009) found “high degree o f inefficiency” in the Malaysian banking 
industry over a period around the Asian financial crisis 1997 (1995-1999). A second 
stage Tobit regression showed that technical efficiencies were positively and 
significantly related to foreign ownership, along with loans intensity, bank size, 
degree o f diversification in business, but negatively associated with market share, 
management expenses and natural logarithm of GDP.
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Montinola and Moreno (2001) is one o f the earliest frontier efficiency studies for 
the Philippines, who found that there was no strong improvement in domestic bank 
efficiency after the liberalization. Dacanay (2007) found the commercial banking cost 
inefficiency increased in the aftermath o f 1997 Asian crisis, which is more or less 
consistent with the findings in the present study. The most recent study for the 
Philippines has been found is Manlagnit (2011), which examined the cost efficiency 
of Philippine commercial banks over the period 1990-2006 using SFA method. The 
results show substantial bank inefficiencies with a significant pattern o f persistence of  
inefficiency among banks, indicating that relatively inefficient (efficient) banks tend 
to remain relatively inefficient (efficient) over a period o f time, and this result is 
consistent with the poor convergence tendency for Phillippine banks that has been 
found in this chapter.
Singapore is the only developed economy in this region. However, due to the 
poor data availability, both quantity and research scope o f bank efficiency studies on 
Singaporean banks are limited. Chu and Lim (1998) estimated cost and profit 
efficiency for only 6 Singaporean listed banks over the period 1992-1996, and they 
found that cost efficiency was much higher than profits efficiency for these 6 banks 
and also bigger banks were tend to have higher efficiency levels. A more recent small 
sample study by Lim and Randhawa (2005) provided mixed results on relationship 
between bank efficiency and bank size when use different input-output combinations. 
The cost efficiencies for larger banks are higher under production approach, while 
under intermediation approach, the result is the opposite. To the best o f my 
knowledge, Sufian (2007) is the only paper that estimated a long-term trend of
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technical and scale efficiencies for Singaporean banks from 1993 to 2003 using a 
DEA window analysis method. What they concluded is that the Singaporean bank 
efficiency was declining in the early period due to the 1997 Asian crisis but fully 
recovered and increased dramatically thereafter. Another finding o f theirs was that 
smaller banks have outperformed larger banks during the period with high technical 
and scale efficiencies.
One o f the earliest papers that studies efficiency for Thailand financial services 
sector is Chansam (2005), which concluded that the efficiency in the Thai financial 
sector was diminishing over the period o f 1998-2004, and regarding the 12 
commercial banks along with other financial institutions included in the study, there 
was no significant difference in efficiency between domestic and foreign banks. A 
later paper by the same author, Chansam (2008), investigated specifically efficiencies 
of commercial banks during 2003-2006 with different input-output specifications, and 
found that efficiencies under operation approach were higher and more stable than 
those obtained under intermediation approach. Sufian and Habibullah (2010a) 
investigated bank technical and scale efficiency for Thailand banking sector in the 
post-Asia crisis period o f 1999-2008 using DEA approach and a second stage 
regression to identify effects o f internal and external environmental variables. They 
found that the recent global financial crisis exerted negative impact on bank 
efficiencies, and unlike results from other developing country studies, domestic banks 
in Thailand actually exhibited higher technical efficiency than foreign owned banks.
These single country bank efficiency studies on ASEAN countries have 
investigated various issues related to banking efficiency, although some inferences are
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conflict with one another and same environmental factor may have completely 
different effects on bank efficiency in different countries, those results still provide 
basic understandings and useful insights for the overall bank efficiency conditions in 
this region.
2.3 Cross-country Bank efficiency studies on ASEAN countries
Cross-country studies o f bank efficiency in developing counties are sparse in the 
literature, and even fewer for comparison o f ASEAN countries. To the best o f my 
knowledge, Karim and Zaini (2001) is the first attempt o f systematically 
cross-country comparison on bank efficiencies for pure ASEAN countries, and is very 
closely related to the present study. They evaluated bank efficiencies for selected 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), using the 
same method used in the present study, i.e. Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model.
Although, there are something in common between the Karim and Zaini (2001) 
paper and the present study, the later is significantly different from the former in a 
number o f aspects. First o f all, the basic questions proposed in the two studies are 
different. The purpose o f Karim and Zaini (2001) is merely to investigate country 
differences in terms o f bank efficiency and the relationship between bank efficiency 
and few control variables. By contrast, the present study asks a deeper question about 
the impact o f financial integration on bank efficiency and the answer provided is not 
only based on the cross-country differentials in bank efficiency but also their 
convergence properties. Secondly, Karim and Zaini (2001) only covered 4 ASEAN 
countries for the period o f 1989-1996 before the 1997 Asian crisis, and they did not
44
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
include Singapore due to poor data availability. The present study evaluates bank 
efficiencies for a later and longer period from 1994 to 2009, covering periods both 
before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. Also Singapore is included in the present study, 
as it is an important member country o f ASEAN and is too important to be excluded 
when consider regional financial integration. The third difference comes in the 
estimation details, Karim and Zaini (2001) used translog cost function whereas the 
Cobb-Douglas cost function is used in the present study, and different environmental 
variables are chosen in the inefficiency modelling. Although both o f the two follow 
intermediation approach when choosing banks’ input and output, they treat deposits as 
both input and output, whereas deposit is only used as input in the current study 
following the classical definition o f intermediation approach more strictly.
Despite the differences discussed above, some o f their results are somehow 
consistent with the findings in this chapter. Although the ranking o f countries in terms 
of average bank efficiency are slightly different, they found substantial difference 
across countries too and the Philippine banking market is among the least efficient 
ones. They also mentioned that “if  the ASEAN banks are free to move within the 
wider ASEAN market, Philippine and Indonesian banks would be at a 
disadvantage...”, which is implicitly consistent with the comments made in this 
chapter. In terms o f bank efficiency determinants, they claimed that the ASEAN 
banks enjoy increasing returns to scale and the larger banks tend to have higher cost 
efficiency level, which is also consistent with the findings in the present study.
29 Sealey and Lindley (1977).
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There are also some cross-country studies are found on Asian countries, including 
other Asian countries, such as China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, which are not 
member countries o f ASEAN. Studies o f this kind include Ariff and Can (2008), 
which using nonparametric DEA method, estimated technical and scale efficiencies 
changes from pre- to post-IMF-restructuring periods for 138 commercial banks during 
1991-2005 in 4 East Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand). 
The effect o f the interventions from IMF in the post-Asian crisis banking reforms in 
East Asian countries varies from country to country, and the restructured banks were 
not significantly more efficient. Increased foreign ownership in the later-stage 
reprivatisation improves bank efficiency but not significantly, which suggests it may 
take longer time for the potential benefits to be realised30. Shen et al. (2009) used the 
SFA method with conventional Random Effect panel estimation and Greene’s ‘true’
• j  i
stochastic frontier models , compared bank cost efficiency over 285 commercial 
banks among 10 Asian countries. They found that the cross-country heterogeneity was 
significant and may distort the efficiency estimates if  not considered, and the average 
bank efficiency level o f Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Singapore, are relatively low comparing with other Asian countries.
30 This finding is also consistent with my results in Chapter 4 for Indonesian banks.
31 Greene (2008)
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3. Methodology and Model Strategies
3.1 Bank cost efficiency
Cost efficiency is achieved when a bank is both allocatively and technically 
efficient, and it is normally measured by a ratio o f the best-practice bank’s cost to a 
bank’s actual cost for producing the same level o f output using the same production 
technology 32 . The parametric efficiency frontier methodology uses an 
arbitrarily-chosen production function to envelope data (outputs, inputs or input prices) 
observation points, with the assumption that firm-specific effects (inefficiencies) are 
one-side distributed. Early deterministic frontier models, such like Aigner and Chu 
(1968) for production function and Forsund and Jansen (1977) for cost function, 
assume that the deviation from the model predicted best-practice is solely attributed to 
the operational inefficiency and do not allow for random errors.
The stochastic production frontier models were firstly introduced separately by 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), which added a 
symmetric random error to account for statistical noise that are not under the control 
of the firms. When input price data are available and under a set o f regularity
'X'Xconditions , the production technology can be expressed as a cost function, which is 
a function for total cost in terms o f outputs and input prices. In a multiple-output 
production environment, estimating a cost function is much more convenient than 
estimating multiple output production models.
32 See section 3 of Chapter 4 for detailed explanations.
33 See Shepahard (1953) or Nerlove (1963) for details.
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The basic idea o f SFA cost frontier method can be graphically illustrated in 
Figure 3-1. The model estimated minimum cost is shown by C*, and the objective 
firm z’s actual cost is given by Q. The vertical distance w, between the two curves 
shows how inefficient the firm is, i.e cost inefficiency o f firm i.
F ig u re  3-1 C o st fu n c tio n  a n d  C o s t ineffic iency
Cost
Output
(Source: Coelli. 2005)
As a general rule, efficiency levels measured relative to one frontier cannot be 
directly compared with efficiency levels measured relative to another frontier. The 
analysis carried out in this chapter is in a multi-country and multi-period context. With 
cross-country comparison and cross time convergence analysis as purposes, the bank 
cost efficiencies are measured in a common-frontier framework34, i.e. a common 
best-practice frontier cross countries and cross time. As argued in Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), “a frontier formed from the complete date set across nations would
14 Estimating common-frontier is a popular practice in cross-country bank efficiency comparative 
studies, e.g. Karim and Zaini (2001); Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001). Criticisms on this practise include 
that the assumption of a single frontier technology is too restrictive, and do not allow for difference in 
technologies in different countries. For more details, see Bos and Schmiedel (2007), Ben Naceur et al. 
(2011).
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allow for a better comparison across nations, since the banks in each country would 
be compared against the same standard” (pp. 187-188).
In order to make a common frontier valid, one have to take cross-country 
heterogeneity into account, as well as the bank-specific characteristics as determinants 
of inefficiency. A popular practice o f investigating the effects o f determinants and 
other environmental variables on (in)efficiency is to conduct a second stage 
regression o f predicted efficiencies, obtained from using either parametric or 
non-parametric frontier techniques, upon bank-specific and other environmental 
variables . Those variables are normally exogenous that have been considered to be 
relevant to the banks’ efficiency levels but are out o f the bank managers’ control. 
These factors might reflect differences in ownership, size, market share, business 
environment, degree o f competition, and differences in country-specific 
macroeconomic conditions among the banks under analysis, which may help explain 
the efficiency differentiations. This two-stage estimation procedure has provided a 
useful analysing tool, but has been criticized for inconsistence in assumptions about 
efficiencies’ distribution between the two stages , where in stage one efficiency 
terms are assumed to be independently half-normally/truncated-normally distributed, 
but in stage two they are assumed to be normally distributed and dependent on the
'xnbank specific variables . Therefore, the two-stage procedure is likely to produce 
inefficient and biased estimates.
35 E.g. Pitt and Lee (1981) and Sufian and Habibullan (2010a).
36 Two-stage estimation based on non-parametric efficiency estimates also faces other criticisms. E.g. 
Simar and Wilson, 2007, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
37 See Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Wang and 
Schmidt (2002) for more discussion.
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This study uses Battese and Coelli (1995) specification o f the stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA)38 to estimate bank cost efficiency. One advantage o f this model is 
that it estimates a stochastic cost frontier and the coefficients for environmental 
variables simultaneously in a single-stage estimation procedure, which avoids 
inconsistent distribution assumption problem and produce more efficient estimates. It 
also allows for unbalanced panel data which can significantly increase the sample size 
given the recognized difficulties in collecting long time series data for emerging 
countries. The general form o f Battese and Coelli (1995) model is specified in a 
log-linear form as follows:
Cl t= f { X iKP) + (Vit+ U lt) (3.1)
Where Cit is the natural logarithm o f total variable cost o f production o f /-th 
bank in period t. The total variable cost is expressed as a function o f a set o f  
explanatory variables, X lt, which includes input prices and output measures o f i-th 
bank in period t. p  is a vector o f parameters to be estimated. The error term contains 
two components. The first component is a symmetric random error, Vlt ~  iidN (0, a ] ) , 
to account for statistical noise. Bank’s inefficiency is captured by the second 
component o f the error term Uu , which is defined as how far the firm operates above
the cost frontier. Thus Uit is assumed to be non-negative and independently 
distributed following a (left) truncated-normal distribution with constant variance, 
Uu ~  N + {mit, cr2) ,  where mit = z it8 and
38 Standard form o f SFA were proposed by Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and ven den 
Broeck (1977) independently.
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Uit= z ud + eu (3.2)
Equation (3.2) models the inefficiency in terms o f its determinants, a set o f  
bank-specific variables and other environmental variables zit , with a vector o f
parameters S , to be estimated. Since Uit is restricted to be non-negative, the error
term in equation (3.2), eu , follows a truncated normal distribution N{0,<y])
left-truncated at point - z itS . The Battese and Coelli (1995) model allows
simultaneous estimation o f the stochastic cost frontier, equation (3.1), and the 
determinants o f inefficiency, equation (3.2), with a one step maximum likelihood 
method.
If the inefficiency term is not statistical significant at all, then the model can be 
estimated as a cost function without having any bank-specific inefficiency 
consideration. Utilizing a simple parameterization o f Battese and Corra (1977) who 
replaced errand cr^  with <r2 = cry +<rj and y = crj/(crj+<Tu) , one can test 
whether the SFA specification is necessary by testing the significance o f
TOthe y  parameter . If y  is not significantly different from 0, it would indicate that 
crj is 0, therefore U it term should be removed from the model.
Regarding the functional form o f the cost function, the Cobb-Douglas and 
translog models are the most popular in the extant literature. In this study, a simple
39 As pointed out in Coelli (1996), “any likelihood ratio test statistic does not have a chi-square 
distribution because the restriction defines a point on the boundary of the parameter space. In this case 
the likelihood ratio statistic has been shown to have a mixed chi-square distribution”. For more on this 
point see Lee (1993) and Coelli (1993).
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Cobb-Douglas cost function has been chosen. The translog model has been argued to 
allow more flexibility by relaxing the assumption o f unitary elasticity o f substitution 
in the Cobb-Douglas function. But the cost o f greater flexibility in the translog models 
is that the implied production function is not monotonic or globally convex as it is in 
the Cobb-Douglas models. The latter has universally smooth and convex isoquants 
and the implied cost function is likewise well behaved (Greene, 2008). Especially, 
researchers have showed that when used in efficiency estimation, the two functional 
forms produce little difference in efficiency ranking40 (Guermat and Hadri, 1999).
Debates also rage about the appropriate choices o f the input/output specification. 
There are two main approaches to the choice o f input/output variables. One is the 
traditional “intermediation approach” (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), in which the input 
of funds and their interest cost is included in the analysis, since funds are the main 
“raw material” which is transformed in the intermediation process (e.g. Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). The other is the “production” approach, in which only physical 
inputs such as labour and capital are included (e.g. Kuussaari and Vesala, 1995). 
Following the intermediation method o f Sealey and Lindley (1977), I use three inputs 
and three outputs. Inputs are the number o f employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and 
total deposits (TD). Outputs are total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), 
and other operating income (OOY) as an approximation for the non-traditional 
business activities o f banks41. Total variable cost and input price terms are normalized 
by the third input price, p 3lt, to impose the linear homogeneity (homogeneous o f
degree 1) restriction in the model. Thus, the complete model is as following:
40 Another reason for choosing the Cobb-Douglas cost function is that as pointed by (Greene, 2008) a 
simpler model setup with fewer parameters to be estimated may help cope with the problem of “wrong 
Skewness” o f the residual term in the production/cost function. However, there is no theoretical basis 
for this in the literature.
41 More discussion on input/output specification see section 4.
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In—2- = /?„+/?, Iny„, + p2 Inyv, + 0, Inyv, + z, In— + / 2 In — + (v„ +//„) 
P  3it Piil Pin
(3.3)
The environmental variables z it included in equation (3.2) enable the control of
differences in bank-specific characteristics and general country-specific 
environmental differences. For bank-specific characteristics, ownership dummy 
variable (OWN) with 1 denotes for dominant foreign ownership, and banks size (SIZE) 
which is measured by the natural logarithm o f bank total assets are included. Instead 
of including country dummy variables, I use two variables that could be considered as 
indicators o f general country-specific economic conditions to capture the 
cross-country heterogeneity, i.e. the GDP growth rate (AGDP) and real GDP per 
capita (GDPP) measured in PPP adjusted international dollar (US dollar). The former 
measures the economic improving speed and the latter represents the general wealth 
status and income level o f each country. The degree o f market concentration is also 
controlled by including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HH1)42 o f each country in 
each period43. The inefficiency determinants model and the (in)efficiency scores (EFF) 
are specified as follows,
42 A commonly accepted measure o f market concentration, which is named after economists Orris C. 
Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman. For more discussion see section 7 in Chapter 5.
43 For more discussion on environmental variables, see Section 4 of this chapter.
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juit = S 0 + S l *OWNit + S 2 * SIZEit + S3 * A GDPit + S 4 *GDPPit + S 5 *HHIit + e it
(3.4)
EFFU = exp(//„); EFF„ > 1
For interpretational convenience, the conventional Farrell (1957)’s definition o f  
efficiency is used, which is merely the inverse o f Shephard (1970)’s efficiency 
(inefficiency) measure, in cross-country efficiency comparison. Thus an efficiency 
measure is defined as p lt, that is, p it = 1 / EFFit and 0 < p it < 1 .
3.2. Convergence models of bank efficiency
3.2.1 Convergence at country-level
In the growth convergence literature, p-convergence exists when the economy of  
low-income countries grows faster that o f high-income countries, in other words, the 
low-income countries are catching up with the high-income countries. It also 
distinguishes between unconditional p-convergence and conditional /3-convergence, 
where the former relates to convergence to a common point or common steady-state 
and the latter relates to different points or steady-states. An alternative concept is 
o-convergence, which relates to the dispersion o f interested measures across groups of  
economies and is achieved when the dispersion narrows over time. The two concepts 
o f convergence are related but they are conceptually different: o-convergence studies 
how the distribution o f income evolves over time whereas p-convergence studies the
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mobility o f income within the same distribution. “p-convergence is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for a-convergence” (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
In this chapter, the convergence concepts are applied to bank efficiency and the 
convergence properties are investigated at two levels, namely, the country level and 
individual bank level. Firstly, /?- and a-convergence will be tested at the country level, 
using the (weighted) average cost efficiency level o f each country’s whole banking 
market. This is to investigate whether the aggregate banking market o f each member 
country is converging towards a regional common steady-state level or towards each 
other. The two types o f convergence at country level is a general indication o f that the 
overall efficiency level o f the banking industry in each country are improving and the 
differences between countries’ aggregate bank efficiency level are diminishing over 
time.
Following Weill (2009) and Casu and Girardone (2010), the following equation is 
employed to test unconditional p-convergence at country level:
InPit  ~ InP u -1 = f i  +& c Inp u . t + e ' ,  (3.5)
p jt  is (weighted) average o f cost efficiency scores o f all banks in country j at
time t
Pjj_Y is the p J t in period t-1
<j)c and 0° are parameters to be estimated, and
£ cj t is random error term, and s cj t ~  iid N{0 ,<j 2c)
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Similar with the exposition in Sala-i-Martin (1996), the dependent variable in the 
above equation is approximately the growth rate o f bank efficiency level. If the partial 
correlation between growth rate in efficiency over time and its initial efficiency level 
is negative, then there is /?-convergence, therefore a negative and significant value for 
the parameter 0° implies unconditional /?-convergence at country-level. The larger 
the absolute value o f the coefficient, the greater the tendency o f convergence. If 
p-convergence exists, intuitively, this implies that the bank efficiency level o f  
countries with low initial bank cost efficiency were improving faster than those with 
high initial efficiency scores, while all countries are improving their efficiency 
towards the best practice level.
The other type o f convergence, which is also o f great economic interest, is 
o-convergence. When the dispersion o f efficiency scores across countries falls over 
time, there is o-convergence. To test whether o-convergence exists across ASEAN 
countries during the last two decades, a simple equation regressing the standard 
deviation across countries in each year on a time trend variable is employed.
<rct = a c + tjcT + £,c (3.6)
<r,c is standard deviation o f (weighted) average efficiency level across
countries in time t,
T is a time trend variable with 1994= 1. 
a c and r f  are parameters to be estimated.
£,c is random error, and £,c ~  iid N (0, cr*c)
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A negative value for the parameter tjc implies a-convergence, which indicates 
the dispersion in banking average cost efficiency across countries is narrowing over 
time. To be consistent with the reported efficiency scores, here variances/standard 
deviations around weighted average, which better presents the actual aggregated 
efficiency level, across countries are used44.
3.2.2 Convergence at bank-level
Convergence properties at country level provide a general picture o f banking 
development in this region, indicating if each country’s banking market as a whole is 
converging towards one another. But using country-level data may neglect some o f  
the important features regarding individual banks. Especially, when the weighted 
average o f the efficiency level is used in convergence analysis, the relevance o f small 
banks is mitigated. It is possible that the aggregate efficiency level o f banking 
industry o f one country is improving/regressing over time, while individual banks 
present different phases o f evolution. Aggregate improvement in either the level o f  
efficiency or the distribution o f efficiency may well conceal problems associated with 
individual banks’ situation. Ignoring these individual bank concerns is dangerous in 
policy making. Therefore, apart from convergence at country-level, the convergence 
properties at bank level may also be important.
By using individual bank as a unit instead o f using each country’s average bank 
efficiency in regression, the sample size can been significantly expanded and made
44 Estimation using variances around arithmetic mean generates similar results.
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sub-period estimations possible, therefore more interesting issues, such as the impact 
of financial integration movements since the 1997 Asian crisis and conditional 
P-convergence, can be investigated. In bank-level convergence estimation, the whole 
sample is also divided into two periods, with the 1997 Asian financial crisis as divide, 
namely 1994-2000 and 2001-2009, and investigate if  the financial crisis, financial 
integration projects and banking reforms thereafter have significantly changed the 
speed o f adjustment in bank efficiency.
The baseline model for bank-level P-convergence is similar with that used in 
country-level convergence tests, except that individual bank’s efficiency scores are 
now used. Similarly, a negative and significant estimated value o f 0 b indicates 
P-convergence across all individual banks in this region over time:
In p ,  -  In p , ,_, =  <j>b +  0b In p„_ , +  s*  (3.7)
p it is cost efficiency score o f bank i at time t
p it_x is cost efficiency score o f bank i at time t-1
<j>b and 6 b are parameters to be estimated, and
s bt is random error, and s bt ~  iid N(0, <7 ^)
Larger sample size also enables the inclusion o f country dummies in the 
regression. Both intercept and slope dummy variables are included to capture the 
cross-country heterogeneity in the steady-state bank efficiency level and their 
convergence tendency. This can also be interpreted as the “conditional 
P-convergence”, testing whether each country is converging to its own steady-state
58
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
level o f efficiency. The testing equation is as follows, where there are i banks, 
/= ! ,..., 1890, belonging to j  countries, j  =1,...,4:
p it and p i t_j have the same meaning as defined earlier 
Dj denotes four country dummy variables excluding Thailand 
<f>bc, Gbc, (pjCmdyj are parameters to be estimated, and 
s bct is random error, and e bct ~ iid N(0, )
Bank-level a-convergence tests the same property with country-level 
a-convergence, but taking individual banks across different countries into account, 
which may encounter greater variation than at country aggregate level. This is simply 
tested by using standard deviations across individual banks’ efficiencies, instead of 
using standard deviations across country (weighted) average efficiencies:
4 4
(3.9)
crb is standard deviation around regional (weighted) average cost efficiency
scores across all individual banks at time t.
T is time trend variable as defined before
a b and i)b are parameters to be estimated, and 
f  * is random error, and <^b ~  iid N (0, cr  ^)
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Again, a negative and significant value for rjb indicates o-convergence across 
individual banks, i.e. the dispersions in cost efficiency at bank level are narrowing 
over time.
3.2.3 Interpretation of convergence
If both types o f convergence are confirmed, then the results could be interpreted 
as an indicator o f general improvement in bank efficiency at country/bank level, as 
the banking industries in different countries are all catching up with the common best 
practice banks and the less efficient countries/banks are improving faster. As a result, 
the dispersion in banking efficiency across countries/banks is getting smaller over 
time.
However, as mentioned above, since p-convergence is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for o-convergence, and not vice versa, there is a possibility that 
only one type o f convergence exists while the other does not. Such like the case in 
Casu and Girardone (2010), only o-convergence is significant. They interpret this as 
that the narrowing down dispersion in efficiency among countries is merely a result of 
moving toward the mean rather than moving towards the best practice. In other words, 
the inefficient banks, whose initial efficiency scores were below the average, are 
catching up with the average level; however, those efficient banks, whose initial 
efficiency scores were above the average, are actually regressing towards the average.
On the other hand, there is also a possibility that only p-convergence is 
significant, but o-convergence does not exist. To the best o f my knowledge, this
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situation has not been detected in banking efficiency studies, but does exist in the 
growth literature studies. Young et al. (2008), for example, demonstrated why 
P-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ^--convergence from a 
theoretical point o f view, and also provided empirical evidence from US country-level 
income growth from 1970 to 1998, where o-convergence did not accompany 
p-convergence. They argued that cross sectional variance may increase or decrease, 
depending on the magnitude o f initial variance, not only the adjustment speed towards 
steady-state. When the initial dispersion is relatively small to the variance o f random 
shocks, the dispersion may converge towards steady-state level from below, i.e. 
increasing towards steady-state level. Thus o-convergence may not be detected even if  
P-convergence exists. Intuitively, economies can be p-converging, while “random 
shocks are pushing them apart”45. Similar argument could also be applied to bank 
efficiency convergence analysis.
4. Variables and Data
4.1 Data sources
My data set covers the 5 initial member countries o f ASEAN, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the period 1994-2009, which 
contains two major financial crises in the history (1997-99 Asian financial crisis and 
the current global crisis starting from 2007). The data set is primarily drawn from the 
balance sheet and income statement o f individual bank from the BankScope database 
of Bureau van Dijk, which reports published financial statements from financial
45 Theoretical demonstration of this issue is presented in Appendix A
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institutions worldwide. For those missing data that are not reported in Bankscope, 
other resources are used, including annual reports of individual bank, central bank 
reports and internet web resources. In the sample data set, only commercial banks are 
considered as they are carrying out relatively similar banking business, and comprise 
the largest segment of depository institutions. The unconsolidated financial reports are 
used, where available, to avoid double-counting. Consolidated reports are used 
wherever unconsolidated reports are not available. After adjusting the data for missing 
values, reported errors and outliers, I end up with an unbalanced panel data set of 
1889 bank-year observations, in which a bank exists for at least 5 years with full 
information. Table 3-1 presents the observation numbers by year and country.
Table 3-1 Observation numbers by year and country
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ALL
1994 36 16 20 4 14 90
1995 40 25 21 4 16 106
1996 39 27 22 4 17 109
1997 43 26 26 5 17 117
1998 49 26 27 6 18 126
1999 52 26 28 8 18 132
2000 45 24 27 8 18 122
2001 44 24 23 8 18 117
2002 41 27 26 8 18 120
2003 45 28 26 8 18 125
2004 47 27 25 8 17 124
2005 50 27 25 8 18 128
2006 48 26 24 8 18 124
2007 46 26 21 8 18 119
2008 43 26 22 8 18 117
2009 39 26 22 8 18 113
Total 707 407 385 111 279 1889
It is necessary to mention that in the data collecting process, it has been noticed 
that, surprisingly, only a limited number of bank reports with limited time periods are 
available on Bankscope database for Singapore. According to Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, although there are 120 commercial banks operating in Singapore by March
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of 2011, but only 6 o f them are local banks and only one-fifth (26 out o f 114) of  
foreign banks offer full banking services. Financial reports o f foreign subsidiaries or 
representative offices are not publicly available. However, given that the Singaporean 
banking industry is fairly competitive, surviving banks must represent the general 
level o f efficiency o f the whole industry, otherwise it can be argued that they would 
have been eroded quickly under the competitive pressure. The small sample of 
Singapore is treated as a representative o f the Singaporean banking industry.
4.2 Variables in efficiency estimation and data treatment
Regarding the choices o f the input/output variables, three-input three-output 
specification is chosen broadly following the traditional “intermediation approach” 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977), in which the input o f funds and their interest cost is 
included in the analysis, since funds are the main “raw material” which is transformed 
in the intermediation process (e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1991). The three typical 
input variables under the intermediation approach are the Number o f  Employees 
(LAB), Fixed Assets (FA) and Total Deposits (TD=customer and interbank deposits + 
other deposits and short-term borrowings). The outputs are, Loans (total customer 
loans + total other lending), Other Earning Assets (OEA= interbank assets + 
securities), and Other Operating Income (OOY=net gain on trading and derivatives + 
net fees and commissions +other non-interest income). The first two variables are 
typical output variables used in many bank efficiency studies. The OOY variable is 
selected to proxy the non-traditional business activities o f banks. Over recent years, 
non-traditional banking activities, such as securitization, derivative securities, standby 
letters o f credit and many other off-balance sheet (OBS) fee-based services become
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more and more popular. Therefore, the importance o f fee-income and other 
non-interest income relative to the traditional interest income has increased 
dramatically46. As pointed out in Siems and Clark (1997) and Rogers (1998) among 
others, ignoring non-traditional activities in estimating efficiency produces misleading 
results, as the relevant outputs are not accommodated while the resources used to 
produce those activities were included. All the data were initially measured in its own 
country’s currency and in nominal terms, in order to ensure the validity o f  
cross-country and over-time comparison, the data is adjusted by Purchasing Power 
Parity exchange rate and is converted into a common currency (US dollar)47 .
Calculating input prices are crucial for estimating bank cost efficiency. The 
price o f labour ( p x) is calculated as the ratio o f personnel expenses divided by the 
number o f employees. Where data on either personnel expenses or employees are not 
reported, the calculation o f the price o f labour relies on some reasonable and 
acceptable working assumptions. I follow what is standard in the literature and 
assume that the growth rate o f the number o f employees is the same as the growth rate 
of total assets (in real terms) for a given bank, and the ratio of personnel expenses to
AO
operational expenses is the same as the closest available year . The price for total 
deposits ( p 2), is calculated by the ratio o f interest expenses to total deposits. The 
price o f fixed assets (/?3), is measured by the ratio o f operating expenses less
personnel expenses to fixed assets. Here the operating expense can be interpreted as 
capital maintenance49. Table 3-2 provides some general statistics o f the data set at per
46 Clark and Siems (2002)
47 The PPP exchange rates are obtained from the World Economic Outlook Database, International 
Monetary Fund, October 2010
48 See for example Altunbas, et al. (2001) and Vannet, 2002
49 Same interpretation used in Shen et al. (2009).
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country category. In order to be more informative, the values presented in Table 3-2 
are in levels, although natural logarithms o f these variables are used in efficiency 
estimation.
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Table 3-2 Statistical data description for variables used in efficiency estimation 
__________ (1994-2009)_____________________________________________________
MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX S.D
I 636.67 87.86 4.84 14293.79 1433.45
M 924.06 394.67 6.71 24493.37 2600.80
Total Variables Cost (C) P 364.48 200.82 4.64 1886.70 388.78
S 976.31 165.40 8.06 4992.71 1267.01
T 1262.42 796.93 1.27 7868.64 1342.26
ALL 755.49 233.95 1.27 24493.37 1641.93
I 2652.92 600.50 2.45 33257.29 5036.46
M 8403.14 3983.75 0.52 81415.90 12548.02
Total Loan (yd P 2445.59 1213.17 3.76 21000.04 2969.90
S 17044.07 4708.30 104.89 92100.57 22736.32
T 16325.44 8226.37 210.84 67181.00 17012.04
ALL 6714.63 1703.51 0.52 92100.57 12177.95
I 2545.04 325.74 6.45 69070.92 7007.28
M 3161.16 1470.82 19.78 38325.76 4672.13
Other Earning Assets (y2) P 2163.06 1134.21 6.71 13834.23 2635.17
S 15863.76 1309.90 6.23 96596.86 24193.54
T 5385.48 2137.37 11.99 34660.27 7448.73
ALL 3802.09 974.40 6.23 96596.86 8768.82
I 80.63 13.51 0.00 2324.30 197.29
M 140.70 61.17 0.00 1689.68 214.84
Other Operational Income (y3) P 97.71 48.86 0.00 637.95 116.26
S 290.25 45.31 1.20 1704.28 433.28
T 214.37 84.72 0.00 1594.47 296.78
ALL 129.12 34.68 0.00 2324.30 234.19
I 2.99 1.25 0.09 121.50 7.94
M 1.95 1.14 0.24 15.97 2.25
Price of fixed assets (pd P 1.46 0.95 0.15 13.83 1.64
S 3.90 0.97 0.27 36.00 6.15
T 1.22 0.61 0.06 45.50 3.05
ALL 2.25 1.00 0.06 121.50 5.43
I 0.14 0.09 0.00 4.57 0.26
M 0.17 0.03 0.00 9.39 0.98
Price of Deposits (p2) P 0.06 0.05 0.01 4.60 0.23
S 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.01
T 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.04
ALL 0.11 0.05 0.00 9.39 0.50
I 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.37 0.03
M 0.07 0.04 0.01 1.41 0.14
Price of Labour (p3) P 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.01
S 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.06
T 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.01
ALL 0.04 0.03 0.00 1.41 0.07
*Except for No. of employee, other variables are measured in million US$ adjusted by PPP exchange rate. 
2005=100
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4.3 Environmental variables
Following other studies on bank efficiency determinants, e.g. Sufian (2009), 
Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010), the control variable vector zu, used in the
sub-regression (3.2), contains three categories o f environmental variables50 The first 
group are bank-specific characteristics including ownership dummy variable (OWN) 
and banks size (SIZE). Earlier researchers51 found that controlling foreign ownership 
is likely to increase efficiency level o f a bank, especially in developing countries 
where domestic economy and financial market are less sophisticated (Jeon and Miller, 
2003). Explained by Sufian (2009), this is because o f “better risk management and 
operational techniques which is usually made available through their parent banks 
abroad”. Bank size could have either positive or negative effect on a bank’s efficiency 
level, depending on whether the bank operates under increasing or decreasing return 
to scale segment o f its cost curve.
The second group o f environmental variables are general macroeconomic 
condition indicators, i.e. the GDP growth rate (AGDP) and real GDP per capita 
(GDPP). These two variables represent two relevant but different concepts. Demand 
for financial services tends to grow as economies expand, but the impact of economic 
expansion on bank cost efficiency is ambiguous. Immoderate lending in economic 
boom may create potential non-performing loan problems which in turn would result 
in high cost o f loan default. On the other hand, economic growth rate o f wealthier 
countries may be lower, but with a relative sophisticated financial system, banks are
50 Other variables were included, such as measure of banks risk; measure of bank profitability, but 
were statistically insignificant.
51 For example, by Isik and Hassan (2003) on Turkish banks, Hasan and Marton (2003) on Hungarian 
banks, and Sathye (2003) on Indian banks.
67
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
likely to operate more efficiently than those in fast-growing but unstable economic 
environment.
The last variable included in estimation is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
base on the total deposits o f sample banks, which captures the specific characteristics 
of banking industry o f each country. This variable is frequently used in banks 
efficiency studies52. Again, its effect on bank efficiency can either be positive, if  
higher concentration is a result o f more efficient production; or negative, if  higher 
market power leads to less competition. Table 3-3 summaries these environmental 
variables by country category.
52 For example, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000); Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010).
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Table 3-3 Environmental variables by country category (1994-2009)
COUNTRY MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX S.D
Indonesia 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49
Ownership Malaysia 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
(1 denotes >50% foreign ownership; Philippines 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34
0 otherwise) Singapore 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47
Thailand 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46
ALL 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
Indonesia 7.31 6.96 4.35 11.42 1.63
Size Malaysia 8.73 8.77 5.67 11.81 1.38
(natural logarithm of bank total assets Philippines 7.90 7.88 3.77 10.45 1.28
measured in million US$) Singapore 8.85 8.65 5.16 12.23 2.20
Thailand 9.37 9.51 5.95 11.55 1.32
ALL 8.13 8.13 3.77 12.23 1.70
Indonesia 3.95 4.92 -13.13 8.22 4.98
Annp Malaysia 5.11 5.85 -7.36 10.00 4.41uUr
(annual % change) Philippines 5.21 5.19 -0.58 12.41 2.67V O  / Singapore 5.43 7.65 -2.39 11.40 4.28
Thailand 3.46 4.75 -10.51 9.24 4.73
ALL 4.47 5.33 -13.13 12.41 4.44
Indonesia 2.87 2.67 2.08 4.15 0.63
GDP per capita Malaysia 10.25 9.58 6.90 14.15 2.21
(measured in Thousand US$, adjusted Philippines 2.58 2.36 1.88 3.52 0.52
by PPP exchange rate) Singapore 38.08 36.62 24.72 51.25 8.79
Thailand 5.94 5.46 4.23 8.24 1.34
ALL 6.92 3.52 1.88 51.25 8.70
Indonesia 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.02
Malaysia 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.01
HHI Philippines 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.01
Singapore 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.02
Thailand 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.01
ALL 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.37 0.05
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5. Empirical Results
5.1 S to ch a stic  F ron tier  A pproach (SFA) an d  b an k  c o st e ffic ien cy
5.1.1 Estimation results of SFA cost function
Equation (3.3) and (3.4), which define the Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model, 
are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood using Frontier in R53, which is 
an extension package of FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) for R. The estimation results 
of the cost function and inefficiency model are given in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4 SFA cost function and inefficiency model estimation results
Variables Parameter Estimate Z-value
Cost function
Intercept A 0.9383 (12.60)***
lny, A 0.5361 (48.64)***
lny2 A 0.4793 (42.80)***
lny? A 0.0131 (3.03)***
ln(Pi/p3) X x 0.0145 (1.31)
ln(p2/p3) X  2 0.8566 (84.04)***
Inefficiency model
Intercept A 431.4906 (2.64)***
Own A -69.7131 (-3.50)***
Size A -45.8782 (-2.56)**
AGDP A -2.0117 (-1.98)**
GDP per Capita A 15.9235 (2.71)***
HHI A -30.2203 (-2.70)***
sigmaSq. a 1 27.1306 (2.75)***
Gamma r 0.9929 (380.54)***
Log likelihood value: -1273.16
*” "and ’ denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly
53 R is 'GNU S’, a freely available language and environment for statistical computing and graphics.
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Since the variables used in the cost function are expressed in log forms, the 
estimates o f coefficients can be interpreted as output elasticities or input price 
elasticities o f total cost. Estimation o f the cost function clearly shows that all three 
outputs have positive and significant effects on a bank’s total cost, indicating that total 
variable cost increases with expansion in production and emphasising on the 
importance o f both traditional and non-traditional banking activities. The sum of the 
three output elasticities is 1.0285, which implies that if  the production is expanded 
systematically by 1%, the total cost o f production would increase by a little higher 
than 1%. The aggregate production o f banking industry in the ASEAN countries 
could be characterised as constant return to scale to diseconomy o f scale. Further 
expansion o f the banking market would lead to more than proportionally increase in 
costs.
However, compared with loans (yi) and other earning assets (y2), bank cost is less 
sensitive to non-traditional business (y3), evidenced by a much lower elasticity level, 
1.3% for the third output comparing with roughly 50% for the other two outputs. This 
may explain partly why banks are increasingly engage in non-traditional banking 
activities, as diversification in business increases bank’s revenue without increasing 
much o f the cost at the same time. Increases in input prices will all increase bank’s 
total cost, but to different extents. Given the restriction o f homogeneity o f degree one 
in input prices imposed in the cost function54, the main contributor to total cost is 
interest expenses on deposits and other short-term funding (P2), which has the highest
54 Which indicates Xi + z2+Xi -^  where x 3 is elasticity for price of labour, which is not shown 
explicitly in the estimation results.
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elasticity level o f 85.66%. Fixed assets cost (Pi) and labour cost (P3) together only 
contribute less than 15% to the total variation in total cost.
The estimated value o f y parameter, which measures the significance o f bank 
specific inefficiency effect in the cost function, is nearly 1 and statistically significant 
at 1% significance level, therefore, the SFA model specification on bank-specific 
inefficiency is necessary. With regard to the characteristics o f inefficiency, only those 
variables which are significant (at most 10% level) are kept in the final regression55. 
Banks with dominant foreign ownership tend to have lower inefficiency level than 
their domestically owned counterparts. Given that most o f the countries in ASEAN 
are developing countries, this result is consistent with those have been typically found 
in banking efficiency studies on developing countries, e.g. Isik and Hassan (2003) on 
Turkish banks, Sathye (2003) on Indian banks and Sufian (2009) on Malaysian banks. 
Home field advantage o f developing countries with relatively unsophisticated 
financial markets is easily overcome by foreign banks from developed counties, 
because o f their advantages in risk management and operational techniques. Another 
bank-specific variable included in the regression is bank size, measured by the natural 
logarithm o f total bank assets. The negative and significant coefficient o f bank size 
indicates that, on average, larger banks are more efficient than smaller banks. This is 
mainly due to the economies o f scale. Along with the negative coefficient on HHI 
market concentration ratio, this also could be related to market power argument, 
larger banks pay less for inputs but charge more for financial products, resulting in
55 Other variables, such as cost to income ratio, net interest margin, ratio of non-interest income to 
total income measuring degree of business diversification and state-own bank dummy variables, were 
included, but were found not statistically significant.
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higher cost efficiency, and thus banks operating in highly concentrated markets are 
tend to be more cost efficient on average.
As mentioned earlier in Section 4, the two macroeconomic condition variables, 
GDP growth rate and real GDP per capita, represent two relevant but different 
concepts and could influence bank efficiency level in either way. Based on the 
estimation results for ASEAN countries, the two variables are both significant but 
with opposite signs, implying that economic expansion (higher growth rate) with 
higher demand for credit and banking services increases the bank efficiency level, but 
banks in wealthier economies are less efficient. At a first glance this is in 
contradiction with the widely accepted fact that banks o f developed countries are 
more efficient, but if  one look into the sample data and relate these findings to the 
later efficiency results, it is interesting to notice that Singapore has both the highest 
average GDP growth rate and the highest average real GDP per capita, and it also has 
the highest average cost efficiency level over the other countries. On the other hand, 
one may also notice that Indonesia has the second lowest average growth rate and the 
second lowest real per capita GDP, but its average bank cost efficiency over the 
whole period is the second highest among selected countries. Therefore, it seems that 
it is the joint effect o f these two factors that mattered to the efficiency level rather 
than individual effect o f each factor. When the effect o f one factor dominates that of 
the other, bank efficiency may move in line with the dominating factor. However, the 
dominating factor may be different in different countries.
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5.1.2 Bank cost efficiency estimates
The significance o f bank size and market concentration ratio in bank efficiency 
determinants raises the necessary consideration o f individual banks’ size effect on 
market overall efficiency level. Arithmetic mean o f bank cost efficiency may 
under-evaluate the importance o f larger banks and over-estimate the contribution of 
smaller banks to the overall efficiency level, therefore, the weighted average o f bank 
cost efficiency is used for comparison purpose rather than the arithmetic mean. The 
yearly average efficiency o f each country is weighted by individual banks’ total assets, 
and the cross countries average efficiency level is weighted by country GDP based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation. Table 3-5 provides these results o f yearly 
weighted average o f individual country and o f the whole region, and a graphic 
presentation is given in Figure 3-2.
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Table 3-5 Yearly (weighted) average efficiency of each country
Year Indonesia M alaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand W eighted Average
1994 0.9286 0.8845 0.8728 0.9591 0.7561 0.8749
1995 0.9288 0.9059 0.8799 0.9579 0.9282 0.9219
1996 0.9383 0.8817 0.8791 0.9621 0.9188 0.9201
1997 0.9297 0.8803 0.8725 0.9602 0.9163 0.9148
1998 0.8949 0.8743 0.8629 0.9647 0.9208 0.9001
1999 0.9350 0.8801 0.8874 0.9631 0.9232 0.9200
2000 0.9378 0.8839 0.8892 0.9598 0.9250 0.9219
2001 0.9389 0.8755 0.8962 0.9567 0.9205 0.9207
2002 0.9368 0.8514 0.8661 0.9506 0.9241 0.9123
2003 0.9259 0.8387 0.8738 0.9459 0.9233 0.9065
2004 0.9169 0.8447 0.8645 0.9435 0.9155 0.9008
2005 0.9070 0.8530 0.8770 0.9376 0.9034 0.8967
2006 0.9047 0.8691 0.8764 0.9324 0.9117 0.8998
2007 0.9030 0.8614 0.8935 0.9159 0.9074 0.8975
2008 0.9061 0.8544 0.8991 0.9141 0.9046 0.8974
2009 0.9132 0.8592 0.8933 0.9119 0.8989 0.8989
Average 0.9216 0.8686 0.8802 0.9460 0.9061 0.9065
Figure 3-2 Weighted average bank cost efficiency
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Relative to the common-frontier across all countries for the sample period, 
average bank cost efficiency o f the whole region is around 90%. A mild decease in 
efficiency happened around the 1997 Asian crisis and a relatively larger decline since 
2003 when many o f the ASEAN countries began a reprivatisation process which is 
part o f the banking structural reforms, since many weak banks have been nationalised 
during the period o f crisis. Many theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
support that the incoming o f new private ownership, especially foreign ownership, 
have positive impacts on bank’s efficiency. However, it is probably that the change is 
gradual until the new culture and system are properly in place (Ariff and Can, 2008; 
Besar and Milne, 2009). The short period increase in cost might be explained by the 
increases o f bank’s investment in the newly acquired plants. Unfortunately, the most 
recent global financial crisis reached around 2006, before the benefits o f banking 
structural reforms are actually realized. Similar patterns o f efficiency evolution can be 
found in all individual country cases, which imply most o f the ASEAN countries have 
been experiencing roughly similar changes in economic environments and banking 
industry.
For individual countries, Singaporean banks largely define the cost frontier, 
presenting the highest weighted average efficiency in almost all years but one. Its 
average efficiency level over the whole period is nearly 8% higher than the regional 
lowest level from Malaysia (94.6% vs. 86.86%). Indonesia and Thailand are sitting in 
the next tier, with efficiency scores just along or above the regional average level (the 
dotted line in Figure 3-2). Philippines and Malaysia are the two countries with 
relatively inefficient banking market comparing with other countries in this region, 
and their efficiency levels are roughly 2~4% lower than the regional average level.
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Country differentials in terms o f average bank cost efficiency level raises the worry 
about currency union’s feasibility. Clearly, Singaporean banking industry has better 
management quality over other member countries by various degrees.
Individual banks’ efficiency situation may add more information to the analysis. 
Take the average efficiency score o f the most recent 5 years (2005-2009) for each 
individual bank, and rank them accordingly. Table 3-6 provides a summary o f the 
results. The dispersion in bank cost efficiency are much greater at bank-level, the 
lowest efficiency score during the 5 years is only 34.33% from a Malaysian bank, 
whereas the highest level is 93.17% from a Singaporean bank. This is saying that the 
total cost o f the best bank in the region is only one third o f that o f the worst bank for 
the same production level. If this comparison between the best and the worst bank is 
only an extreme case, then the substantial difference between the weighted average of 
top 30 banks and bottom 30 banks should be general enough to illustrate the point. 
The average efficiency o f top 30 banks is 91.67%, which is nearly 15% higher than 
that o f the bottom 30 banks during the most recent 5 year. Regarding the number of  
banks in each category, it is worth to mention that none o f the 25 Malaysian banks are 
in the top 30 category and more than half o f them are in the bottom 30. Clearly, these 
significant differences in average bank cost efficiency are not favourable for banking 
market integration.
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Table 3-6 Bank level efficiency summary for 2005-2009
Average Efficiency No. o f Banks
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Total
TOP 30 0.9167 17 0 2 3 8 30
BOTTOM 30 0.7717 10 13 4 2 1 30
ALL 0.8957 46 25 22 8 18 119
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5.2 Convergence of bank cost efficiency
Estimation results on bank cost efficiency level seem not supportive enough for a 
high degree o f banking market integration, but as discussed earlier, the speed of  
adjustment o f banks may also be o f great interest. If low efficiency banks are catching 
up with high efficiency banks and the dispersions in bank efficiency are narrowing 
over time, the integration process is still effective. Convergence analysis in economic 
growth literature has been long recognised as a useful tool in assessing the economic 
integration. These convergence concepts are applied to bank efficiency analysis, 
seeking for evidence o f catching up behaviours between banks and narrowing down 
dispersions over time. Convergence tests are carried out at two different levels, 
namely at country-level and at bank-level. The former consider each country’s 
banking market as a whole and assessing the convergence properties o f country 
weighted average efficiencies, while the later weights individual banks equally 
regardless o f bank size and their origin country.
5.2.1 Country-level convergence properties
Firstly the country-level analysis is conducted to examine whether the banking 
industry o f each country as a whole are converging towards one another. Equation
(3.5) and (3.6) are estimated, using country weighted average bank cost efficiency 
scores reported in Table 3-5. Since the country weighted average efficiency is a 
reasonable indicator o f overall efficiency level o f one country at one point o f time, 
convergence properties based on the country average will provide a general picture 
about whether countries are converging towards the common steady-state efficiency
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level or towards each other as a whole, without taking individual bank performance 
into account. Equation (3.5), which models unconditional /?-convergence, is estimated 
by fixed effect panel estimation56, and equation (3.6) modelling o-convergence is 
fitted by OLS. Table 3-7 reports the testing results at country-level.
Convergence testing at country-level delivers positive news, as both types of 
convergence are confirmed by negative and significant coefficient estimates on 
right-hand side variable in both equations. /?-convergence indicates that efficiency 
level o f low efficiency countries are improving faster than that o f high efficiency 
countries. More specifically, within this region, countries with low banking industry 
average efficiency, like Malaysia and Philippines, are catching up with high banking 
efficiency country, like Singapore. They are improving their relative positions 
towards the best-practice frontier which are largely defined by Singaporean banks due 
to superior production technology or management quality. The intercept term in the 
regression can be used to calculate equilibrium regional average efficiency level when 
the growth rate o f efficiency on the left-hand side o f equation (3.5) is 0. The 
equilibrium regional average efficiency level is 90.58%57 in this case. Evidence for 
a-convergence proves that the distribution o f efficiency also improves overtime, as 
the standard deviation58 across country weighted average is declining over time, 
which implies the country differential in terms o f bank efficiency are diminishing, and
56 Model selection of all panel estimations in this thesis is based on results of F-test for fixed effect 
model against OLS, Hausman specification test for fixed effect model against random effect model, 
and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS. These three tests 
have been done sequentially for every panel estimation. The model selection test statistics are also 
reported along with the results of the test-accepted models.
57 Calculated as exp(0.0795/-0.8042)=0.9058
58 Here the standard deviation around weighted average o f country weighted average efficiency across 
countries is used.
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the general efficiency level o f banking market o f each country are getting closer 
towards one another.
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Table 3-7 country level convergence results for 1994-2009
Coefficient T-statistic
Unconditional B-convereence (FE)
Intercept -0.0795 (-1 1 .1 0 )-
1 -0.8042 (-1 1 .6 7 )-
Steady-state efficiency 0.9058
No. o f obs. 75
F-test F(4,69)=20.79***
Hausman test chi2(l)=333.52***
B-P test 333.52***
overall RA2 0.2881
o-convergence (OLS)
Intercept 0.0449 (8.61)***
T -0.0015 (-2.78)**
No. o f obs. 16
Adi RA2 0.3098
‘F-test’ — the F-test for fixed effect model against OLS,
‘Hausman test’ — the Hausman specification test for fixed effect model against random effect model. 
‘B-P test’ -  the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS.
82
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
5.2.2 Bank-level convergence properties
The supportive evidence provided by country-level convergence properties 
should not be overvalued in assessing the actual degree o f banking market integration, 
because all it proves is that each country’s banking market as a whole are converging 
over time. The analysis itself and the inference drawn from it are both limited, as it 
only explains the general situation o f each country without considering individual 
bank issues, and also limited number o f observations does not enable in-depth 
analysis in changing behaviour o f convergence over time and from different countries. 
As discussed earlier in section 3.2, ignoring problems associated with individual 
bank’s situation is dangerous in policy making. The bank-level convergence analysis 
discussed below may fix this danger by providing more detailed information on 
converging behaviours o f individual banks.
The larger sample size obtained by using individual bank as unit in estimation 
enable us to do sub-sample estimations and investigate whether the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the regional integration projects and banking structural reforms 
thereafter have changed the convergence properties in bank efficiency. The 16 years 
of sample are divided into two sub-periods: pre-crisis (including crisis) period 
1994-2000 and post-crisis period 2001-2009. For both unconditional and conditional 
/3-convergence, and bank-level o-convergence, the test is firstly conducted for the 
whole sample period and obtains average convergence coefficients. Then test for two 
sub-periods, and conduct a Wald coefficient test to see if  the convergence tendency 
significantly changed from the first period to the second period. If the change is 
significant, the question asked is whether the reforms after financial crisis have
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improved or hampered the converging process? Table 3-8 summarized the bank-level 
unconditional p-convergence testing results, which are obtained by estimating 
equation (3.7). Table 3-9 and Table 3-10 report the testing results on bank-level 
conditional (country-specific) p-convergence results by estimating equation (3.8), and 
bank-level o-convergence results are stored in Table 3-11.
5.2.2.1 Bank-level p-convergence
Using individual bank cost efficiency scores, strong evidence for unconditional 
P-convergence still can be found for the whole sample period and for the two 
sub-periods separately, as coefficients on the lagged efficiency are all negative and 
significant. Over the whole period, in general, low efficiency banks are catching up 
with high efficiency banks. But comparing with the results reported in Table 3-7, 
which are obtained by estimation using country weighted average cost efficiency, the 
convergence tendency is much smaller this time and also the steady-state efficiency 
level is lower. Given that larger banks are more efficient, this may emphases the 
anxiety about individual bank variations which was raised before, since when all 
banks are equally weighted regardless o f bank sizes, either efficiency level or 
convergence tendency becomes more or less worse. Comparing the two sub-periods, 
the time evolution o f average steady-state efficiency level is consistent with what has 
been found in analysis o f efficiency estimates earlier in Section 5.1.2, Table 3-5 and 
Figure 3-2. This decline in average efficiency level could be explained by the 
short-term high investment cost in re-privatised banks and the current economic 
environment.
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Table 3-8 Bank-level unconditional p-convergence testing results (Fixed effect)
1994-2009 1994-2000 2001-2009
Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats
Intercept
In/Vi
Wald test
-0.0561 (-12.73)’" 
-0.3230 (-14.48)"’
-0.1056 (-21.1)’" 
-0.8554 (-22.16)’’’
-0.0831 (-12.57)’" 
-0.4092 (-13.99)"’ 
F(l,919)=232.9l’"
Steady-state efficiency 0.8406 0.8839 0.8162
No. o f obs. 1718 660 1058
F-test
Hausman test 
B-P test
F(149,1567)=3.12*" 
ch i2(l)= l 19.85’" 
chi2(l)=7.68’’’
F(133,525)=3.54*"
ch i2 (l)= 333 .6 f"
chi2(l)=0.84
F(137,919)=3.27*" 
chi2( 1 )= 133.51 ’”  
chi2(l)=7.64*"
overall RA2 ***** . * - __ 0.0171 0.1632 0.0163
‘F-test’ — the F-test for fixed effect model against OLS,
‘Hausman test’ — the Hausman specification test for fixed effect model against random effect model. 
‘B-P test’ -- the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS.
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Since the 1997 Asian crisis is a common major economic affair affecting all 
countries in ASEAN, government intervention and banking structural reforms were 
carried out in all countries to various degrees. If those reforms are effective and 
successful, banking industries should be strengthened since weak and insolvent banks 
were eliminated and healthy banks are enlarged in size through mergers and 
acquisitions. Therefore, despite the level o f bank efficiency, which may be affected by 
other general economic issues, the converging tendency should be somehow improved 
as those banks that survived in the crisis should be reasonably considered to be more 
effective in adopting new technology and improving efficiencies. However, 
apparently this is not the case according to my findings, which clearly show that the 
convergence process has been slowed down after the 1997 Asia crisis. As shown in 
Table 3-8, the convergence tendency coefficient o f post-crisis period is only less than 
half o f that for pre-crisis period (-0.41 vs.-0.86), and the result o f Wald coefficient test 
also confirms that this change in convergence tendency is significant at 1% 
significance level. Banking reforms after 1997 Asian crisis seems not effective from 
this point o f view.
A larger sample size not only enables cross-time comparison on bank efficiency 
converging behaviour, but also enables the cross-country comparisons. The 
conditional P-convergence by introducing country dummy variables, modelled by 
equation (3.8), now could be tested to investigate the cross-country differences in 
convergence behaviour. The results are summarised in Table 3-9. In this test, both 
intercept dummy variables, to capture the difference in steady-state efficiency level, 
and slope dummy variables, to capture differences in convergence speed are included, 
therefore, it is essentially separate convergence estimations o f each country towards
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its own steady-state. The individual country-specific convergence tendency parameter 
could be obtained by taking the sum o f coefficients on lagged cost efficiency and 
countries’ slope dummy variable, and country-specific steady-state efficiency level 
could be calculated using the sum of intercept and coefficient on this country’s 
intercept dummy variable. In order to make the analysis more intuitionistic, discussion 
will be based on Table 3-10, which reported all calculated country-specific 
convergence tendency and steady-state efficiency levels.
Country-specific steady-state cost efficiency levels in Table 3-10 exhibit similar 
patterns as what has been found before. In steady-state, the Singaporean banking 
market is still the most efficient one, and Malaysia still has the least efficient banking 
market in all periods. For most o f the countries, efficiency level in post-crisis period is 
lower than that in the pre-crisis period due to the tightened regulatory forces and 
short-term high investment cost in reprivatisation, except for Philippines and 
Singapore. Country-specific convergence properties are slightly complicated this time. 
First o f all, the average convergence tendencies are substantially different from 
country to country in all periods. More interestingly, it has been noticed that, there are 
two countries actually have a diverging banking market in the post-crisis period, i.e. 
Philippines and Singapore, who have positive and significant convergence 
coefficients. Balanced by a significant but relatively small convergence tendency in 
pre-crisis period, the average convergence tendency for Philippines is 0.0862, which 
is not significantly different from 0. Given that Philippines has been classified into 
low bank efficiency countries, this result indicates that within the Philippine banking 
market, low efficiency banks are not really catching up with high efficiency banks
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through the whole period, and the banking reforms has made the situation even worse 
after the 1997 crisis.
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Table 3-9 Bank-level conditional p-convergence testing results (OLS)
1994-200959 1994-2000 2001-2009
Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats Coefficient t-stats
Intercept -0.0716 (-6.99)*** -0.0412 (-3.87)*** -0.0766 (-5.05)***
In/Vi -0.6597 (-9.72)*** -0.4003 (-3.86)*** -0.6746 (-7.78)***
I 0.0402 (3.00)*** 0.0033 (0.29) 0.0430 (2.12)**
M 0.0449 (3.69)*** 0.0246 (1.71)* 0.0424 (2.30)**
P 0.0847 (5.13)*** 0.0004 (0.03) 0.1065 (4.36)***
S 0.0708 (4.44)*** 0.0109 (0.46) 0.0681 (2.84)***
/xln/Vi 0.4015 (4.31)*** 0.0032 (0.03) 0.4397 (3.48)***
A/xln/v, 0.5814 (8.42)*** 0.3215 (2.63)*** 0.5926 (6.72)***
* In P/,,-1 0.7458 (7.99)*** 0.1118 (1.02) 0.9140 (7.14)***
5  x In p , , . x 0.9282 (11.61)*** -0.2809 (-0.62) 0.9351 (9.16)***
No. o f obs. 1718 660 1058
B-P test ch i2(l) = 3.27* chi2(l) = 0.24 ch i2(l) = 2.60
Adj. RA2L--------T T - . ------------ zz I---- 7 0.101 0.2331 0.1045
" and ' denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly 
‘B-P test’ — the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS.
59 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS only marginally reject OLS at 10% significance level, in order to be consistent with 
estimations for other periods, we report OLS estimates.
89
Table 3-10 Bank-level conditional p-convergence -- Country-specific results
___________________________ 1994-2009________________________ 1994-2000_______________________ 2001-2009
Country Coefficient F-stats Coefficient F-stats Coefficient F-stats
I I n / V i + Z x l n / v ,  
Wald test
-0.2582 (16.41)*" -0.3971 (101.92)*** -0.2349 
F(l,1048)=3.13*
(6.56)**
M l n /V i  + M x ln p IJ_l -0.0783 (38.02)*** -0.0788 (1.50) -0.0820 (25.71)***
Convergence Wald test F(l,1048)=0.04
Tendency P l n / V i  + P x n^ Pu-i
Wald test
0.0862 (1.80) -0.2885 (64.77)*** 0.2394 
F(l,1048)=31.40***
(6.46)**
S l n / V i + S *  In P ,M
Wald test
0.2685 (40.46)*** -0.6812 (2.35) 0.2605 
F( 1,1048)=304.84***
(23.33)***
T In P i .,-1 
Wald test
-0.6597 (-9.72)*** -0.4003 (-3.86)*** -0.6746 
F(l,1048)=10.00***
(-7.78)***
I 0.8855 0.9090 0.8667
Steady-state
M 0.7111 0.8100 0.6590
P 0.8589 0.8681 0.8826
Efficiency
S 1.0000 0.9565 1.0000
T 0.8971 0.9022 0.8927
* * * '  * * ' and * denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly 
I-Indonesia; M-Malaysia; P-the Philippines; S-Singapore; T-Thailand.
90
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency Convergence Properties of Selected ASEAN Countries
The situation in Singapore looks no better than in the Philippines. The only 
negative convergence coefficient appears in pre-crisis period, but not statistically 
significant. The positive and significant coefficient indicates divergence for post-crisis 
period and for the whole sample period. However, Singapore cannot be judged in the 
same way as that is for the Philippines. Most of the best-practice banks are 
Singaporean banks which largely define the efficiency frontier for the whole region. 
Since they are already on the frontier, the improvement potential for them relative to 
the frontier is very limited. The converging process maybe happened well before the 
sample period, and banking market in Singapore is already in a relative steady-state 
with a constant distribution o f cost efficiency. The only warning massage that should 
be paid attention to is the diverging tendency in recent year, which may imply that, 
without hampering the average efficiency advantages that Singaporean banks have 
over banks in other countries, relatively low efficiency banks are not improving as 
fast as high efficiency banks in Singapore.
The situations in the other three countries are somehow similar in the sense that 
convergence coefficients are all negative and significant for all periods, indicating the 
convergence process is happening throughout. For Indonesia, the convergence process 
slowed down a little in the post-crisis period, but the change is only marginally 
significant at 10% significance level. Convergence tendency for Malaysia in the two 
sub-periods are roughly the same without significant changes. The only improvement 
in terms o f bank efficiency convergence appears in Thailand with a stronger 
convergence tendency after the banking reforms, evidenced by a coefficient that is 
negative and significantly larger in absolute value in the post-crisis period. 
Country-specific bank-level p-convergence provides very mixed results, and the
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convergence behaviours o f different countries are very much different. Taking the 
individual banks’ performance into account, one can clearly see that there is still a 
certain level o f heterogeneity existing across countries, and the degree of banking 
market integration is still relatively low from this perspective.
S.2.2.2 Bank-level o-convergence
In section 5.2.1, evidence for o-convergence has been found at country level, 
which says that the dispersion between countries’ average bank efficiency are 
narrowing over the sample period. However, distinguishing to the individual bank 
level produces completely different results. In bank-level o-convergence test, the 
dispersion measure o f individual banks’ efficiencies is regressed on a time trend 
variable, and the dispersion is measured in three different ways. In the first scenario, I 
measure the dispersion around annual overall (weighted) average efficiency level o f  
the whole region, for all banks regardless o f their country origins as if  they were 
operating in a common market. Unfortunately, without country separation, only 16 
observations are obtained, the sub-period estimations are not permitted and only a 
simple OLS regression could be done. Results are reported in Table 3-11. Even from 
this simple regression, o-convergence is completely rejected by a positive and 
significant coefficient on the time trend variable. This is already contradicting with 
the o-convergence found at country level, and the enlarging dispersion in efficiencies 
of individual banks is further confirmed by the other two experiments using different 
measurements o f dispersion.
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Table 3-11 a-convergence using regional standard deviation
Coefficient t-stats
Intercept 0.0291 (2.78)**
T 0.0087 (8.05)***
No. of obs. 16
overall RA2—m  . __ . _ . . . . . .  ■ . . . . . .  . — 0.8097
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5 %  and 10% significance level accordingly
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In order to conduct the test in greater details, two more measures o f dispersion in 
bank efficiency are used. The standard deviations are also calculated in each year by 
country around (1) own country weighted average efficiency, and (2) regional 
weighted average efficiency. In each case, 5 observations are obtained each year over 
16 years, and a balanced panel estimations using random effect have been conducted 
for the whole period and also for the two sub-periods defined earlier. Again, a Wald 
coefficient test is conducted to help identify changes in convergence behaviour 
between two sub-periods. Table 3-12 summarises the results using the two measures 
of dispersion.
By measuring dispersion around own country weighted average efficiency, it 
allows for some degree o f intra-country heterogeneity in average bank efficiency level, 
and test whether banks are o-converging within their own countries. Given what has 
been found earlier that the country weighted average efficiencies are o-converging, 
o-convergence within each country towards its own weighted average may also be 
indicative for cross-country o-convergence in the region but to a lesser extent. The 
last experiment on bank-level o-convergence is a more strict way o f measuring 
dispersion. This time it does not allow for any intra-country heterogeneity, and 
assume that all banks are converging towards a common efficiency level, which they 
should do in a well-integrated banking market. The intuition o f using this 
measurement is basically the same as using standard deviations across all banks 
regardless o f their country o f origin. The purpose o f measuring standard deviations by 
country is merely to increase the sample size and conduct more detailed tests.
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Table 3-12 o-convergence using individual country standard deviation
1994-2009 1994-2000 2001-2009
Coefficient z-values Coefficient z-values Coefficient z-values
o-convergen ce around ow n country w eighted  average
Intercept 0.0063 (0.35) 0.0506 (3.87)*** -0.0483 (-1.04)
T 0.0094 (6.72)*** -0.0018 (-0.82) 0.0140 (4.57)***
Wald test chi2(l)=26.67***
No. of obs. 80 35 45
F-test F(4,74)=4.35*** F(4,29)=4.78*** F(4,39)=12.36***
Hausman test chi2(l)=0.00 chi2(l)=0.00 chi2(l)=0.00
B-P test chi2( 1 )= 11.17*** chi2(l)=9.26*** chi2(l)=45.71***
overall RA2 0.3304 0.0139 0.1911
o -convergen ce around  regional w eigh ted  average
Intercept 0.0179 (0.80)
T 0.0089 (6.85)***
Wald test
0.0499 (3.98) 
0.0009 (0.61)
-0.0279
0.0127
(-0.57) 
(4.1 I f
chi2(l)= 14.51
No. of obs. 
F-test
Hausman test 
B-P test 
overall RA2
80
F(4,74)=10.51*
chi2(l)=0.00
chi2(l)=61.34*
0.2877
35
F(4,29)=12.83* 
chi2(l)=0.00 
chi2( 1 )=3 5.17* 
0.0046
45
F(4,39)=15.82*
chi2(l)=0.00
chi2(l)=58.71*
0.1417
’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly 
‘F-test’ -  the F-test for fixed effect model against OLS,
‘Hausman test’ -  the Hausman specification test for fixed effect model against random effect model. 
‘B-P test’ — the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effect against OLS.
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Unfortunately, no matter what measure is used for dispersion in efficiency at 
bank-level, no evidence can be found for o-convergence in either the whole sample 
period case or in the sub-period cases. The estimated coefficients on time trend 
variables are either positive in most cases or negative but insignificant only in 
pre-crisis period o f experiment (1). Both experiments show that the convergence 
behaviour is not clear in pre-crisis period since the coefficients are insignificant. 
However, in the post-crisis period, bank efficiencies are o-diverging, with a widening 
dispersion, and the change in convergence behaviour is significant according to Wald 
coefficient tests. Once again, this test proves that countries are converging towards 
one another on average does not mean that all individual banks are converging too.
From the perspective o f bank efficiency convergence properties, it seems that the 
degree of banking market integration is still weak. Good news is that bank efficiencies 
of each member country are both p- and o-converging on average, and deeper banking 
integration could be achieved if  strong convergence tendency also exist among 
individual banks. Unfortunately, the test results on bank-level convergence provide 
mixed results, and most o f the results are actually negative due to strong asymmetries 
in terms o f convergence behaviours from country to country.
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6. Conclusions
In this chapter, the effectiveness o f regional financial integration projects and 
national banking structural reforms in the aftermath of 1997 Asian financial crisis was 
assessed from a bank efficiency point o f view, in the hope o f finding evidence of  
convergence in banking market among the 5 core member countries o f ASEAN. The 
bank cost efficiency was estimated by using Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model 
under a common-frontier framework. The advantage o f using this model is that the 
impacts o f environmental variables on bank efficiency could be controlled by 
estimating cost function and bank inefficiency model simultaneously in one 
single-stage estimation, and this is particularly useful to capture cross-country 
heterogeneity when estimating a common-frontier for multiple countries. Bank 
efficiency scores are then used to test for their convergence properties at two different 
levels, namely country-level and bank-level. The concepts o f /?-convergence and 
o-convergence that are borrowed from the growth-convergence literature were applied 
to bank efficiency analysis. Investigating cross-country and within country 
convergence properties o f bank efficiency is interesting, because a banking market 
with catching up behaviour from laggers and improving distribution o f efficiencies, i.e. 
narrowing down dispersion o f efficiency, could be argued as an indicator o f the 
degree o f banking market integration.
Empirical estimations on country-level bank efficiencies and their convergence 
properties provide relatively supportive information. The 5 countries were classified 
into three tiers, with Singapore on the top having the highest average bank efficiency 
level, Indonesia and Thailand in the middle tier, and Philippines and Malaysia on the 
bottom, which are classified as low efficiency counties. Average cost efficiency o f the
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whole region is around 90% for the whole period, and the biggest cross-country 
difference in average efficiency o f 8% appears between Singapore and Malaysia. The 
Cross-country differences in average efficiency may be less worrying, since strong 
evidence is found for both /?- and o-convergence among weighted average efficiencies 
at country-level. Therefore, ASEAN banking market looks like a converging market 
when only focusing on average bank efficiency o f each country.
However, ignoring issues at micro-level can be dangerous in policy-making, but 
taking individual banks into consideration can erode the confidence, which has been 
built up based on country-level analysis results. Despite the substantial difference in 
efficiency levels among individual banks, merely the mixed results o f bank-level 
convergence properties have made the situation more problematic. Conditional 
bank-level /?-convergence show that the sample countries are in very different stages 
of convergence process. Some countries are converging faster than others, and both 
converging and diverging markets exist in the region. Particularly, not as expected, 
banking structural reforms and the regional financial integrations after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis have not provided strong encouraging force for the regional banking 
convergence, and actual speed o f banking market convergence becomes slower after 
the banking reforms in general. Tests o f bank-level o-convergence using various 
measurements o f bank efficiency dispersion provide consistent results, which are also 
negative news. Dispersions o f individual bank efficiencies are actually widening over 
time, indicating that the distribution of bank efficiency is rather getting worse. Neither 
/?-convergence nor o-convergence tests at bank-level support a high degree o f banking 
market integration.
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Chapter 4 Efficiency Convergence Properties of 
Indonesian Banks 1992-2007
1. Introduction
The cross-country efficiency convergence properties o f ASEAN banks have been 
examined in the previous chapter, and it has been found that the degree o f banking 
market integration for ASEAN countries is still relatively low, since the convergence 
tendency in terms o f banking efficiency is not strong. In the previous chapter, I raised 
the question about the importance of individual banks’ performance, and have 
examined bank efficiency convergence properties within each country by simply 
introducing country dummy variables into the convergence tests. Bank efficiency 
convergence within each individual country could be seen as a pre-condition for a 
meaningful cross-country convergence, otherwise integrated market would be 
dominated by only a few large banks. In this chapter, I will conduct a single country 
bank efficiency study on Indonesia in much greater details, and examine its 
convergence properties accordingly. This single country study is only based on 
Indonesia, which is one o f the largest economies o f ASEAN and has the best data 
availability, but the methodology developed for the examination o f bank cost 
efficiency and its convergence properties in this chapter can be easily applied to any 
other country.
Studies o f bank efficiency in the Far East emerging economies have become a 
growing industry in recent years. There are a number o f reasons as to why this may be 
the case. First, since capital and debt markets remain undeveloped and immature, the 
principal process o f financial intermediation remains the banking system. The role o f
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the banking system in propagating shocks to the rest o f the economy is evident in the 
part it played in Indonesia during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and it is claimed that 
a stronger banking system in 2008 cushioned the economy from the 2008 global crisis 
(see Basri and Rhardjaa, 2010).
Secondly, the banking sectors o f developing economies face stronger competition 
due to globalisation o f the financial system. Even with post crisis regulatory changes, 
liberalisation and bank reform will continue in the emerging economies through the 
dismantling o f barriers to entry like equity ownership and to allow a greater number 
of the foreign-owned banks to operate and to compete directly with the 
domestic-owned banks. This creates the imperative to evaluate the position o f the 
domestic banks in term o f their performance and efficiency.
Thirdly, the pass-through o f central bank policy will depend on the competitive 
structure and efficiency o f the banking system. The efficiency and competitiveness of 
the banking system also affect the allocation o f loanable funds to investment 
opportunities and ultimately the growth o f the economy.
A number o f studies o f the efficiency o f the Indonesian banking system have 
emerged in recent years, but hitherto none have posed the questions that are the 
purpose o f this chapter. This chapter examines the evolution o f efficiency in the 
banking system in Indonesia using non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
supplemented with a bootstrap technology to produce bias-corrected estimates that 
have inferential capability. Specifically it poses three questions. First, how sensitive 
are estimates o f bank efficiency to semi-parametric methods o f estimation and
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input/output choices? This question is answered by estimating efficiency using the 
two-stage semi-parametric bootstrap method o f Simar and Wilson (2007) with 
different combination o f bank output variables. Second, has bank efficiency improved 
over the decade and a half to 2007? This question is answered by evaluating the 
convergence properties o f bank efficiency. Third, have the 1997-1999 financial crises 
and the banking reform process hampered or promoted the speed at which banks have 
improved and caught up with the benchmark bank? This question is answered by 
sub-periods estimation and comparisons.
This chapter is organized along the following lines. The next section describes the 
development o f Indonesian banking, highlighting the deregulatory trend o f the 1990s 
and the impact o f the financial crisis o f 1997-98. Section 3 reviews the literature of 
bank efficiency estimation and details the methodology o f two stage semi-parametric 
double bootstrap DEA estimation. Section 4 outlines the methodology o f the growth 
convergence literature and its application to the convergence o f banking efficiency. 
Section 5 describes the model strategies and data. Section 6 details the empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Indonesian Banking System
Like many developing countries, the Indonesian financial sector is dominated by 
commercial banks rather than by bond and equity markets. There are quite a few  
banks (over 200 banks) in Indonesia. One o f the reasons is the entry investment to 
open a bank is quite low, the lowest in South East Asia. Some o f these banks are 
privately owned and are quite new. According to Indonesian banking law, Indonesian
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banking institutions are typically classified into commercial and rural banks. 
Commercial banks differ with rural banks in the sense that the latter do not involve 
directly in payment system and have restricted operational area. In term of operational 
definition, bank in Indonesia are classified into non-Islamic and Islamic-based 
principles commercial banks.
The history o f Indonesian banking industry started when several Dutch banks 
were nationalized after Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1950s. During that 
period government also allowed entities to establish private commercial banks and 
limited number o f foreign banks. From 1950s to 1970s, banks, especially state banks, 
were benefited from economic policies introduced by government to boost Indonesian 
economy. One aspect o f these policies was that the state-owned enterprises were 
required to deposit all their funds in state banks. The government also subsidized state 
bank deposit rates (Margono and Sharma, 2004).
Indonesian banks were heavily regulated until June 1983. The state has played an 
influential role through direct ownership, the market was dominated by state banks, 
with Bank Indonesia alone accounting for 35 percent o f the total assets of the entire 
financial system; other state banks holding another 40 percent (Halim, 2000). The 
central bank set interest rate ceilings on bank credits for individual banks, and 
instructed banks to support the national growth strategies and to finance certain types 
of investment. This “strategic” policy turned out to be one the root causes o f the 
subsequent failure in credit assessment in the banking sector (Halim, 2000). The 
banking market was underdeveloped and played a very minor role in financial 
intermediation, because that the Indonesian economy at that time were characterised
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by the presence o f large, dominant corporate and family-owned corporations, which 
often own their own financial subsidiaries and conduct connected lending through the 
interrelationship between finance and ownership.
The early financial reforms were initiated in early 1980s with the economic 
transition from oil-reliant industry to manufacturing and financial services. The 
financial system was deregulated in two stages. The first stage, which began in 1983, 
was the removal o f  interest rate controls and credit ceilings for all banks, and resulted 
in significant increases in the deposit rate and lending activities. The second package 
in October 1988, also known as Pakto 88, was another cornerstone in the banking 
system. This reform included a major reduction in the reserve requirements o f private 
commercial banks, liberalised the process o f liquidity creation and opened the way for 
joint venture banks. State owned enterprises were allowed to put their funds in private 
banks. The deregulatory policies encouraged the opening o f many new banks, the 
number o f commercial banks jumped from 112 in 1989 to nearly 240 in 1994 
(Margono and Sharma, 2004). As a result, Indonesian banking industry were 
completed by a mixture o f state commercial banks, local government-owned banks, 
private national banks, joint venture banks, branches o f foreign banks, and many 
small rural credit banks. The competition between banks was significantly intensified.
The banking deregulation packages lowered the barrier to new market entrants. 
Since then private banks had started to dominate the market. The deregulation policy 
had been double-edged. In common with many emerging economies, liberalization 
was followed by strong growth in the banking system and with it the growth in 
non-performing loans and fragility typically associated with banking crises (Goldstein
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and Turner, 1996; Halim, 2000). Financial deregulation always stimulates financial 
expansion. Higher interest rates and lower reserve requirements are always 
accompanied by rapid credit expansion; lifting restrictions on bank lending 
encourages borrowing in risky sectors such as property and construction.
Reregulation was undertaken between 1991 and 1995 aimed at increasing capital 
adequacy. In 1991 Bank Indonesia introduced a minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) o f at least 8 per cent, based on the Basle Accord. This minimum was 
scheduled to increase to 9 per cent by 30 September 1997, 10 per cent by September 
1999, and 12 per cent by September 2001. The first banking law was passed in 
October 1992, which set up a formal regulatory framework for Indonesian banking 
industry. New regulations in 1995 raised the minimum equity requirement of banks 
from Rp 50bn to Rp 150bn by 2001. However, these time schedule was not achieved 
due to the economic crisis. By this stage, the government had realised the need to 
limit new entry in banking, and to regulate the “deregulated banks”. The government 
had already perceived potential problems as a result o f the previous speedy 
liberalisation, but policy enforcement was ineffective (Halim, 2000).
The financial crisis o f 1997 revealed some o f the inherent weaknesses in the 
banking system. A contagious process of a currency shock quickly became a banking 
crisis, and soon after, economic crisis. At the end o f 1997, combined with high 
interest rates and a loss of currency value by more than 80%, banking sector was in 
deep trouble (Margono and Sharma, 2004). Under pressure from the IMF, the 
government launched a series o f reforms in the banking sector, including the closure 
of ailing banks, take-over o f troubled but viable banks, and the recapitalisation of
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relatively healthy banks. In November 1997, the licenses o f 16 insolvent banks were 
revoked and the banks were liquidated, and this triggered panic and significantly 
hampered the public confidence in banking sector.
In order to restructure banking sector in Indonesia, the government set up the 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in January 1998, which took over 7 
troubled banks and put other 54 weak banks under its close supervision. By the end of 
1999, 66 out o f 239 banks were closed (Suta and Musa, 2003). Since then, the 
country’s ailing banking sector has been suffering negative spreads and extremely 
high level o f Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), which increased significantly within one 
year from 9 percent in 1997 to almost 60 percent in 1998 (Halim, 2000). The 
Indonesian government introduced the Central Bank Act (Act No.23) o f 1999 and the 
2004 amendment to the Central Bank Act o f 1999, which gave independence to Bank 
Indonesia and reintroduced its status as Tender o f last resort’. Several institutions60 
have also been established to help the two monetary authorities, Ministry o f Finance 
and the central bank (Bank Indonesia), manage the banking structural reforms. For 
Indonesia, the economic contraction was deeper and its recovery process was slower 
than other East Asian countries, like South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, because o f complication from political instability. As argued by (Hill and 
Shiraishi, 2007), the Indonesian economy was not fully recovered at least until 2004.
60 These new institutions include IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency) and AMU (Assets 
Management Unit), which is a part of IBRA.
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As shown in Table 4-1, at the end of June 2007 there were 130 banks61 operating 
in Indonesia with a combined balance sheet of over IDR 1,770 trillion (US$ 190 
billion). This total compares with a figure of 222 banks in existence at end-December 
1997. The shrinkage was largely due to post-crisis liquidation, suspension and merger, 
engineered by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) under agreement 
with the IMF (Hadad et al., 201 la).
Table 4-1 The Structure of the Indonesian Banking Industry at end-June 2007. 
Type o f  Bank________________________________ Number o f  Banks Total Assets (IDR tril.)
State-owned banks 5 641.1
Foreign exchange private national banks 35 691.2
Non-foreign exchange private national banks 36 32.5
Regional government-owned banks 26 165
Joint venture banks 17 78
Foreign banks (branching)____________________________ 11___________________163
Total"   130_________________1770.8
* Data source: Bank Indonesia.
Since 1998, the banking sector has been effectively renationalized and returned to 
the pre-liberalization structure. To further strengthen the banking system, the 
government conducted a re-privatisation program of nationalised banks. Through this 
program, government shares were sold to both domestic and foreign investors. During 
2000 to 2007, there were 15 banks were re-privatized to foreign investors (mostly 
Asian based institutions). The increased foreign presence changed the structure of 
banking system with the share of foreign subsidiary banks rising from 4.5% in 2000 
to 32.8% in 2007 (Besar and Milne, 2009). Apart from the re-privatisation program,
61 This comprised 5 state-owned banks, 35 foreign exchange private national banks, 36 non-foreign 
exchange private national banks, 26 regional government-owned banks, 17 joint venture banks and 11 
foreign banks.
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efforts also have been made towards a more stable banking environment by reducing 
the number o f banks in the country, through a number o f ways, such as requirement 
on minimum Tier I capitalisation, introduction o f ‘single presence policy’ in June 
2006 and the Financial Stability Net in 2007. The Structural Reform Programme has 
produced a stronger and better capitalized banking system in the post-crisis period. 
According to (McCawley, 2009), the present Indonesian banking system is sound, 
capital-adequacy and liquidity indicators have improved over the years, and the 
quality o f loan portfolios has been strengthened.
3. Measuring Efficiency Using Non-parametric DEA 
Approach
3.1 DEA efficiency literature
Compared with the conventional accounting ratios that are used to measure bank
performance, the economic efficiency concepts defined using neoclassical production
theory are more comprehensive measures which take account o f all inputs and outputs
and produce “total factor productivity measures” instead o f “partial productivity
measures”(Cooper et al., 2007). According to Koopmans (1951), producers are
treated as “optimizers”, which are trying to maximise profit subject to input and
output prices, minimise production costs subject to given factor inputs and input
prices, and the efficiency concepts are defined as the ability o f a firm to obtain those
optimising objectives. First empirical implementation o f these concepts was carried
out by Farrell (1957), who further decomposed economic/cost efficiency into
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency and implemented linear programming to
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identify those (in)efficiency measures. Concepts o f technical efficiency and cost 
efficiency can be illustrated by using an isoquant and isocost framework in Figure 
4-1.
F ig u re  4 -lT e c h n ic a I  E ffic iency  a n d  C o st E ffic iency
X l/Y
A
A ”
AO X 2/Y
(Source: Coelli. 2005)
Figure 4-1 shows a constant return to scale (CRS) isoquant YY for firms that 
produce a single output using two inputs XI and X2, and AA is the isocost curve 
given the input prices. The isoquant represents the optimal production level given the 
current production technology and thus is treated as a technical frontier. All firms 
operating along the isoquant are technically efficient, but cost minimisation only 
happens on point Q, which is the tangential point o f isoquant and the lowest isocost. 
Other points except point Q, e.g. point R, on the frontier YY are said to be technically 
efficient but cost inefficient, due to allocative inefficiency which means they do not 
use the optimal factor combination o f inputs that minimises the cost. Points that are to 
the right o f the isoquant, such as point P, are both technically and cost inefficient.
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Take a firm that operates on point P for example, its technical efficiency (TE) is 
measured by the ratio o f optimal input use to the actual input use, which is shown by 
OR/OP in the diagram, and technical inefficiency (TIE) is given by RP/OP. The TIE 
indicates the percentage by which all inputs need to be reduced, without a reduction in 
output, to achieve technically efficient production. The actual cost for firm P is shown 
by A”A* given the input prices and the cost efficiency (CE) is defined by OS/OP, 
which is the ratio o f optimal cost to its actual cost. It follows that the cost inefficiency 
(CIE) is given by SP/OP. Allocative efficiency (AE) is defined by OS/OR, by using 
point P’s projection point on the technical frontier, point R, which is technical 
efficient but using the wrong factor mix. AE is essentially the residual between CE 
and TE, and can be calculated by CE/TE.
These theoretical efficiency concepts assume that the production technology is 
known, which is not the case in practice, and the efficiency frontier cannot be 
identified without a priori information on technology. Researchers then have 
developed various frontier efficiency methodologies to empirically estimate the 
efficient frontier based upon sample data. In the bank efficiency literature, bank 
efficiency is normally measured by either parametric or non-parametric method, 
however there is no consensus on the preferred method for determining the 
best-practice frontier against which relative efficiencies are measured. The parametric 
approach, such as the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), specifies a functional form 
and allows for random errors which follow a symmetric normal distribution while the 
inefficiencies are measured by a truncated distribution.
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However, the parametric approach suffers from the problem o f misspecification 
of the functional form, and possibly inefficiency and multi-collinearity. Usually a 
local approximation such as the Cobb-Douglas or trans-log form is specified, which 
has been argued to provide poor approximations for banking data (see McAllister and 
McManus, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). In theory, parametric estimators offer 
faster convergence and produce consistent estimates, but this would be true only if  
there is no misspecification of the functional form. In contrast, the nonparametric 
model, such as the conventional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which utilises 
linear programming method to construct an “envelope” o f outputs against inputs 
usage, does not require the explicit specification o f the form o f the underlying 
production relationship, but at the cost of slower convergence rates and hence larger 
data requirements. The nonparametric approach also has been criticized for not 
considering errors due to chance, measurement errors, or environmental differences; 
hence all deviations are attributed to the measured inefficiency. The conflict between 
the nonparametric and parametric approaches is important because the two types o f 
methods tend to have different degrees o f dispersion and do not always produce a 
common ranking o f the same financial institutions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
Early bank efficiency studies are mainly on developed economies in the US or 
Europe , but recently more and more attentions have been given to Asian and other 
regions, such as Hong Kong (Drake et al., 2006) and Singapore (Sufian, 2007), and 
especially emerging markets, like India (Ataullah and Le, 2006; Bhattacharyya et a l 
1997), and Malaysia (Sufian, 2009). Studies o f Indonesian banks have been few but 
significant. Using the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), estimates o f cost efficiency,
62 See literature review in Chapter 3.
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scale economies, technological progress and productivity growth o f Indonesian banks 
over the period 1993-2000 have been produced by Margono et a l (2010). They found 
that the average cost efficiency o f all banks was 70% during the whole period, with 
80% and 53% for pre-Asian crisis and post-Asian crisis respectively. Other papers 
Hadad et al. (2008; 2011a, b) used non-parametric, slacks-based DEA with a Simar 
and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrapping methodology to monthly/quarterly supervisory 
data within a relatively short period 2006-2007. They found that the average 
efficiency during the sample period was around 70%. Bank efficiencies are positively 
related to the JCI index o f the Indonesian Stock Exchange, and state-owned banks are
/'o
the most efficient. Using the Malmquist productivity index , technological progress 
was identified as the main driver of productivity growth. Besar and Milne (2009) 
examined the effects o f ownership change during the reprivatisation program after the 
Asian financial crisis using a SFA model over 2000-2007. They found that the 
re-privatisation program had a positive impact on Indonesian bank’s efficiency and 
competition, but the change happens gradually.
3.2 Bootstrap DEA and Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap
In the previous chapter, parametric approach, SFA, is used to evaluate bank cost 
efficiencies for 5 ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. For comparison purpose, the 
cost efficiency o f Indonesian banks will be evaluated by using the alternative method 
in this chapter, i.e. the non-parametric DEA method. The conventional DEA approach 
suffers from a common drawback o f finite sample bias, inconsistency due to slow 
convergence rate, particularly in the case of multiple inputs and outputs, which
63 The Malmquist index was first suggested by Malmquist (1953).
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increased the dimensionality o f the problem. As stated by Kneip, Park and Simar 
(1998), large bias, large variance and very wide confidence intervals may be produced 
when the number o f inputs and outputs is large, unless a very large quantity o f data 
are available. Also, the efficiency measure is very sensitive to outliers and is upward 
biased by construction. The bootstrap provides an attractive alternative to the 
conventional DEA.
The first use o f the bootstrap in frontier models dates to Simar (1992). Its use for 
nonparametric envelopment estimators was developed by Simar and Wilson (1998, 
2000a). The essence o f the bootstrap idea o f Efron (1979, 1982) and Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993) is to approximate the sampling distributions of interested variable 
by simulating, or mimicking, the data generating process (DGP). The bias o f DEA 
estimator can then be estimated and confidence intervals can be constructed by using 
this approximated distribution.
Simar and Wilson (2007) propose a two-stage semi-parametric bootstrap model, 
which is capable o f incorporating the effects o f environmental variables in the 
non-parametric estimation of efficiencies. Simar and Wilson (2007) cite 47 published 
papers that employed a two-stage approach wherein nonparametric, DEA efficiency 
estimates are regressed on a set o f environmental variables in a parametric, 
second-stage analysis. The typical two-stage approaches do not provided a coherent 
description o f a DGP, and the method o f inference is flawed since the DEA efficiency 
estimates are biased estimates and are serially correlated, in a complicated, and 
unknown way.
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In order to deal with the problem described above, Simar and Wilson (2007) 
defined a DGP that provides a rational basis for regressing non-parametric, DEA 
efficiency estimates on some environmental variables in a second-stage analysis. In 
addition, they suggested bootstrap procedures to provide valid inference in the 
second-stage regression, as well as to increase the efficiency o f estimation and correct 
the estimation bias. This chapter adopts Algorithm #2 o f this two-stage 
semi-parametric double bootstrapping method set out by Simar and Wilson (2007) to 
estimate the cost efficiencies of Indonesian banks.
The concepts o f cost efficiency related subjects were introduced by Farrell (1957) 
and Debreu (1951) and developed into implementable DEA form by Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (1985) using linear programming technologies. The efficiency o f a firm 
can be defined and measured as the radial distance of its actual performance from a 
frontier, as described earlier. The first stage is simply a conventional DEA efficiency 
estimation, and the Tone (2002) new cost efficiency DEA model, which allows for 
heterogeneity in unit prices o f input among banks, is employed at this stage. As a 
general rule, efficiency levels measured relative to one frontier cannot be directly 
compared with efficiency levels measured relative to another frontier. In order to 
make the later cross-time convergence analysis more sensible, a common-frontier 
framework, wherein, efficiencies o f all observations are measured relative to a 
common frontier, is used. The input oriented efficiency measure and constant return 
to scale (CRS) is assumed as an optimal scale in the long run.
113
Chapter 4 Efficiency Convergence Properties of Indonesian Banks 1992-2007
The cost efficiency p  for the j-th bank is defined as;
P t  =  e x ' j / e * i  (4.1)
where e E Rm is a row vector with all elements being equal to unity, and x j  
is the optimal solution o f the Linear Programming (LP) problem given below;
[Cost]
_*
eXj = mm exj
x, X
sJ. Xj > XX
yj< Y X
* * 0 (4 .2 )
where X  = (xl,...,x„), with Xj = (p lJxlj,...,pmJxmj)T, is the matrix of individual 
factor costs, and Y = (y x,..., y n) e  Rsxn is a matrix o f outputs.
The cost efficiency measure p j<  1 is the scalar efficiency score for the j-th bank. 
If p j= \  the z-th bank is cost efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if  p j<  1 the 
bank is inefficient and need a (1- p j ) reduction in the total cost.
In the second stage, the efficiency estimates p j  are regressed on a set of 
environmental variables z} by using a maximum likelihood method. In practice,
Shephard’s (1970) definition o f efficiency is used to avoid two boundaries points. 
Shephard’s efficiency measure is merely the reciprocal o f the conventional Farrell 
efficiency score ( =  1 / P j), and can be treated as a measure o f inefficiency. If zy is a
At.
vector of environmental variables for the j  bank and p is  a vector o f parameters
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associated with each factor to be estimated, then equation (4.3) below describes the 
model to be estimated:
Yj = ZjP + £ j > \  (4.3)
Equation (4.3) is estimated under (left normal) truncated regression (use only 
Yj > 1 in this step) and £j is a truncated random error jV(0,<r*), truncated at
(1 -  Zjp).  The rest o f the second stage algorithm steps are:
Step 1: bootstrap, for each j  = , randomly draw s *  from the distribution
N(0,S’s)  with left-truncation at ( \ - Z j P )  and computey* = z } p  + e  * .
Step 2: construct a pseudo sample o f inputs by setting x) = Xjfj  / y) f°r all banks and 
keep the output measure unchanged, y] -  y j .
Step 3: re-estimate DEA cost efficiency f /  using the method described in the first 
stage by replacing observed sample(xj , yj )  by pseudo sample{ x * , y *).
Step 4: loop over this procedure 100 times {Lx = 100)64, take the m e a n ,// ,  o f 100 
Yj* estimates, then compute the bias-corrected estimator f j  for each bank, such
64 As stated in Simar and Wilson (2007), the purpose of this bootstrap is to get the mean of the 
bootstrapped distribution, and 100 iterations are sufficient for this purpose.
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thatfy = 2f j  -  Yj • The bias-corrected Farrell efficiency score can be easily obtained 
by taking the reciprocal o fy j , that is p j  = 1 / f j .
Step 5: re-estimate the marginal effects o f environmental variables, Zj , using the
bias-corrected efficiency estimate, y j , to obtained coefficients estimates p , by 
left-truncated regression with L2 =1000 bootstrap replications. Once the set o f L2 
bootstrap parameter estimates for ft and g ]  have been obtained, the percentile 
bootstrap confidence intervals can then be constructed.
This two-stage double bootstrap DEA model described in section 3 is estimated 
by using FEAR 1.1265, which is a software package for frontier efficiency analysis 
with R. I program the estimations following strictly the procedures described above. 
The main commands used are “costmin” to estimate the DEA cost efficiency, 
“trunc.reg” to carry out the truncated regression o f DEA cost efficiencies on 
environmental variables, “runorm.trunc” to draw random samples from truncated 
regression residuals to facilitate bootstrap procedures, and the “boostrap.ci” to 
construct the bootstrapped confidence interval o f interested parameters.
4. Convergence of Bank Efficiency
The concepts o f p-convergence, conditional p-convergence and a-convergence 
that are borrowed from the economic growth literature were introduced in Section 3.2 
of Chapter 3. Applications o f convergence concepts to cross-country comparison of
65 Written by Paul W. Wilson (2009)
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bank efficiency are also discussed in Chapter 3. To the best o f my knowledge, Fung 
(2006) is the only paper that has examined convergence properties o f bank efficiency 
for a single country, with an investigation on the convergence in pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency for the US bank holding companies (BHCs). The 
convergence speed is a measure of how quickly the less productive banks catch-up 
with the more productive ones. The findings did not support the hypothesis of  
“absolute (unconditional) convergence”, but showed strong evidence in favour of 
“conditional convergence”, which means the steady-state productivity to which a 
BHC is converging is conditional on the BHCs own level o f technical efficiency. In 
this chapter, bank specific characteristics have already been incorporated into 
efficiency estimation as environmental variables in the second stage estimation and 
country effects are common for every bank in a single country testing; therefore, 
unconditional ^-convergence and o-convergence are sufficient for the purpose of this 
chapter.
Following what has been done in the previous chapter, to estimate unconditional 
y3-convergence, the following equation is employed:
In Pj,, -  In =<f> + 0\n p j t_K + V j (4.4)
Where
p jj  is the bias-corrected cost efficiency o f bank j at time t
Pjj-i is the bias-corrected cost efficiency of bank j at time t-1 
(j) and 6 are the parameters to be estimated 
v j t is the error term, and v j t ~ iid N(0, crv2)
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A negative value for the parameter 0  implies unconditional /?-convergence. The 
higher the coefficient in relative terms the greater the tendency for /3-convergence.
The o-convergence is tested by regressing a dispersion measure, i.e. the annual 
standard deviation (around weighted average efficiency) o f individual bank’s 
efficiency, on a time trend variable:
= a  + r1T + £, (4.5)
where
o f  is standard deviation around (weighted) average cost efficiency scores across 
all individual banks at time t.
T is time trend variable as defined before 
a  and 77 are parameters to be estimated, and
is random error, and ~ iid A (0 ,o f)
Similarly, a negative value for the parameter rj implies cr -convergence. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the two types o f convergence do not necessarily exist at the 
same time, and implications are different when only one o f them exists or both of 
them exist.
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5. Model Strategy and Data
5.1 DEA efficiency estimation model strategy and variables
The data set is drawn primarily from the balance sheet and income statements o f 
banks from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. Data for missing periods were 
obtained from the annual reports of individual bank and central bank statistics. The 
data only focus on commercial banks as it comprises the largest segment of depository 
institution in Indonesia (98.6% of banking industry assets66). Where possible, the 
unconsolidated financial reports are used, to avoid double-counting.
Due to the major structural change of the banking system following the financial 
crisis, many problematic banks were acquired by other banks or merged to form a new 
bank, and nationalised banks have been resold to private sectors. The final sample is a 
very much unbalanced panel. In order to keep as many as observations possible and to 
smooth out the distortion effect o f the financial crisis, the years o f the financial crisis 
(1997-1999) are taken out o f the sample as a separate period, and the pre-crisis 
(1992-1996) and post crisis period (2000-2007) are left as two separate periods. All
7estimations except o-convergence test are therefore carried out within each 
sub-sample. The sample sizes of different time periods are summarized in Table 4-2.
In this chapter, three classic input variables are chosen under the intermediation 
approach, which are the Number o f  Employees {LAB), Fixed Assets {FA) and Total 
Deposits (77>=customer and interbank deposits + other deposits and short-term 
borrowings). On the output side, bank asset creation and income generation are not
66 Figures are calculated from reported values in 2007 Banking Statistics, Bank of Indonesia.
67 Due to insufficient number of observations.
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always highly correlated because o f the creation o f non-performing loans. 
Unfortunately data for non-performing loans are not available for most o f the years; 
therefore I use three different combinations o f outputs to test for robustness. Model 1 
concerns only asset creation, and uses Loans (total customer loans + total other 
lending) and Other Earning Assets (OEA= interbank assets + securities), as outputs. 
Model 2 takes the income flows of a bank as the output, including the income from 
traditional banking business, the Total Interest Income (77T=interest income on loans 
+ other interest income) and Other Operating Income (O0T=net gain on trading and 
derivatives + net fees and commissions +other non-interest income) to proxy the 
growing non-traditional business activities of Indonesian banks. Model 3 is a mixture 
of previous two models and uses both stock and flow variables as outputs: Loans, 
OEA and OOY, and this model is consistent with what has been used in previous 
chapter, capturing both traditional and non-traditional banking activities. Except for 
LAB, all variables are measured in real terms (2005 = 100). Table 4-3 summarises the 
modelling strategies with different output specifications.
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Table 4-2 Sample sizes of Indonesian banks
Number o f  Bank-year observations
1992-1996 171
1997-1999 98
2000-2007 312
Table 4-3 Modelling strategy
Inputs Outputs
Model 1 LAB, FA, TD Loans, OEA
Model 2 LAB, FA, TD TIY, OOY
Model 3 LAB, FA, TD Loans, OEA, OOY
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Input prices are crucial for estimating cost efficiency. The price o f labour ( p l ) is 
calculated as the ratio o f personnel expenses divided by the number o f employees. 
Where data on either personnel expenses or employees are not reported, the 
calculation o f the price o f labour is conducted according to what is standard in the 
literature and assume that the growth rate of the number of employees is the same as 
the growth rate o f total assets for a given bank and the ratio o f personnel expenses to 
operational expenses is the same as the closest available year (see for example 
Altunbas, et al, 2001 and Vannet, 2002). The price for total deposits ( p 2), is 
calculated as the ratio o f interest expenses to total deposits. The price of fixed assets 
( p 3), is measured by the ratio o f operating expenses less personnel expenses to fixed 
assets. Table 4-4 provides a snapshot of the data.
What is noteworthy is the evolution of the loan-to-deposit ratio which can be 
taken as a measure o f leverage. In the pre-crisis period the ratio was greater than unity 
but in the final period this has dropped to an average o f 0.45. This adjustment to a 
lower level o f leverage is also seen in the liquidity ratio taken as the ratio o f other 
earning assets to loans, which has risen from 35% in the pre-crisis period to 143% in 
the post-crisis period. A further noteworthy observation is that despite the growth in 
average earning assets between the pre and post crisis periods, the real price of labour 
has remained remarkably stable.
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Table 4-4 Statistical data description (sub-periods)
1992-1996 1997-1999 2000-2007
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
Total Cost (C) 2071 3439 49 14861 4449 9531 62 62651 2755 5629 19 44534
Inputs
Fixed Assets (x l) 362 553 1 2440 394 681 1 3000 510 992 0.72 6159
Deposit (x2) 13378 21804 320 102236 17392 33203 302 140960 23905 46362 134 275132
Labour(x3) 1386 2486 17 14059 2257 4162 11 21607 4370 7888 9 39915
Input Prices
price fixed assets (p i) 1.18 1.75 0.14 11.67 2.40 3.77 0.09 26.38 1.89 2.08 0.15 15.68
price o f deposit (p2) 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.74 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.76
price o f labour (p3) 0.20 0.15 0.01 1.00 0.15 0.20 0.01 1.29 0.14 0.21 0.02 2.11
Output
Total Loan 13474 22357 293 85335 10987 23407 62 126757 10742 18080 11 94904
Other Earning Assets 4755 8736 52 41249 6913 17696 44 130098 15381 36326 49 299111
Other Operating Income 207 386 0.39 2171 339 1367 -6689 9826 404 903 -38 8726
Total Interest income 2193 3561 53 16236 3286 5918 73 31388 3064 6223 18 44380
*Except for No. o f employee, other variables are measured in bil.IDR. 2005=100
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5.2 Environmental variables
The environmental variables, z } used in the second stage truncated regression,
contains the bank-specific characteristics which may be related to the efficiency level 
of bank i. Following the literature on the determinants of bank efficiency (e.g. Sufian, 
2009), the following seven variables are included, which have been found to be 
typical determinants o f bank efficiency, for the bank-specific characteristics 
vector Zj68. The description o f the variables and their expected relationship with bank 
cost inefficiency are provided in Table 4-5.
Table 4-6 presents the statistical descriptions of the firm-specific environmental 
variables. According to these statistics, over the two periods before and after the 
financial crisis, the average size o f Indonesian banks has slightly increased by 3.5%. 
More significant increases are seen in the measure o f foreign ownership (26%), 
market concentration (18%), business diversification (32%) and cost to income ratio 
(11%). Average GDP growth rate was lower after the financial crisis and fewer 
state-owned banks exist in the post-crisis period following the banking structural 
reforms.
68 Other variables were included, such as measure of banks risk; measure of bank profitability, but were 
statistically insignificant.
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Table 4-5 Environmental variables used in truncated regression
Variables Description Hypothesized relationship with
inefficiency69
Ownership Dummy 
(OWN)
1 denotes >50% foreign ownership, 0 
otherwise -
A negative relationship with cost inefficiency is 
expected
HHI
Sum o f the squares of the market 
shares o f all banks in each year + /-
A proxy o f market concentration. No priori 
expected sign.
Size Natural logarithm o f total assets + /-
A proxy o f bank size. No priori expected sign.
Diversification
(DIV) Non-interest income/total assets
-
A proxy o f diversification in traditional banking 
business. A negative relationship with cost 
inefficiency is expected
Cost to Income ratio (Ctol) Overheads / (net interest revenue + other operating income)
+
Accounting measurement o f cost inefficiency. 
Positive relationship with economic (DEA) cost 
inefficiency measurement.
AGDP
SOB
Growth rate o f GDP 
1 denotes SOB’s, 0 otherwise
+/-
+/-
Included as Macroeconomic condition. No priori
expected sign.
No priori expected sign
69 The dependent variable used in truncated regression is Shephard’s (1970) definition o f  efficiency, which indicates higher inefficiency by higher value.
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Table 4-6 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-specific Environmental Variables
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Ownership Dummy 0.5088 0.5014 0.0000 1.0000
HHI 0.1028 0.0093 0.0946 0.1170
Size 8.6271 1.5775 5.9610 11.6821
1992-1996 Diversification 0.8955 0.5287 0.0159 3.2629
Cost to Income ratio 0.5881 0.2147 0.2128 2.1888
Growth o f GDP 7.4455 0.6334 6.4600 8.2200
SOB 0.1404 0.3484 0.0000 1.0000
Ownership Dummy 0.5612 0.4988 0.0000 1.0000
HHI 0.1249 0.0168 0.1014 0.1447
Size 8.6673 1.5866 6.0620 12.0815
1997-1999 Diversification 1.7966 2.0747 -5.0493 8.7001
Cost to Income ratio 2.2194 22.4067 -36.3600 206.8813
Growth o f GDP -3.1251 7.8182 -13.1270 4.7000
SOB 0.0918 0.2903 0.0000 1.0000
Ownership Dummy 0.6410 0.4805 0.0000 1.0000
HHI 0.1212 0.0146 0.1033 0.1430
2000-2007 Size 8.9332 1.7029
5.7541 12.8809
Diversification 1.1809 0.9375 -0.5078 8.3749
Cost to Income ratio 0.6533 1.4156 -2.9322 24.4664
Growth o f GDP 5.0183 0.7616 3.6430 6.3450
SOB 0.1026 0.3039 0.0000 1.0000
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6. Empirical Results
6.1 Bank cost efficiency and environmental variables
6.1.1 Bank cost efficiency
The cost efficiency estimations are conducted for each sub-period, and each bank 
is assigned an efficiency score in each year. Given the limited space, rather than 
report all individual bank efficiency scores, researchers normally only report the 
annual average or weighted average efficiency scores as a representative of the 
industry efficiency level, In this chapter, both arithmetic mean and the weighted 
average annual bank cost efficiency are reported and compared.
Table 4-7 to Table 4-9 report the yearly arithmetic average cost efficiency scores 
for each model and each individual estimation periods, and Table 4-10 to Table 4-12 
report the corresponding counterparts of average cost efficiency scores that are 
weighted by individual banks’ total asset. The first column o f each table gives the
A
standard DEA cost efficiency score/. Bootstrap results are given in the following 
columns, which are the mean o f efficiencies from 100 bootstrap iterations,/*,
A
followed by the bias-corrected cost efficiency estimate / ,  which are calculated by 
u s in g /= 2 / - / * ,  and the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are also reported
after / .  Shephard’s efficiency measures are used in the whole estimation process, but 
for interpretation convenience, the corresponding Farrell’s efficiency measures are 
reported too in the last two columns, given by the standard DEA score p ,  and the
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bias-corrected efficiency score p  70, and most of the discussions below will be based 
on these Farrell’s efficiency measures.
All non-bootstrap standard DEA cost efficiency estimates are outside the 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, which means the estimation biases of 
conventional DEA are significant at 95% confidence level. As shown in the tables, the 
bias-uncorrected Farrell’s efficiency measures, p , are upward biased comparing
with p , the bootstrapped bias-corrected cost efficiency estimate. These estimates are 
however significantly lower than the estimates available in the extant literature. The 
reason is that as I used a constant return to scale common-frontier framework, and 
efficiencies o f all observations in each sample period are estimated relative to a 
common frontier, This common-frontier is like an envelopment o f individual years’ 
frontiers, so some o f the observations may be found further away from the 
common-frontier than it could be if using a single year frontier as a benchmark. 
Despite the absolute level of efficiency scores, the indicative information delivered by 
them should still hold.
70 One may notice that p  and p are not straight reciprocals o f y  and y , this is because p  and p
are the average o f the reciprocals of each individual bank’s Shephard’s efficiency, not the reciprocals 
of the averages.
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T a b le  4-7 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency  -- A rith m e tic  y e a rly  av e rag e . M odel 1
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
A
r A *
r
A
A 95% confidence interval A
P
A
A
Py low high
1992 3.3546* 1.1381 5.5755 5.5043 5.6249 0.3524 0.2485
1993 3.5078* 1.1479 5.9093 5.8532 5.9476 0.3600 0.2642
pre-crisis 1994 3.4974* 1.1380 5.8860 5.8300 5.9246 0.3562 0.2657
1995 3.4956* 1.1262 5.8669 5.8067 5.9127 0.3384 0.2442
1996 3.5809* 1.1215 6.0617 6.0044 6.0992 0.3257 0.2229
1997 2.9353* 1.1541 4.7618 4.6891 4.8069 0.4188 0.3171
financial crisis 1998 3.5493* 1.1430 5.9798 5.9078 6.0285 0.3851 0.3006
1999 2.9947* 1.1553 4.8459 4.7622 4.9090 0.4197 0.3305
2000 2.2136* 1.2717 3.1872 3.1131 3.2528 0.5097 0.4264
2001 2.2210* 1.2561 3.2165 3.1425 3.2803 0.4984 0.3998
2002 2.2648* 1.2437 3.3089 3.2454 3.3648 0.4820 0.3769
2003 2.2603* 1.2466 3.3077 3.2408 3.3638 0.4950 0.3959
post-crisis
2004 2.5399* 1.2262 3.8881 3.8310 3.9373 0.4524 0.3587
2005 2.4591* 1.2352 3.7252 3.6697 3.7745 0.4671 0.3748
2006 2.3540* 1.2433 3.5027 3.4477 3.5554 0.4829 0.3962
2007 2.3839* 1.2443 3.5849 3.5348 3.6292 0.4859 0.3935
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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T a b le  4-8 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency ~  A rith m e tic  y e a rly  av erag e . M odel 2
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
A
r A *
r
95% confidence interval A AA
r low high P P
1992 1.9671* 1.3597 2.6073 2.4316 2.7106 0.5481 0.4681
1993 2.1803* 1.3171 3.0925 2.9404 3.1764 0.5005 0.3937
pre-crisis 1994 2.4228* 1.2739 3.6044 3.4750 3.6778 0.4457 0.3302
1995 2.1377* 1.3177 2.9920 2.8522 3.0771 0.5000 0.4039
1996 2.1662* 1.3124 3.0502 2.9033 3.1321 0.4903 0.3898
1997 2.8985* 1.1885 4.6281 4.4023 4.7032 0.3802 0.2619
financial crisis 1998 1.9692* 1.3337 2.6859 2.5021 2.7951 0.5798 0.5120
1999 3.2943* 1.1789 5.4097 5.2717 5.4909 0.3492 0.2418
2000 2.4118* 1.2276 3.6458 3.5546 3.7073 0.4717 0.3559
2001 2.0689* 1.2422 2.9173 2.8001 2.9968 0.5132 0.3995
2002 2.1682* 1.2355 3.1083 2.9897 3.1915 0.5031 0.3974
post-crisis 2003 2.5526* 1.2009
3.9187 3.8174 3.9830 0.4335 0.3144
2004 3.3307* 1.1450 5.5163 5.4353 5.5648 0.3254 0.2102
2005 2.9227* 1.1600 4.6854 4.6018 4.7394 0.3644 0.2416
2006 2.3712* 1.2056 3.5368 3.4266 3.6083 0.4500 0.3316
2007 2.8142* 1.1686 4.4598 4.3742 4.5159 0.3824 0.2616
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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T a b le  4-9 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency -- A rith m e tic  y e a rly  av e rag e , M odel 3
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
A
r A *
r
J 95% confidence interval A AA
Y low high P P
1992 2.4230* 1.2321 3.6403 3.5356 3.7180 0.4884 0.3995
1993 2.6110* 1.2312 4.0590 3.9698 4.1193 0.4757 0.3762
pre-crisis 1994 3.0870* 1.1807 5.0285 4.9566 5.0812 0.3988 0.3025
1995 3.0418* 1.1741 4.9251 4.8556 4.9796 0.3931 0.2983
1996 2.9498* 1.1805 4.7428 4.6611 4.8012 0.4057 0.3020
1997 2.8951* 1.1611 4.6759 4.6188 4.7164 0.4257 0.3252
financial crisis 1998 2.9251* 1.2072 4.7282 4.6757 4.7654 0.4662 0.3907
1999 2.7000* 1.1938 4.2245 4.1385 4.2937 0.4505 0.3651
2000 2.1529* 1.3101 3.0708 3.0030 3.1372 0.5315 0.4558
2001 2.1643* 1.2816 3.0923 3.0193 3.1592 0.5089 0.4120
2002 2.2205* 1.2664 3.1993 3.1347 3.2640 0.4913 0.3950
post-crisis 2003 2.2139* 1.2729 3.1949 3.1329 3.2569
0.5024 0.4116
2004 2.5141* 1.2451 3.8226 3.7680 3.8752 0.4555 0.3662
2005 2.4539* 1.2482 3.7053 3.6523 3.7543 0.4679 0.3775
2006 2.3437* 1.2613 3.4724 3.4170 3.5248 0.4856 0.4012
2007 2.3811* 1.2566 3.5693 3.5204 3.6142 0.4861 0.3947
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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For a better visual comparison on efficiencies across time and across models,
/V
Figure 4-2 plots the bootstrap bias-corrected Farrell efficiencies, p , o f each model 
against the time horizon.
F ig u re  4-2 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency  -- A r ith m e tic  y e a rly  a v e ra g e
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Interestingly, Model 1 and Model 2 exhibit different patterns in the results for the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Average efficiency rose in the post-crisis period 
measured by Model 1 but fell as measured by Model 2, highlighting the sensitiveness 
of the results to the choice o f outputs. It also demonstrates that different output 
measures may need broader contextual background to understand the development of 
efficiency. The loan write-offs during the crisis period would have been unevenly 
distributed between the efficient and inefficient banks but the inefficient banks would 
have had to reduce costs faster than the efficient banks resulting in an overall increase 
in average efficiency. However, the inefficient banks may have carried more 
non-performing loans in the crisis period resulting in lower interest earnings and
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lower average revenue efficiency measured by Model 2. Model 3 produces a smoother 
profile o f efficiency estimates over the periods as an amalgam o f both Model 1 and 
Model 2.
The efficiency scores also clearly reflect the impact o f the re-regulation period 
1993-1995, which leads to a short-period decline in bank efficiency after 1993 in all 
three cases. Average cost efficiency level is low during the 1997-1999 Asia crises but 
improves post crisis, reaching a peak in 2000-2001 and start declining due to two 
major events. One is the re-privatisation process which occurred around 2003 and the 
global financial crisis beginning in 2007. This is seen in the drop in average efficiency 
post 2003. While in general the consensus o f the literature is that privatisation and 
increased foreign ownership has increased the efficiency o f formerly state-owned 
enterprises, e.g. Megginson and Netter (2001); Megginson (2005), it is possible that in 
the case o f Indonesian banks, the change is gradual until the new culture and system 
are properly in place (Besar and Milne, 2009). The short period increase in cost, thus 
lower cost efficiency, might be explained by the increased o f bank’s investment in the 
newly acquired subsidiaries. Unfortunately, there has come another global financial 
crisis around 2006, before the benefits o f this re-privatisation reform are actually 
realised. This finding is consistent with the finding in Chapter 3 for most o f the 
ASEAN countries, including Indonesia.
Arithmetic average efficiencies treat every individual bank equally weighted, but 
it is widely accepted that banks o f different sizes are influential to the whole market 
differently. The contribution o f a small bank with very little market share to the 
industry average efficiency level is also very small, even if  it is the most efficient
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bank. If large proportion o f the market is dominated by a few large banks, then the 
industrial average efficiency level should be determined by the efficiency levels of  
these few large banks too. Therefore, in order to better present the actual average 
efficiency level o f Indonesian banking industry, the annual weighted averages of bank 
efficiency scores are also calculated and reported in Table 4-10 to Table 4-12. In this 
case, the individual banks’ cost efficiency scores are weighted by their market 
significance, i.e. banks’ total assets. Followed by Figure 4-3 which plots the weighted
average o f bootstrap bias-corrected Farrell efficiencies, P , for three models with 
different output variables. Similar with the arithmetic average efficiency results,
A
non-bootstrap DEA scores,^ , are still upward biased at 95% confidence level. 
Weighted averages efficiencies still reflect the major events during the sample period, 
including efficiency declining since 1993-1995 re-regulation, low efficiency level 
during the 1997-1999 Asia crises and a continuers decline in the post-crisis period 
lead by the re-privatisation reform after the crises and the beginning of the current 
global financial crisis.
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T a b le  4-10 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency -- W eig h ted  y e a rly  av e rag e . M odel 1
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
f A ♦ A 95% confidence interval A
P
A
A
r 7 low high P
1992 2.8907* 1.1477 4.6340 4.5474 4.6923 0.3782 0.2516
1993 3.1936* 1.1326 5.2603 5.1892 5.3101 0.3420 0.2207
pre-crisis 1994 3.2247* 1.1336 5.3206 5.2463 5.3709 0.3512 0.2336
1995 3.3691* 1.1187 5.6196 5.5522 5.6660 0.3196 0.2041
1996 3.4698* 1.1123 5.8303 5.7641 5.8724 0.3079 0.1922
1997 2.9955* 1.1235 4.8748 4.7977 4.9204 0.3643 0.2411
financial crisis 1998 4.8280* 1.0890 8.5794 8.5339 8.6100 0.2550 0.1727
1999 3.3763* 1.1285 5.6263 5.5264 5.6883 0.3470 0.2341
2000 1.9704* 1.3137 2.6382 2.5424 2.7310 0.5559 0.4942
2001 2.1879* 1.2569 3.1241 3.0460 3.1948 0.4804 0.3611
2002 2.3666* 1.2278 3.5077 3.4426 3.5677 0.4364 0.3073
post-crisis
2003 2.5134* 1.1989 3.8313 3.7739 3.8839 0.4131 0.2831
2004 2.8970* 1.1668 4.6329 4.5828 4.6755 0.3605 0.2383
2005 2.9529* 1.1634 4.7502 4.7037 4.7893 0.3558 0.2355
2006 2.7796* 1.1719 4.3913 4.3436 4.4344 0.3732 0.2485
2007 2.8669* 1.1647 4.5764 4.5311 4.6163 0.3646 0.2415
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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T a b le  4-11 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency  -- W eig h ted  y e a rly  av e rag e . M o d e l 2
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
A
Y A * * 95% confidence interval A AA
Y Y low high P P
1992 2.1827* 1.3774 3.0792 2.9690 3.1669 0.5594 0.5223
1993 1.8494* 1.3627 2.3421 2.1291 2.4571 0.5578 0.4660
pre-crisis 1994 2.3894* 1.2691 3.5154 3.3705 3.5967 0.4450 0.3226
1995 2.2495* 1.2855 3.2243 3.0898 3.3004 0.4650 0.3567
1996 2.1379* 1.3064 2.9732 2.7969 3.0691 0.4879 0.3791
1997 3.4808* 1.1398 5.8229 5.4614 5.8830 0.2997 0.1848
financial crisis 1998 2.6342* 1.2094 4.0718 3.9128 4.1577 0.4157 0.3024
1999 3.7284* 1.1698 6.2871 6.1710 6.3605 0.3042 0.1955
2000 2.1847* 1.2332 3.1430 3.0194 3.2207 0.5025 0.3926
2001 1.9240* 1.2523 2.5991 2.4684 2.6855 0.5390 0.4212
2002 2.0094* 1.2454 2.7738 2.6494 2.8580 0.5272 0.4106
post-crisis 2003 2.4811* 1.1891 3.7739 3.6784 3.8340
0.4214 0.2880
2004 3.3147* 1.1369 5.4924 5.4184 5.5352 0.3157 0.1970
2005 3.2180* 1.1363 5.2997 5.2268 5.3420 0.3199 0.1983
2006 2.6121* 1.1742 4.0499 3.9576 4.1056 0.3964 0.2647
2007 3.1759* 1.1381 5.2138 5.1408 5.2570 0.3255 0.2031
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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T a b le  4-12 B o o ts tra p p e d  cost efficiency -- W eig h ted  y e a rly  av erag e . M odel 3
Bootstrap cost efficiency Farrell efficiency
r —* J 95% confidence interval A
Y Y low high P P
1992 2.0031* 1.2939 2.7755 2.6482 2.8678 0.5772 0.5054
1993 2.0034* 1.2562 2.7587 2.6106 2.8562 0.5283 0.4098
pre-crisis 1994 2.8723* 1.1808 4.5695 4.4700 4.6376 0.3958 0.2766
1995 2.6732* 1.1808 4.1670 4.0783 4.2349 0.4063 0.2945
1996 2.6376* 1.1883 4.0901 3.9852 4.1602 0.4202 0.3024
1997 2.9791* 1.1267 4.8395 4.7842 4.8793 0.3674 0.2443
financial crisis 1998 4.2705* 1.1146 7.4521 7.4132 7.4806 0.2920 0.2040
1999 2.7743* 1.1805 4.3720 4.2696 4.4433 0.4204 0.3070
2000 1.8977* 1.3508 2.4634 2.3825 2.5783 0.5851 0.5671
2001 2.0780* 1.2786 2.8868 2.8027 2.9757 0.5050 0.3912
2002 2.2557* 1.2478 3.2661 3.1940 3.3428 0.4613 0.3371
post-crisis 2003 2.4208* 1.2201 3.6259
3.5655 3.6902 0.4295 0.3017
2004 2.8487* 1.1847 4.5194 4.4695 4.5673 0.3661 0.2446
2005 2.9464* 1.1749 4.7264 4.6834 4.7670 0.3565 0.2367
2006 2.7728* 1.1849 4.3655 4.3186 4.4103 0.3741 0.2501
2007 2.8664* 1.1766 4.5640 4.5192 4.6056 0.3646 0.2421
denotes basic DEA efficiency is outside the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval, i.e. it is significantly different from the bias-corrected efficiency score.
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Figure 4-3 Bootstrapped cost efficiency — weighted yearly average
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Table 4-13 Mann-Whitney test for two-period efficiency differences
Arithmetic average Weighted average
Mean efficiency Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pre-Crisis period 0.2491 0.3971 0.3357 0.2205 0.4094 0.3577
Post-Crisis period 0.3903 0.3140 0.4018 0.3012 0.2969 0.3213
Z value -2.93*** 1.76* -2.20** -2.34** 1.61 1.03
***’ **' and ’ denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly.
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Compare with the arithmetic yearly average efficiencies, the weighted averages 
provide more information about the distribution o f cost efficiency level regarding 
bank sizes. When use arithmetic mean, efficiencies are improved in the post-crisis 
period in model 1 and model 3, but under weighted averages, i.e. when large banks 
are given more weight, the improvements become less clear. The statistical 
significance o f the overall efficiency changes between the two periods are tested by 
conducting a Mann-Whitney two-sample non-parametric test. Table 4-13 reports the 
results o f this test for the three models and two average calculations. As shown by the 
test results, the differences in overall mean efficiency o f the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods are highly significant for all three models under arithmetic yearly average 
calculation, but the difference is only significant for model 1 when use weighted 
average efficiency. Therefore, the results indicate that the improvements in cost 
efficiency after the 1997-1999 Asia financial crises mainly comes from the small 
banks, and the efficiency levels of large banks have not been improved or even 
worsened. When large banks are given more weights, i.e. use the weighted average, 
the average efficiency levels have been dragged down and the improvements become 
less visible. This finding is further evidenced by looking into the coefficient estimates 
on the environmental variables in the second stage truncated regressions.
6.1.2 Truncated regression results for environmental variables
Table 4-14 reports the truncated regression results using the conventional DEA 
cost efficiency estimates ( f t ) and the bias-corrected DEA cost efficiency estimates
((3  ) as the dependent variable. The differences are notable and confirm the
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expectation that using biased DEA estimates in the second stage parametric regression 
on environmental variables produces inaccurate estimates. Most o f the estimates on 
the environmental variables exhibit the expected sign and are consistent in all periods 
when significant at the 5% significance level, however, inconsistency does exist for 
few cases.
The dependent variable in Table 4-14 is Shephard’s (1970) definition of 
efficiency, which indicates higher inefficiency by higher value. Thus positive/negative 
marginal effects in the truncated regression indicate negative/positive marginal effects 
on cost efficiency. Unsurprisingly, foreign ownership always has a positive impact on 
bank cost efficiency, like the case in most developing countries. Cost efficiency is 
negatively correlated with bank size, indicating small banks are more efficient. But 
these two effects are only significant in the post-crisis period for most cases. Clearly, 
the post-crisis newly re-privatised banks, especially foreign acquired ones have 
dramatically high level o f cost efficiency, and they are obviously smaller in size 
comparing with big national banks. On the other hand, many small problematic banks 
have been merged into big state-owned banks or have been merged to form a new 
bigger bank with better capital adequacy during the structural reform process. The 
problems o f high level non-performing loans and book value insolvency may have 
been carried over and lead to a low level o f efficiency for large banks. This could 
explain what has been found earlier that the yearly weighted average efficiencies are 
lower than the arithmetic means, since the most influential banks to the industry are 
not the most efficient ones.
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Table 4-14 Truncated regression results
1992-1996 1997-1999 2000-2007
P P P P
A
P P
Const. 4.2725 7.1945 2.2213 2.5056 2.6309 3.4399
OWN -0.1824 -0.0331 -1.4342 -2.5669* -0.6384 -1.0887*
HHI -19.4372 -32.0615 -11.4329 -14.536 -8.074 -15.187
Size 0.0384 0.0021 0.3019 0.5992* 0.1508 0.2822*
Model 1 DIV 0.4237 0.6696* 0.0658 0.018 -0.0429 -0.0716
Ctol 0.0257 0.0449* 0.0194 0.0379* 0.0259 0.0238
AGDP -0.0872 -0.0823 -0.057 -0.1294* -0.038 0.0743
SOB -1.6964 -3.08948 -0.208 -0.3845 -0.6144 -1.2567*
Sigma 0.8766 1.6399 1.4202 2.8115 0.6802 1.2809
Const. 6.2136 12.0604* -2.5046 -6.5457* 1.982 2.3741
OWN -0.0868 -0.1087 -0.576 -1.2949* -0.1126 -0.2994
HHI -26.3348 -58.7551* 22.9392 46.9658* -9.7569 -19.2493
Size 0.1499 0.2773* 0.3347 0.6953* 0.0909 0.1763*
Model 2 DIV -0.4779 -0.9039* -0.0436 -0.0855 -0.0613 -0.0063
Ctol 0.0098 0.0163* -0.0016 -0.0026 0.0232 0.0469
AGDP -0.3493 -0.6863* 0.0979 0.2026* 0.2116 0.4741
SOB -0.8814 -1.7521* -0.0961 -0.2466 -0.618 -1.4030*
Sigma 0.459 0.9267 0.8858 1.896 0.8858 1.8961
Const. 6.3595 10.5728 4.1113 6.6790* 2.7641 3.3137
OWN -0.1579 -0.0162 -1.2295 -1.7238* -0.6289 -1.1239*
HHI -29.9489 -49.5821 -15.9499 -19.8219 -8.6528 -13.7195
Size -0.0035 -0.1073 0.1797 0.2544 0.1358 0.2316*
Model 3 DIV -1.2422 -2.6463* -0.2162 -0.4724* -0.1077 -0.0509
Ctol 0.0249 0.0417* 0.015 0.0288* 0.0235 0.0195
AGDP -0.075 0.0407 -0.0438 -0.1010* -0.0169 0.1445
SOB -1.5114 -2.7600* -0.1633 -0.1174 -0.5587 -1.1659*
Sigma 0.8805 1.6347 1.0857 1.8211 0.6597 1.2254
’denotes coefficient is significant at 5% significance level.
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Given the foreign banks are relatively more efficient, state owned banks also 
consistently exhibit higher efficiency. Cost efficiency is also negatively related to the 
cost to income ratio, when significant. Diversification in business is not very 
influential as expected, only helps to improve cost efficiency in the early period 
according to Model 2 and Model 3, but has an opposite effect in Model 1. This 
indicates that loan is still the main revenue generating business for commercial banks. 
Coefficient on market concentration measured by HHI is positive and significant in 
Model 2 in the pre-crisis period, but negatively related to cost efficiency in the crisis 
period. This suggests that market power may have been prevalent in loan pricing in 
the pre-crisis period driving up revenues relative to costs but is reversed in the crisis 
period. The macroeconomic environment measured by GDP growth, which has a 
common effect on all banks in the country, therefore shows no clear pattern of 
influence on cost efficiency over the individual models or over separate periods.
6.2 Convergence properties of cost efficiencies
Using the bootstrap bias-corrected Farrell cost efficiencies, p  ’s, for every 
individual bank, the unconditional ^-convergence is tested by using unbalanced panel 
estimation and ^-convergence in banking cost efficiency is tested by an OLS 
estimation. STATA 10, which is a data analysis and statistical software, is used for 
this estimation. To select the appropriate panel data estimation model, the following 
model specification test procedures are adopted. Firstly, an F-test is used to test fixed 
effect model against Pooled OLS regression. If the Pooled OLS regression model is 
rejected, then a Hausman specification test is conducted to test for the appropriate 
common effect model, fixed effect or random effect model? Finally, a Breusch-Pagan
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Lagrange multiplier test is carried out to test the significance o f random effect, if
71 •Random effect model is not rejected in the second step . The model selection tests 
show that fixed effect model is the most appropriate model to use in all models and 
for all periods. All the model selection test statistics along with the unconditional 
^-convergence test results are reported in Table 4-15.
For all models and in all periods, the estimates o f coefficient on the lagged 
efficiency are all negative and significant at 1% significance level. This is very strong 
evidence for unconditional ^-convergence, indicating that for both pre-crisis and 
post-crisis period, even in the transition period o f financial crises, inefficient banks 
are catching up with efficient ones through a faster growth rate in cost efficiency. This 
also could be seen as a signal o f the dynamic improvement in cost efficiency o f  
Indonesian banks.
71 Theoretically, this test is not necessary if random effect model is rejected in Hausman specification 
test; however, the test is still conducted for a robustness check even if random effect model is rejected.
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Table 4-15 Unconditional p-convergence test results (Fixed effect estimation)
1992-1996 1997-1999 2000-2007
Intercept
tap,,,-.
Wald test
C oefficient z-values 
-1.5541 (-9.94)*** 
-0.9422 (-9.97)***
Coefficient z-values  
-1.5042 (-7.15)*** 
-0.9969 (-7.35)*** 
F(l,52)=0.16
Coefficient z-values  
-0.7922 (-11.56)*** 
-0.6910 (-11.55)*** 
F( 1,218)= 17.64***
MODEL 1 No. o f obs. 
F-test
Hausman test 
B-P test 
overall RA2
130
F(38,90)=3.43***
chi2(l)=90.56***
Chi2(l)=2.75*
0.0583
89
F(35,52)=2.03**
chi2(l)=40.80***
chi2(l)=0.81
0.1336
262
F(42,218)=3.36*** 
chi2(l)= 122.89*** 
chi2(l)=0.71 
0.0568
Intercept
ln  P j j - i
Wald test
-1.0830 (-12.67)*** 
-1.0074 (-13.01)***
-2.1927 (-16.05)’*’ 
-1.7887 (-15.20)*** 
F(l,52)=44.10***
-0.9802 (-11.97)*’’ 
-0.7544 (-11.96)*** 
F(l,218)=16.10***
MODEL 2 No. o f obs. 
F-test
Hausman test 
B-P test 
overall RA2
130
F(38,90)=3.10***
chi2(l)=378.23***
chi2(l)=1.52
0.2877
89
F(35,52)=3.87***
chi2(l)=648.63***
chi2(l)=0.03
0.4138
262
F(42,218)=1.84***
chi2(l)=70.02***
chi2(l)=0.60
0.2199
Intercept
P j j - \
Wald test
-1.2444 l  (-10.91)*1* 
-0.9058 (-10.83)***
-1.4291 (-7.25)*" 
-1.0520 (-7.34)*** 
F( 1,52)= 1.04
-0.7860 (-11.97)**’ 
-0.6978 (-11.91)*** 
F( 1,218)=12.62***
M O D E L 3 No. o f  obs. 
F-test
Hausman test 
B-P test 
overall RA2
130
F(38,90)=3.15*** 
ch i2(l)= l 03.59*** 
chi2(l)=0.56  
0.1310
89
F(35,52)=1.87**
chi2(l)=42.05***
chi2(l)=2.61
0.1236
262
F(42,218)=3.61***
chi2(l)=123.92***
chi2(l)=0.25
0.0675
***’ **’ and * denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly.
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However, the tendency o f convergence alters over each sub-period. Wald tests are 
used to test whether the degree o f convergence tendency in the post-crisis period has 
significantly changed from the pre-crisis level. During the financial crisis, the 
convergence tendency is higher than pre-crisis level, but the change is only significant 
in model 2. Given the economic environment during that time, the reason for this 
positive change is rather that the income generating ability o f initially efficient banks 
were declining faster, and make the growth rate in efficiency o f inefficient banks 
relatively higher. After the structural reforms, the post-crisis period shows 
significantly weakened tendency of convergence for all three models, indicating a 
more conservative strategy to risk-taking and asset growth as a means by which 
inefficient banks catch-up with efficient banks. Related back to the yearly average 
efficiency scores and the marginal effects o f environmental variables discussed earlier, 
small banks and foreign owned banks become more efficient in the post-crisis period, 
while large banks become less efficient due to defensive mergers o f insolvent banks 
during the financial crisis period and the banking reforms afterwards. It is possible 
that in both periods, relatively inefficient banks are catching up with efficient banks, 
but the leaders and laggers are reversed after the banking structural reform.
While /?-convergence tests the movement within one distribution, o-convergence 
tests the change o f the distribution, which is done by regressing the annual standard 
deviation o f cost efficiency scores across all banks, which measures the dispersion 
among individual banks’ efficiency levels, on a time trend variable. Table 4-16 
reports the testing results for o-convergence. As the difference between arithmetic and 
weighted yearly average efficiency is quite substantial, the o-convergence is tested 
using two different standard deviation calculations. One is the standard deviation
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around the arithmetic average, which is the conventional way o f calculating standard 
deviation. The other is the standard deviation around the weighted average efficiency.
Using two measurements o f standard deviation produces very similar 
o-convergence test results. The o-convergence is only found in Model 2, but not in the 
other two models, especially not in model 1, where the coefficient on time trend 
variable is positive and significant. In terms o f the convergence concepts themselves, 
there are two circumstances under which p-convergence does not accompany 
o-convergence. One, the laggers overtake the leaders. In other words, the initially 
inefficient banks becomes more efficient than those initially efficient ones, and keep 
on growing at a faster rate which drives wider the dispersion. This point has been 
proved by the analysis above, in the post-crisis period, small and foreign banks 
become more efficient while big banks were more efficient in the pre-crisis period. 
Two, the initial dispersion o f efficiency levels is very small, smaller than the 
steady-state dispersion level, and the random shock is relatively large. In this case, the 
dispersion will grow and converge towards steady-state level from below72. Given 
that the Indonesian banking market were heavily regulated by quantitative controls 
and political relationship banking at the beginning, which maybe even earlier than the 
sample period, the initial efficiency dispersion is very likely to be small. Indonesian 
banks are still catching up with one another, i.e. is /^-converging, but random shocks 
are pushing them apart.
72 See Appendix A for a theoretical illustration of this point.
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Table 4-16 o-convergence test results (OLS estimation)
Arithmetic average Weighted average
MODEL 1
Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values
Intercept
T
No. o f obs. 
Adj RA2
0.2314
0.0031
16
0.1896
(16.42)” ’
(2.12)*
0.2232
0.0054
16
0.3841
(13.69)” ’
(3.22)***
Intercept 0.2387 (11.97)” * 0.2467 (9.51)***
T -0.0062 (-2.99)** -0.0062 (-2.33)**
MODEL 2
No. o f obs. 16 16
Adj RA2 0.3461 0.2277
Intercept 0.2691 (18.02)*** 0.2657 (12.84)***
T 0.0008 (0.50) 0.0027 (1.27)
M O D E L 3
No. o f obs. 16 16
Adj RA2 0.0523 0.0394
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly
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Comparing the three models, Model 1 and Model 2 produce completely opposite 
results, in which o-divergence is found in Model 1 while a-convergence in Model 2. 
Again, Model 3 looks like an amalgam of the other two models. Model 1 shows that 
the dispersion of the cost efficiency across banks in terms o f asset creating is 
widening, which could be explained by the increasing differences in bank 
management and operational techniques that are brought by the banking reform and 
new ownership structures. The new management team might be more efficient in 
credit creating process and in other financial investment. New financial products and 
other financial innovations may lead to a change in structure o f banks’ balance sheet, 
and allow banks to operate on a higher leverage ratio.
On the other hand, Model 2 suggests that the capabilities o f generating income of 
banks are becoming more and more similar between banks over time. The message 
could be either positive or negative. For the whole industry, banks become more and 
more equally profitable is an overall improvement, but for those banks that have 
introduced new techniques and new ownership structures, creating more assets or 
more diversification in business did not effectively make them outstanding in terms of 
profitability. The reason could be many, one of which could be the cultural difference 
between the foreign operational mechanisms and the home country local environment. 
The comparative advantages in productivity have not been fully utilised to generate 
profit.
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7. Conclusion
In this chapter, the bank cost efficiencies are estimated for a sample o f Indonesian 
banks over the period 1992-2007 by using the Simar and Wilson’s (2007) two stage 
semi-parametric double bootstrap DEA procedure, with the aim of analysing its 
convergence properties. The estimates o f  cost efficiency produced by this method are 
starkly in variance with the findings o f the extant literature. This is explained by the 
assumption o f  constant returns to scale along with the common-frontier approach 
adopted in the estimation methodology. However, the absolute measures of efficiency 
are unlikely to influence its dynamic pattern.
One beauty o f  the Simar and W ilson’s (2007) two-stage double bootstrap method 
is that one can incorporate the effects o f  bank-specific environmental variables into 
the efficiency estimation without sacrificing the non-parametric nature of DEA. 
Estimates o f  marginal effects o f the environmental variables, together with the 
noticeable difference between arithmetic and weighted yearly average efficiency, 
proves that there is a structural change in Indonesian banking industry after the 
1997-1999 A sia financial crises. Although, the cost efficiency estimates are sensitive 
to choice o f  outputs, in general, small banks, especially foreign owned banks become 
more efficient in the post-crisis period, thanks to the new managerial skills brought by 
the new ownership structure. Diseconomies o f scale exist for large banks in the 
market.
The efficiency results then are used to test the convergence properties of  
Indonesian banks’ performance. Strong evidences o f /?-convergence are found for all
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models and in all periods, which indicate that inefficient banks are improving faster 
and catching up with the efficient banks in all sub-periods. However, the tendency of 
convergence was weakened in the post-crisis period suggesting that the reforms 
created an environment o f caution that resulted in a slower catch-up by the inefficient 
banks to the efficient frontier. Given the sudden rise in the force of small and foreign 
owned banks, it is possible that the initially efficient large and national banks now 
become the relatively inefficient banks.
The efficiency estimates are sensitive to choice o f outputs, so are the convergence 
properties. The results o f o-convergence are double-edged. Narrowing dispersion of 
bank efficiencies in terms o f revenue generating indicates that there is an overall 
improvement in profitability for the whole industry. However, the o-divergence found 
in Model 1, which mainly concerns assets creating behaviours, also shows that the 
introduction o f new ownership structure and better operational skills are effective in 
credit creating and business diversification, but the changes are not effective enough 
to produce significant comparative advantages in terms o f profitability for those 
newly acquired banks.
150
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN 
Banking Markets
1. Introduction
Chapter 3 investigated the banks’ capabilities in product maximisation and cost 
minimisation, which are represented by relative efficiencies. The analysis o f ASEAN 
banks’ cost efficiencies and their convergence properties produced mixed results on 
ASEAN banking market integration, due to the substantial cross-country bank 
efficiency asymmetries and the lack of convergence at individual bank level. The 
present chapter will examine the banking markets at the aggregate level, and asses the 
differences in terms o f market competitiveness across countries.
With the improved trend in financial integration that emerged after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, one would expect to see lower entry barriers in ASEAN national 
financial markets, and hence intensified competition level. Banks operating in markets 
with different degrees o f competitiveness may behave substantially different in pricing 
behaviours, and opening up the cross-country barrier, letting foreign banks to compete 
freely in domestic market will increase the competitive pressure in less competitive 
markets. Cross-country dispersion in banking markets’ competitive structures is a 
crucial factor to evaluate the financial integration process, and the similarity in 
individual country’s banking market competitiveness is also an indicator for integration. 
Differences in member country’s banking market competition level may also affect the 
implementation o f monetary policies in each member country. Similarity in the banking 
market competitive structure may also help reap the maximum benefits from future 
monetary integration.
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The degrees o f banking market competition is measured by a non-structural 
approach, Panzar-Rosse (PR) reduced-form revenue model, which is based on the new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) theories o f contestable markets. The PR 
//-statistic is estimated for the whole sample period as well as rolling window periods 
to assess the time evolution o f market competitiveness. The time series o f //-statistics 
then are used to test the relationship between market competition and concentration. It 
has been found that the ASEAN banking market could be described as a contestable 
market; however the main finding of this chapter is again to show a low degree of 
integration.
The rest o f this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the text 
book models o f market structures, their relationships with economic efficiency and 
the implications for banking markets. Section 3 reviews how banking market 
competitiveness has been empirically examined in the literature and the main 
techniques have been developed. Section 4 outlines the methodology used in this 
chapter, i.e. the Panzar-Rosse model, along with some recent improvements. The 
empirical estimations in this chapter use the same sample as in Chapter 3; a detailed 
data description was presented in Chapter 3. Section 5 o f the current chapter provides 
only brief data information on the main variables used in this chapter. Section 6 
reports the PR model estimation results and implications for introducing currency 
union. Section 7 investigates the relationship between market competition and 
concentration in ASEAN banking markets under a counterfactual assumption o f a 
existing currency union. The final section, section 8 concludes this chapter.
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2. Market types and economic efficiency
In economics, market structure (also known as market form) describes the state o f 
a market with respect to the degree of competition that exists between the firms in an 
industry. Market structure is categorized on the basis o f market structural variables 
which are believed to determine the extent and characteristics o f competition. 
Traditionally, those variables that have been used as the main criteria to distinguish 
different market structures are: the number and size o f producers and consumers, the 
extent of product substitutability, the cost structure, ease o f entry and exit, and the 
extent of mutual interdependence of producers and consumers.
Markets are normally classified into four major types o f market structure, with 
descending order o f degree of competition, perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, oligopoly, and pure monopoly. These four market structures each 
represents generic characterization of a type of real market. Firms’ behaviours are 
implicitly or explicitly different under different types o f market structure, and 
therefore the contributions to economic efficiency are also different. The basic 
textbook models, firms’ behaviors and to what extent that economic efficiency is 
achieved under each market type are reviewed briefly below.
2.1 Perfect competition
Perfect competition is an economic model that describes a hypothetical market 
form in which no producer or consumer has any market power to influence prices, and 
this type o f market would lead to a completely efficient outcome. There are six
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conditions that market has to satisfy to be a perfectly competitive market: 1, the 
market has to be “atomistic”, in which there are large number o f small producers and 
consumers, each so small that its actions have no significant impact on others. 2, the 
products have to be homogeneous. Goods and services are perfect substitutes, that is, 
there is no product differentiation. 3, Perfect and complete information. All firms and 
consumers know the prices set by all firms. 4, all firms have equal access to 
production technologies, and resources are perfectly mobile. 5, Free entry and exit to 
the industry. 6, individual buyers and sellers act independently (Katz and Rosen, 
1998).
Collusion and cartels are not possible under this market structure. In general, it 
can be argued that perfectly competitive market results in economic efficiency, which 
is achieved when each good is produced at the minimum cost and where consumers 
get maximum benefit from their income. The combination o f (long-run) production 
being at minimum average cost and the marginal cost pricing keeps prices at a 
minimum, and no economic profit exist anymore, as shown in Figure 5-1.
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F ig u re  5-1 L o n g -ru n  e q u ilib r iu m  o f  p e rfe c t co m p e titio n
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Perfect competition is a case of “survival of the fittest”. Inefficient firms will be 
driven out o f the business, since they will not be able to make even normal profits. 
This encourages firms to be as efficient as possible and, where possible, to invest in 
new improved technology. However, the basic assumptions o f perfect competition are 
very strict. Few, if  any, industries in the real world meet these conditions. One 
important reason for this has to do with economies o f scale. Firms must be small 
under perfect competition: too small in most cases for economies o f scale. Once a 
firm expands sufficiently to achieve economies o f scale, it will usually gain market 
power. It will be able to undercut the prices o f smaller firms, which will thus be 
driven out o f business. Perfect competition is destroyed. Therefore, perfect 
competition could exist in any industry, only if there were no economies o f scale.
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2.2 Monopoly
On the other extreme o f the market structure line is monopoly. A monopoly exists 
when there is only one firm (or few firms behave perfectly collusively) in the industry. 
For a firm to maintain its monopoly position, there must be barrier to the entry o f new 
firms. Since there is only one firm in the industry, the firm’s demand curve is also the 
industry’s demand curve. Compared with other market structures, demand under 
monopoly tends to be less elastic at each price, since the monopolist can raise its price 
and consumers have no alternative firm to turn to within the industry. Thus the 
monopoly firm is a ‘price maker’. It can choose what price to charge at their best 
interest. The profit maximising point for a monopolist is still where marginal revenue 
equal marginal cost, but it could earn supernormal profit due to the downward 
slopping demand curve, and the economic profit will not be competed away in the 
long run, since there are barriers to the entry o f new firms. These profits will tend to 
be larger the less elastic is the demand curve. The actual elasticity will depend on 
whether reasonably close substitutes are available in other industries. Under 
monopoly, the monopolist is not forced to operate at the bottom o f the average cost 
curve because o f the barriers to entry. Thus, other things equal, long-run prices will 
tend to be higher, hence lower output than the competitive levels. As illustrated in 
Figure 5-2, monopolist could charge as high as Pm, while the competitive price is only 
atPc.
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Sheltered by barriers to entry, the monopolist can still make large profits even if  it 
is not using the most efficient technology. It has less incentive to be efficient and the 
production costs may be higher under monopoly. On the other hand, the monopoly 
may be able to achieve substantial economies of scale, and it can use part o f its 
supernormal profits for research and development and investment. It may not have the 
same incentive to become efficient as the perfectly competitive firms which are 
fighting for survival, but it may have a much greater ability to become efficient than 
has the small firm with limited funds.
Very few markets in practice can be classified as perfectly competitive or as a 
pure monopoly. The vast majority o f firms do compete with other firms, and yet they 
are not pure price takers, they do have some degree o f market power. Most markets, 
therefore, lie between the two extremes of market structures, in the realm of  
‘imperfect competition’: monopolistic competition and oligopoly.
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2.3 Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic competition model was developed by American economist Edward 
Chamberlin (1899-1967) and English economist Joan Robinson (1903-1983). It has 
the following characteristics: there are quite a large number of firms. Each firm’s 
actions are unlikely to affect its rivals to any great extent. There is freedom of entry, 
but unlike perfect competition, each firm’s product or service is sufficiently different 
from its rivals’, therefore it could raise the price without losing all its customers. Thus 
its demand curve is downward sloping and relatively elastic. This is known as the 
assumption o f “product differentiation”. It is possible for the monopolistically 
competitive firm to make supernormal profit, but only in the short run. Chamberlin 
(1962) argued that firms selling differentiated products were qualitatively 
indistinguishable from classical monopolists, and its actions would satisfy all the 
conditions o f monopoly profit maximization. However, that market equilibriums in 
the two models were vastly different. The firms set their price so that the output level 
equalise the marginal cost and marginal revenue. The demand curve facing the 
individual firm depends upon the prices or quantities o f substitute products, while the 
products are differentiated, the entry or exit o f rivals will cause the perceived demand 
curve to shift in or out, until in the long-run equilibrium, zero economic profit are 
achieved when demand curve tangent to the average cost curve, the so called 
“Chamberlinian tangency”. Figure 5-3 shows a graphical illustration o f short-run and 
long-run equilibrium conditions for monopolistic competition.
158
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
F ig u re  5-3 S h o r t- ru n  a n d  L o n g -ru n  eq u ilib r iu m  o f  M o n opo lis tic  C o m p e titio n
PricePrice
LRMCMC
AC
LRAC
AC.
MR, AR,
Quantity Quantity
Short-run Long-run
Although economic profits are competed away in the long-run under 
monopolistic competition, it is still leads to a less efficient allocation o f resources than 
perfect competition. Fewer products will be sold and at a higher price, and also firms 
will not be producing at the minimum cost level. On the other hand, although the firm 
facing demand curve is downward sloping, it is still likely to be highly elastic if  large 
number of substitutes exist, and consumers may benefit from having a greater variety 
of products to choose from. Each firm may satisfy some particular requirements o f  
certain consumer groups. Comparing with monopoly, freedom o f entry and hence zero 
economic profit in the long-run are likely to keep price down and encourage cost 
saving, however, monopolists are more likely to achieve greater economies o f scale 
and have more profit to invest in research and development.
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2.4 Oligopoly
Oligopoly occurs when just a few firms share a large proportion o f the market. 
The firms may produce virtually identical product or differentiated products, and 
much o f the competition between oligopolists is in terms o f marketing its own brand. 
There are two crucial features that distinguish oligopoly from other market types. One 
is that there are various barriers o f entry, of which sizes may vary from industry to 
industry. The other one is that, under oligopoly, firms are interdependent. Each firm is 
reacting to its rival’s actions, and different firms may react differently and 
unpredictably. Therefore, there is no single one generally accepted theory of 
oligopoly.
Oligopolists are pulled into two different directions. One is that the
interdependence o f firms may make them wish to collude with each other. If they can
club together and act as if  they were a monopoly, they could jointly maximize
industry’s profits. A formal collusive agreement is called “cartel”, which may agree
on prices, market share, advertising expenditure, etc. In many countries, cartels are
illegal, as they are seen by the government as a means o f driving up prices and profits,
and thereby as being against the public interest. Sometimes cartels may be more
disadvantageous than monopoly in terms of efficiency, as there may be less scope for
economies o f scale given the relatively smaller size o f each individual oligopolist and
high cost maybe involved in extensive advertising. On the other hand, oligopolists
could choose not to collude and compete with their rivals to gain a bigger share of
industry profits for themselves. If there is some degree o f competition or if  barriers to
entry are weak, oligopoly may provide more social benefits over other market types.
For example, like in the monopoly case, they could use the supernormal profit they
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have earned for research and development in new technology, and oligopolists have a 
considerable incentive to improve efficiency due to competition. Additionally, 
non-price competition through product differentiation may lead to wider range of 
choices for consumers.
2.5 Contestable markets and the optimal competitive structure for 
banking market
Economists, like Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), Panzar (1987) and Stigler 
(1987), have developed the theory of contestable markets, which addresses the 
importance o f the potential competition rather than actual competition. This theory 
argues that what is crucial in determining price and output is not whether an industry 
is actually monopoly or competitive, but whether there is threat o f potential 
competition. The threat o f competition has a similar effect to actual competition. A 
market is perfectly contestable when the costs of entry and exist by potential rivals are 
zero, and such entry can be made very rapidly. In such cases, when the possibility o f 
earning supernormal profit occurs, new firms will enter, thus driving profits down to 
the normal level. The threat o f entry will ensure that the firm already in the market 
behave as if  they were under perfect competition, otherwise new entries would take 
place, and potential competition would become actual competition. The more 
contestable the market, the more will a monopoly be forced to produce at low cost and 
charge low price to the consumers, and hence more efficiency to the society. The 
theory of contestable markets breaks down the basic assumptions about the link 
between number o f firms or concentration with market competitiveness. Competitive 
outcomes can be achieved under several circumstances, even in a very concentrated
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market, whereas collusive behaviour can happen even when a large number of firms 
exist.
The optimal competitive structure is always a debatable question, especially for 
banking market. In a competitive market, banks are price-takers and maximise profit 
by supplying the greatest quantity of credit and minimising costs. On the other hand, 
banks with market power can charge a price above its marginal cost level and make 
supernormal profit; as a result they are normally better capitalized to withstand shocks 
and relatively more stable. However, the market ends up with less available quantity 
of credit and at a higher price.
Much o f the literature may support that the perfect competition is an ideal market 
structure, as competitive market is more efficient and could promote economic growth. 
But as argued by Northcott (2004) that some degree o f market power, hence 
profitability may help maintain stability in the financial sector73. The trade-off 
between economic growth and financial stability highlights that both of the two 
extremes o f market structure could have positive implications, and neither o f perfect 
competition nor pure market power is ideal for the banking market. What may be 
preferred is “something in-between”, an environment that could promotes efficiency 
and minimise the social cost o f market power, meanwhile maintain the stability 
through profits obtained from any residual market power. Such a market may satisfy 
the definition of “contestability”. Documented by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), 
bank efficiencies are natively related to the level of entry barriers. Tighter entry 
requirements may lead to high interest margin and high overhead cost, and restrictions
73 See Padoa-Schioppa (2001) and Northcott (2004) for more detailed reviews on this point,
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on foreign participation tend to increase fragility of banking system. These results are 
consistent with the contestability theory, and emphasize that it is the threat o f  
potential entry that determines banks efficiency and financial stability.
3. Measuring market structure and competition in 
banking markets
The degree o f competition and market structures are empirically tested by using 
various methods, which could be divided into two major streams: the traditional 
structural approach and the newly emerged non-structural approaches, which are 
based on the classic Industrial Organization (10) theory and New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) approach correspondingly.
3.1 The structural approaches
Most o f the early studies in banking use structural approach, such as 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. In this model, banks’ conduct is 
determined by market structure which is assumed exogenous, and the combination of 
market structure and conduct influences banks’ performance, normally measured by 
the price o f a particular product or banks’ profitability. The one-way causal 
relationship is empirically tested by regressing profitability measures on the 
concentration ratio and other control variables. A positive relationship between the 
concentration ratio and firm’s profits indicates that banks operating in concentrated 
market with greater market power could exercise less competitive pricing behaviour
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and generate higher profits. Early empirical applications o f SCP approaches in 
banking mainly use U.S. data and often find the expected positive relationship 
between bank profits and market concentration. Such studies include Berger and 
Hannan (1989), who found that higher concentration leads to lower deposit rates for 
US banks from 1983-1985; Hannan (1991) found that higher concentration ratios 
result in higher interest rate charged on loans74.
The SCP paradigm has been criticised in many aspects. Many researchers argued 
that the strong assumption of exogenously shaped market structures and the one-way 
causality from market structure to banks’ performance distort the validity o f the 
model specification, for example, Scherer (1980), Gilbert (1984), Tirole (1988), and 
Vesala (1995). Apart from the questionable strong assumption o f exogenous market
• •  •  7 «structures, the microeconomic foundation for this positive relationship is weak , and 
could be undermined easily by other theories. For example, in the context of 
contestable markets mentioned earlier, under the threats o f free entry and potential 
competition, even a monopoly bank would price at competitive level. Price 
competition between non-collusive oligopolists would also lead to efficient outcomes. 
Bikker and Haaf (2000) also pointed out that the empirical applications o f SCP 
paradigm to the banking industry often do not explicitly involve bank conduct 
measurements and only concentrate on the structure-performance relationship.
The shortcomings o f SCP paradigm, was firstly challenged by another structural 
method, which is called efficient-structure hypothesis (ESH), raised by Demsetz
74 Weiss (1989) provides a review of the early literature.
75 Bikker and Haaf (2000) presented some theoretical derivation of the positive relationship between 
market concentration and market performance, but valid under strong assumptions.
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(1973) and Peltzman (1977). This theory suggests that the reason why some firms 
could make super-normal profits over others is because they were more efficient in 
production and hence were able to acquire larger market share, which leads to 
concentration. Therefore, it is the market share, which reflects firm-specific efficiency, 
rather than concentration ratio that should be directly correlated with profitability, and 
also the concentration is not a direct indicator o f market power. Unlike SCP paradigm, 
this model assumes endogenous market structure, which is formed as a result of 
exogenous firm-specific efficiencies, and the concentration is a result o f efficiency 
instead of collusion behaviours.
Although both SCP and ESH approaches are largely empirical, applying them to 
the banking industry incurs several difficulties. The specification and measurement 
problems are obvious. Many studies use the price o f a particular banking product, 
which ignores cross-subsidisation between different products o f a bank, as a measure 
of bank performance. Others use profitability measures, such as banks’ return rate, 
which consolidates profit and loss from multiple products o f individual bank into one 
single measure, however the profitability is also a poor measure o f market power. 
Theoretically, market competitiveness is characterised by firm’s pricing behaviour, i.e. 
the deviation o f output price from marginal cost. The actual profit may be affected by 
demand and supply of substitute products from other financial institutions or other 
geographical markets. But the identification of substitutes market and geographical 
market is particularly difficult for banking industry, where many differentiated and 
substitutable products are available and some o f them are provided by non-bank 
financial institutions or even non-financial institutions (Northcott, 2004).
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Although early studies found the expected relationship between bank profitability 
and concentration, the results were less convincing when control for factors like 
differences in bank specific efficiencies and other environmental variables. Later 
studies using this method normally provide mixed results. Berger (1995) controlled 
the difference in X-efficiency between banks to distinguish between the SCP and ESH, 
and found results in contradiction with both theories; concentration is usually 
negatively related to profits, and the positive relationship between efficiency and 
profits is also weak. Another study by Punt and Van Rooij (2001), using European 
banking data, also provide mixed results. The positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability was not robust to different specifications of 
profitability measurement. Demirgu9 -Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) controlled for 
regulatory policies in a cross-country context, and found that the positive effect of 
concentration on bank interest margins becomes insignificant.
3.2 The non-structural approaches
New empirical industrial organization (NEIO) theories challenge the theoretical 
and empirical problems of traditional structural approaches, and examine the market 
structure directly through the firms’ price-marginal cost margin without including any 
explicit market structure measurement. Vasala (1995) highlights three important 
aspects that distinguish NEIO from SCP and ESH. One, NEIO assumes that firms’ 
price-marginal cost margin cannot be directly observed from data; instead, it can only 
be estimated through an economic cost function or proxied by reasonable 
measurements. Two, unlike the SCP and ESH, which are largely empirical exercises, 
the estimated equation under NEIO are always derived directly from the economic
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imperfect competition theory. The inference about the market structure is precise and 
the alternative hypothesis can be specified explicitly. Three, NEIO studies typically 
only concern a single industry. Two most important techniques in NEIO studies 
include Bresnahan-Lau (BL) mark-up model, developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982), and Panzar-Rosse (PR) reduced-form revenue model developed by Rosse and 
Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987)76. Since both methods are rooted in 
the profit-maximizing equilibrium first-order conditions, their test-statistics are 
systematically related to each other, and under certain conditions, they are also related 
to additional measures of competition, such as the Lemer index77, through the demand 
elasticity measures (Shaffer, 1982,1983).
3.2.1 Bresnanhan-Lau (BL) model
The BL mark-up model assesses market competitiveness through the difference 
between firms’ perceived marginal revenue and the demand price. Given the profit 
maximising condition that marginal cost equals to marginal revenue, in equilibrium, 
competitive firms would set the price just at the marginal cost level, which equals to 
marginal revenue; however firms with market power would not do so, and the 
marginal revenue and the demand price would be different. A test statistic, X, ranging 
from 0 to 1, is calculated to measure the deviations from marginal cost o f firms’ 
pricing behaviour. A value of 0 for X indicates the firms is pricing at marginal cost
76 The Iwata model, Iwata (1974), is also a popular approach of NEIO, but has not been used in 
banking industry extensively. Only very few studies of banking industry use this approach, for 
example, Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994).
77 The conventional Lemer Index of market power measures the disparity between price and marginal 
cost as a percentage of the price, and is calculated as (P-MC)/P.
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level and hence operating in a perfect competitive market, and value of 1 indicates 
that the market is a monopoly or perfect collusive market.
One of the earliest BL model applications in banking industry is provided by 
Shaffer (1989), who found the US banking market, in a long period of 1941-1983, is 
consistent with perfect competition, and collusive conduct is strongly rejected. In his 
later work Shaffer (1993), he found that from 1965 to 1989, the Canadian banking 
market was also consistent with perfect competition structure although concentration 
level was relatively high, and changes o f the Bank Act has improved competition after 
1980. In Shaffer (2001), he estimated conduct and excess capacity o f the banking 
industry in 15 industrialized countries in different regions all over the world during 
1979-91. Results are mixed for different countries, significant market power was 
found in five countries and the market is more competitive in other countries. Gruben 
and McComb (2003) applied the same method to Mexican banking market, and found 
that the output prices were set below the marginal cost level before 1995. They 
described this situation as “super-competitive” market.
3.2.2 Panzar-Rosse (PR) model
In this chapter, banking market competitiveness of ASEAN countries are 
examined country by country using one the most popular non-structural approach, the 
Panzar-Rosse (PR) model. Unlike the BL model, which is usually applied to 
aggregate industry data, the PR model utilises firm-specific data, allowing for 
differences in production function of specific firms, to investigate the relationship 
between input factor prices and firm’s revenue, without requiring information on
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equilibrium output price and quantities o f the industry. The BL model also has the 
drawback of producing anticompetitive bias if  the sample fails to span complete 
markets (Shaffer 2001), and in the context o f cross-country samples, failure in 
correcting cross-border competition may result in misleading estimates. The PR model, 
on the other hand, only uses the firm-level reduced form revenue information, and does 
not require a specific regional market definition, and is more appropriate for the 
analysis carried out in this chapter.
Studies using the Lemer Index to measure banking market competitiveness are also 
popular78, however the Index is normally applied in a single output context. Studies of 
this kind usually only concern the traditional banking activity, and take earning assets 
as the only output. The modem banking business has grown in both scale and scope, the 
non-traditional off-balance sheet activities has become more and more important, and 
the single output market power measure may provide limited information of actual 
competitiveness. Additionally, unlike the PR model, which provides a statistic derived 
from the general equilibrium condition of profit-maximising, the Lemer Index is only a 
partial equilibrium measurement o f firms’ market power, and maybe affected by other 
conditions, such like firms cost structure and risk preference (Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). Given the complexity in the economic environment, Lemer Index may be an 
incomplete indicator o f market power.79
The PR model examines the extent to which changes in input factor prices are 
reflected in (equilibrium) revenues o f a specific firm. The key argument is that, an
78 For example, Kubo, K. (2006). Turk Ariss (2010), and Weill (2011)
79 The Lemer Indices are also calculated for the ASEAN banking markets, using the marginal cost of 
loans derived from the cost function estimated in Chapter 3. Results are reported in Appendix B.
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increase in input factor prices will increase the marginal cost for all kind o f firms, but 
the reactions to this change is different in different type o f markets. In perfect 
competitive market or contestable market, the marginal revenues will increase by the 
same amount as marginal costs so that the zero economic profit is still maintained. 
With free entry condition, the market ends up with fewer firms, each of which still 
supplies the same amount of product but with a higher price. Therefore for firms 
remaining in the industry, the total revenue should increase proportionally with the 
increase in factor prices. On the other hand, monopoly or perfect collusions with full 
market power would bear all the reduction in equilibrium output demand due to 
increases in price, and the total revenue is reduced in this case.
The empirical test is based on the comparative static properties o f reduced form 
revenue equations in terms o f inputs factor prices and other control variables. The test 
statistic, H, is calculated as the sum of elasticities o f revenue with respect to each 
input price. Perfect competition is characterised by H- 1 and H<0 indicates monopoly 
or collusive behaviours, values in between indicate monopolistic competition. Under 
certain conditions, the magnitude o f //-statistic can be interpreted as a measure o f the 
degree o f competition. The PR model is better designed to work with firm-specific 
data, also as pointed by Shaffer (2004), it has another advantage over BL model. The 
BL model estimates are more like to show an anticompetitive bias in small samples, 
but the PR approach provides robust results in small sample case. Nevertheless, there 
are limitations and problems with this widely-used approach80.
80 See section 4 for more discussion on the problems associated with the empirical applications of PR 
approach.
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Empirical applications o f PR approach to banking industry starts from Shaffer 
(1982), who estimated the //-statistics for New York banks in 1979 and find 
monopolistic competition. Other early studies are mainly based on developed 
countries too. Nathan and Neave (1989), who concluded that the Canadian banking 
industry was characterised as monopolistic competition between 1982 and 1984, and 
perfect competition could not be rejected in 1982. Similar results are found for other 
financial institutions. Heffeman (1993) is one o f the earliest studies on UK banking 
market, which examined competition in retail banking in the 1980s, and the situation 
of 1990s was examined in his later work Heffeman (2002). The findings suggested 
that the UK retail banking market was best characterized as monopolistic competition. 
A more recent work by Matthews et al. (2007) estimated the //-statistic for 12 UK 
major banks over the period 1980-2004 and also found monopolistic competition for 
the UK banking market and less intense competition for non-core (off-balance sheet) 
banking business. Single country studies on developed countries also include Vesala 
(1995) who evaluated market structure for Finnish banking market and found 
monopolistic competition for 1985-1988 and 1991-1992, but perfect competition for 
the period o f 1989-1990. Molyneux et al. (1996) examined Japanese commercial 
banking market, and found monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly in 
1986 and monopolistic competition in 1988.
Several multiple-developed country studies have also been found in the literature. 
Molyneux et al. (1994) applied the PR approach to a sample o f German, UK, French, 
Italian, and Spanish banks over period 1986-1989, and suggest monopoly for Italy and 
monopolistic competition for other countries. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) found 
monopolistic competition o f varying degrees for 15 EU countries’ banking market
171
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
from 1989 to 1996. De Bandt and Davis (2000) found monopoly behaviour for small 
banks in France and Germany while monopolistic competitions are found for small 
banks in Italy and for large banks in all three countries for the period 1992-1996. 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) found, in general, monopolistic competition is the best 
description for banking markets in 23 industrialised countries over 1988 to 1999, but 
degree o f competitiveness varies between big banks and small banks in different 
countries. They also found a negative relationship between competitiveness and 
concentration, which support the contestability theory, although the relationship is 
weak. Another recent study by Casu and Girardone (2009b) tested degree of 
competition for the 5 largest EU banking markets for the period 2000-2005, using 
both structural (HHI) and non-structural (PR model) approaches. They found that the 
deregulation and market integration processes have not increased the competitive 
pressure and the EU banking market become more concentrated, and the 
concentration is not necessarily a good proxy for competition.
Empirical studies on developing counties and transition economies using the PR 
model are relatively few but increasing. Studies again find mostly evidence for 
monopolistic competition. Belaisch (2003) evaluated the Brazilian banking market 
and found evidence o f non-monopolistic market structure. Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007) examined the competitive conditions in the banking industries o f 11 Latin 
American countries for the period 1993-2000. They found monopolistic competition 
is the best market type to describe the banking industry in those countries, however a 
decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s due to increased 
consolidation was observed. Al-Muharrami et a l  (2006) investigated the banking 
market structure o f Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during the period
172
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
of 1993-2002 and also found evidence for monopolistic competition in general, but 
there was considerable variation between countries.
A notable comprehensive cross-country study using PR approach in the literature 
is Claessens and Laeven (2004). They estimated the degree o f competitiveness for 50 
countries consisting of both industrialised countries and developing/transitional 
countries, o f which three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) were 
also included in the present study. They found the //-statistics o f each country over 
the period 1994 to 2001 are all in the range o f 0.60 to 0.80, therefore “monopolistic 
competition” is the best description for the banking market in those countries. They 
are also relate the competitiveness measures to several factors and try to identify the 
factors that influence banking market competitiveness, and found that the 
competitiveness indicator is positively related to concentration indicator and foreign 
bank entry, but negatively related to entry and activity restrictions. This result 
supports the contestability theory. A very recent study, Olivero et al. (2011) 
investigated how the banking market competitive structure affects the monetary 
implementation through the bank lending channel in 10 Asian countries (including all 
5 sample countries in the present study) and 10 Latin American countries over the 
period 1996-2006, and found increased competition in banking industry weakens the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Their GMM81 estimates for PR //-statistic provide 
similar information as the results in the present study; Singapore has the most 
competitive banking market and Thailand has the least competitive banking market 
among the 5 countries selected.
81 The dynamic GMM estimator for PR model will be discussed later in section 4.4.
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4. Methodology
4.1 The basic Panzar-Rosse (PR) model
Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed a very general 
test for market structures through testable restrictions on the firm’s reduced form 
revenue equation, that satisfies the general profit maximising conditions of any firm. 
In banking firm theory, banks are treated as normal profit maximising firms and 
therefore follow the general profit maximising rule, which is that the profit is 
maximised when marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Using non-parametric 
notations, the relationship can be presented in the following way:
R'(yi,z l) = Ci(y i,wi,ti) (5.1)
R' and C' are the first order differentiations of bank f s  revenue ( Rt ) 82 and cost (C ,) 
functions, i.e. the marginal revenue and marginal cost o f bank i. A narrower definition 
of y, could be simply the level o f outputs, but could also include output prices, 
advertising costs etc., which are decision variables that affect bank f s  revenue and 
cost, w, represents the vector o f input factor prices that are given to the bank. z;. and
t, are vectors o f exogenous shift variables in the revenue and cost functions, and they 
may or may not contain the same variables.
82 In monopolistic competition case, the revenue function is also affected by the number of firms, n, of 
which the equilibrium value is also a function of exogenous variables, wt , zi and tt.
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For competitive outcomes under either perfect competition or Chamberlinian 
equilibrium of monopolistic competition, the market sustains zero economic profit in 
equilibrium:
£ l ( y % z , ) - C ’{yl ,wl ,ti ) = 0 (5.2)
Where the asterisks (*) denote the equilibrium level o f each variable. Employ 
equation (5.1) and substitute out the endogenous variable y* , a reduced-form revenue 
equation could be derived in terms of input factor prices and other exogenous 
variables only, i.e. Rt (wi ,z j iti ) . The Panzer-Rosse //-statistic is defined, in a J
input factors case, as the sum of factor price elasticities of the reduced form revenue 
equation.
H  = Y ™ L ^  (5.3)
h dw, R,
This //-statistic measures the extent to which total revenue response to a change 
in input factor prices. According to the theorem and two propositions o f Panzar and 
Rosse (1987), the //-statistic for a monopolist must be nonpositive, indicating an 
increase in input factor prices will reduce bank’s total revenue. The monopoly case is 
a very generalised result and requires nothing more than the profit maximising 
hypothesis. In symmetric Chamberlinian equilibrium, the //-statistic is less than or 
equal to unity, indicating reduction in revenue is less than proportion with the 
increases in input prices. The //-statistic equals to unity when the banking market is in
83 Bikker and Haaf (2002) provides a parametric illustration of this deriving process.
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long-run competitive equilibrium, implying bank’s total revenue will increase by 
exactly the same amount as costs. Panzar and Rosse (1987) also attempted a model for 
oligopoly, and showed that the //-statistic is negative, however, there is no evidence 
of generality and in general the relationship is indeterminate.
The PR //-statistic is not only used to reject certain market types. Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) proves that, under the assumption o f constant price elasticity of demand 
with constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology, the //-statistic for 
a monopoly is a negative function of the price elasticity o f demand, e, and equals to 
l-e. Vesala (1995) proves that //-statistic is an increasing function o f e, in the case of 
monopolistic competition. As the number of banks increases, the demand elasticity 
increases till the perfect elastic bank facing demand curve o f perfect competition 
reached. Therefore, the magnitude of H-statistic is also o f great interest and could be 
used as a measurement o f competition. Table 5-1 summaries the corresponding 
market structure o f each possible //values.
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T ab le  5-1 D isc rim in a to ry  p o w er o f H -sta tis tic
E s tim ate d  H  In d u s try  e q u ilib riu m / C o m p etitiv e  e n v iro n m e n t
Monopoly equilibrium^ is a decreasing function o f the 
perceived demand elasticity) or Perfect cartel,
Monopolistic competition with free entry (Chamberlinian) 
equilibrium (H is  an increasing function o f the perceived 
demand elasticity).
Perfect competition. Free entry equilibrium with full (efficient) 
capacity utilization.______________________________________
H <0  
0 < H < 1  
H = 1
177
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
4.2 Empirical model specification and variables
The PR model is empirically tested by estimating a log-linear form reduced form 
revenue function in terms of inputs factor prices and other exogenous variables as 
follows:
J K N
lnR„ = «„ + X a j lnw,« + 2  A  'n +  X Y„ InX nl + /J„ (5.4)
j =1 *=1 n =1
This is a typical panel estimation model that contains observations o f i banks over 
/  periods, where / = 1,2 ,...,7  and t  =  \ ,2 , . . . ,T . WJit represents the price for j  input
t l ifor i bank in period t. The variables in Z are bank-specific exogenous variables that 
influence bank’s revenue and cost functions. Some researchers think that other 
variables, such as macroeconomic variables may also exogenously affect bank’s 
revenue through demand of credit, and therefore should be included in the 
reduce-form revenue equation. Those variables are included in the vector X .84 The 
last term /ult in the equation is a random error term. Since all terms are expressed in
the natural log form, the coefficients a . can be interpreted as the price elasticities o f
revenue, therefore the PR //-statistic is defined as the sum of the estimates for a ’s:
#  = 2>y <5-5>
j =1
84 For example, Matthews, K. et al. (2007)
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Empirical estimation of the reduce-form revenue equation (5.4) involves variable 
selections. The typical dependent variables used the most often in the existing 
literature are interest revenues or total revenues including both interest revenue and 
non-interest revenue. Most studies, including many o f the articles reviewed earlier in 
the present study85, have chosen to scale the dependent variable by bank’s total assets, 
or include a scale variable on the right-hand side o f the equation to capture the 
economies of scale, such as natural logarithm o f total assets. However, argued by 
Bikker et al. (2006), such practice may distort the nature o f the revenue equation and 
lead to biased estimates of //-statistics. Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2006) 
investigated the consequences o f estimating a misspecified revenue equation under 
each market type and demonstrated that scaling the dependent variable or including 
scaling variables as explanatory variable would essentially transform the revenue 
equation into a price equation, since the resulting dependent variable is essentially the 
lending rate or ‘price’. This misspecification would lead to a systematic bias of 
H-statistic towards unity under monopoly or monopolistic competition models. For 
this reason, in the present study, I choose to use the absolute (total) revenue measure 
rather than the relative revenue measurements which are scaled by bank’s total assets 
and do not include any size/scale variable on the right-hand side o f the equation.
The dependent variable used in the present study is total bank revenue (77?), 
including both interest revenue (IR) from the traditional bank business, and other 
operating income (OYY) accounting for the increasingly important non-traditional 
banking activities, such as fee-based products and other off-balance sheet activities. 
Following the intermediation approach o f Sealey and Lindley (1977) that is used in
85 Such as Shaffer (1982), Nathan and Neave (1989), Coccorese (2003), Claessens and Leaven (2004) 
among others.
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Chapter 3 and 4, the input variables are still the number o f employees {LAB), fixed 
assets (FA) and total deposits (TD), and their prices PL, PFA and PD  86are included 
as the W variables in equation (5.4).
Three bank-specific control variables are included in the reduce-form revenue 
equation. The first bank-specific variable is bank cost efficiencies which are obtained 
in Chapter 3. According to the ESH, higher efficiency improves bank’s profitability to 
acquire market share, and hence higher market concentration. On the other hand, 
competition is normally treated as encouragement to foster efficiency in standard 
economic theory. The empirical evidence also provides mixed results on the
on
relationship between competition and efficiency, especially for banking markets . To 
account for the effects o f bank efficiency level, Casu and Girardone (2006) introduced 
non parametric DEA efficiency measures into the reduced form revenue equation as a 
control variable capturing bank’s managerial ability, and estimated the PR H-statistics 
for 15 EU countries. They found that including the efficiency measures generally 
reduces the estimates o f //-statistics for EU banking markets, but the change is not 
statistically significant. Since the sample used in this chapter consist o f the same 
banks as those used in Chapter 3 for bank cost efficiency estimations, following Casu
DO
and Girardone (2006), I utilise those (normalised) efficiency estimates (EFF) 
obtained in Chapter 3 and use them as one bank-specific control variable in the 
revenue equation.
86 See section 4 of Chapter 3 for detailed calculation methods of the input prices.
87 E.g. Claessens and Laeven (2004), Casu and Girardone (2009a).
88 The efficiency estimates obtained in Chapter 3 were estimated against a common-frontier, covering 
all 5 countries and multiple periods for comparison purpose. Here the efficiency scores are normalised 
by the best-practice bank of each country in each period.
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Other bank-specific variables include the ratio o f deposits to loans (RD/L) 
measuring the leverage and the ratio o f loans to assets (RL/A) measuring the loan 
intensity, and these two ratios could be used as a bank’s risk preference measurement. 
Despite the profit situation which may also concerning cost minimisation, the revenue 
of a bank, especially the interest income is expected to positively correlated with 
leverage and loan intensity ratio. Bank’s revenue and profitability are also very 
sensitive to the macroeconomic environment, as the demand for banking services and 
credit is closely related to the business cycle. I include the growth rate o f GDP 
{AGDPii) to capture the effect of macroeconomic variations. The one period lagged 
GDP growth rate {AGDPitt. i ) is also included as the repayment o f loans and interest 
payments may last for more than one period and may be affected by the economic 
situation in previous periods too. The equation estimated for each country is as 
following:
In TRit = a 0+ a l In PLit + a 2 In PFAit + a 3 In PDlt + In EFFit + p 2 In RD/L(,
+ p 3 In RL/A„ + Y\ ln AGDPit + y2 In AGDPjt_x + fiit  ^ ^
and the PR //-statistic is defined as
H  = a x+ a 2 + a 3 (5.7)
To allow for bank-specific heterogeneity, equation (5.6) is estimated by GLS with 
cross-sectional fixed effects panel estimation method.
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4.3 Long-run market equilibrium test
The validity of PR model and its //-statistic depends heavily on the market 
equilibrium assumption. The predicting power o f //-statistic is only valid, especially 
for monopolistic and perfect competition type o f market, when the market is in 
long-run equilibrium. This assumption can be tested empirically by estimating a 
reduce-form profit equation. The idea of this test is that the (risk-adjusted) rates of  
return on assets across banks should be equalised under the competitive pressure and 
no bank can make supernormal return in equilibrium. Therefore the rate o f return 
should not be affected by changes in input prices, if  the market is in long-run 
equilibrium. This test is usually based on an equation that replaces the dependent 
variable in equation (5.4) with pre-tax profit measurements, e.g. return on assets 
(ROA), as following:
lnxa = a ' + £ a ' l n l V ja + J ^ /} ' ln Z hl+ J ^ / rlln X M+ £ l, (5.8)
j =1 k = \  n =1
Where n  is the pre-tax profit measure, and every other variables are still the same as 
defined in equation (5.4). The test statistic, E, is defined as the sum of the price 
elasticities o f profit with respect to each input factor price:
E = i > ;  (5.9)
j =1
As ^-statistic measures the sensitivity of pre-tax profit with respect to the input 
factr prices, when E=0, the market is in long-run equilibrium; while E<0 implies the 
market disequilibrium in which increases in factor price would lead to decrease in
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profit. This market equilibrium test has been widely used in many studies, for 
example, Shaffer (1982), Claessens and Laeven (2004), etc.
In this chapter, the dependent variable used in the profit equation is adjusted 
return on assets (ROA). In the case o f negative profits, i.e. accounting losses, the ROA 
could take small negative values, which raises difficulty in the transformation of 
natural logarithm. To deal with this problem, following Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
among others, the dependent variable (ROA ) is adjusted, such as ROA =l+ROA. 
All explanatory variables on the right-hand side are the same as those used in equation 
(5.6), and the equation is also estimated by GLS with cross-sectional fixed effects 
panel estimation method:
In ROA*u = a'0 + a[ In PLit + a \  In PFAit + a\  In PDit + f$[ In EFFit
+ /?TnRD/L„ + /?' lnRL/A„ + y[ In A GDPit + y[ In A GDPit_x (5.10)
+ £u
and the ^-statistic is the sum of the coefficients on logarithms o f input prices:
E = a[ + a \  + a\  (5.11)
4.4 GMM dynamic estimation under market disequilibrium
A natural question to ask after testing the long-run market equilibrium is that 
what if the market is not always in equilibrium when the data are observed? 
Particularly for transitional economies, like the sample countries in the present study,
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the PR model may not be able to provide a good indicator for the market 
competitiveness if the adjustment towards market equilibrium is not instantaneous. 
(Northcott, 2004).
This issue has been discussed thoroughly in a recent paper by Goddard and 
Wilson (2009). They demonstrated that, by using a Monte Carlo simulation exercise, 
the fixed effect panel estimation of the PR model tends to produce biased //-statistics 
towards 0 , when the data generating process is in partial adjustment towards market 
equilibrium. They suggested that for unbiased //-statistic estimates when market is off 
equilibrium, one should apply an appropriate dynamic panel estimator, such as 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) generalized method o f moments (GMM) procedure, by 
including a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side o f the reduce-form
OQ
revenue equation . Also the speed o f adjustment towards equilibrium can be directly 
assessed through the coefficient estimates on the lagged depend variable. As argued in 
their study, “this eliminates the need for a market equilibrium assumption, but still 
incorporates instantaneous adjustment as a special case”.
In this chapter, this recommendation is used with caution, and only used when 
strong evidence o f market disequilibrium is found. The equation with the dynamic 
adjustment is as following, which is estimated by Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM 
procedure:
89 In Goddard and Wilson (2009), whey also suggest that the dynamic adjustment should be made to 
profit equation too when testing market equilibrium. However, I think this is not necessary since the 
validity o f E-statistic does not depend on the market long-run equilibrium assumption.
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A In TRit - a l  + a\A In PLit + a ” A\n PFAit + a ” A In PDit + p"A In EFFit
+ ^AlnRD/L,, + /?3"AlnRL/A„ + y ”A In AGDPlt + y\A  In AGDPit_x (5.12)
+ 77Alnr/?„_, +A//„
where parameter 77 is the so-called “persistence coefficient”, which measures the 
adjustment speed towards market equilibrium and plays a crucial role in estimating 
unbiased //-statistic. The cross-bank fixed effects are eliminated by using first-order 
differences o f all variables. The GMM estimator for unbiased //-statistic under market 
disequilibrium is defined as:
H' = «  + a ”2 + a n3) /(I -  77) (5.13)
185
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
5. Data
The data used in this chapter are drawn from the same sample o f banks and 
countries that are used for Chapter 3, containing 1889 bank-year observations from 5 
core member countries of ASEAN over the period 1994-2009. Unlike Chapter 3, 
where a meta-frontier is estimated using cross-country and cross-time pooled data, 
estimations in this chapter are carried out country by country. Therefore, data in 
Chapter 3 are adjusted by the PPP exchange rate and converted to a same currency 
measure (US$), but in this chapter, the data are only adjusted by own country GDP 
deflator and leave the data still denoted in own country currency. The difference in 
purchasing power o f currencies does not affect the separate country estimations. The 
numbers o f observation for each country in each year are also reported in Chapter 3, 
Table 3-1. In fact, many variables used in this chapter are used in Chapter 3 too, such 
as the input factor prices, price o f labour (PL), price of fixed assets (PFA) and price of 
deposits (PD). One o f  the bank-specific variable included in the present chapter, cost 
efficiency scores (EFF), is the result of Chapter 3 and growth rate o f GDP (AGDP) is 
also an environmental variable used in Chapter 3. The basic information on the 
sample data, input price variables’ calculation method and data treatments are detailed 
in section 4 o f Chapter 3, therefore, are not repeated in the present chapter.
There are few variables that did not appear in Chapter 3, but were introduced and 
discussed in the model specification section earlier. These variables include: the 
dependent variable o f reduce-form revenue equation, total bank revenue (TR), which 
is the sum of total interest revenue (IR) and other operating income (OYY)90; the
90 OYY is also used in Chapter 3 as an output.
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dependent variable of the profit function, (adjusted) return on assets (ROA); 
bank-specific ratio of deposits to loan (Rd/l) and o f loans to total assets (Rl/a). Table 
5-2- Table 5-6 provide snapshots o f all variables used in this chapter for each country. 
Apart from the descriptive statistics of variables for the whole sample period, Table 
5-2- Table 5-6 also present data summaries for the first 5 years (1994-1998) and last 5 
years (2005-2009) o f each county in order to show the time evolutions in these 
variables.
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Table 5-2 Statistical data description -  Indonesia
1994-2009 1994-1998 2005-2009
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
D ependent variable
TR 3105 6290 22 51815 3170 5884 50 28968 2923 5135 27 24297
ROA -0.39 11.24 -112.21 71.32 -3.63 17.45 -112.21 19.75 1.37 5.13 -72.47 8.93
Input Prices
PL 0.14 0.12 29.01 1316.83 0.15 0.13 0.03 1.02 0.13 0.12 0.03 1.32
PFA 2.98 7.94 -1.50 121.50 3.19 7.54 0.14 81.38 2.05 1.99 0.16 10.86
PD 0.14 0.26 0.00 4.57 0.25 0.31 0.04 2.69 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.12
Bank-specific variable
EFF 0.94 0.06 0.48 1.00 0.94 0.05 0.75 1.00 0.93 0.07 0.48 1.00
R d /l 2.19 5.84 0.07 101.13 1.12 0.98 0.07 8.09 1.54 0.65 0.54 5.17
R l/A 0.53 0.20 0.01 0.93 0.65 0.17 0.08 0.93 0.56 0.15 0.05 0.85
M acroeconom ic variable  
AGDP 3.96 4.98 -13.13 8.22 2.24 8.67 -13.13 8.22 5.65 0.58 4.55 6.35
*TR and PL are measured in bil.IDR. 2005=100
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Table 5-3Statistical data description -  Malaysia
1994-2009 1994-1998 2005-2009
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
Dependent variable
TR 2147 4676 18 40952 1200 1654 22 12236 3098 6197 18 40952
ROA 1.09 1.29 -7.79 7.89 0.98 1.43 -5.99 5.08 1.12 0.62 -0.98 2.45
Input Prices
PL 0.14 0.28 0.02 3.01 0.22 0.47 0.02 3.01 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.35
PFA 1.95 2.25 -0.29 15.97 1.16 1.16 0.24 9.51 2.66 2.62 -0.29 14.42
PD 0.17 0.98 0.00 9.39 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.24 1.17 0.00 8.58
Bank-specific variable
EFF 0.90 0.17 0.01 1.00 0.96 0.04 0.80 1.00 0.85 0.23 0.01 1.00
R d /l 2.09 2.21 0.33 24.59 1.37 0.34 0.83 2.87 3.20 5.68 0.15 52.73
R l/a 0.53 0.20 0.00 1.61 0.60 0.11 0.24 0.82 0.47 0.24 0.00 1.61
M acroeconom ic variable
AGDP 5.11 4.41 -7.36 10.00 5.52 6.87 -7.36 10.00 4.14 2.98 -1.71 6.48
*TR and PL are measured in mil.MYR. 2005=100
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Table 5-4 Statistical data description -  the Philippines
1994-2009 1994-1998 2005-2009
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
D ependent variable
TR 10256 11097 115 50726 11552 11824 241 50726 9697 10742 115 50475
ROA 1.05 2.32 -12.80 31.61 1.70 1.49 -8.72 5.20 0.77 2.55 -12.80 31.61
Input Prices
PL 0.55 0.29 0.15 3.07 0.55 0.19 0.15 1.07 0.55 0.32 0.21 3.07
PFA 1.46 1.64 0.15 13.83 1.07 1.02 0.20 7.96 1.63 1.82 0.15 13.83
PD 0.06 0.23 0.01 4.60 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.28 0.01 4.60
Bank-specific variable
EFF 0.92 0.09 0.10 1.00 0.92 0.07 0.69 1.00 0.92 0.10 0.10 1.00
R d /l 2.09 2.21 0.33 24.59 1.61 0.92 0.86 7.92 2.29 2.55 0.33 24.59
R l/A 0.46 0.14 0.03 0.81 0.54 0.13 0.10 0.81 0.42 0.13 0.03 0.71
M acroeconom ic variable
AGDP 5.21 2.67 -0.58 12.41 3.74 2.44 -0.58 5.85 5.84 2.52 3.40 12.41
*77? and PL are measured in mil.PHP. 2005=100
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Table 5-5 Statistical data description -  Singapore
1994-2009 1994-1998 2005-2009
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
Dependent variable
TR 1703 2117 14 7616 1597 1305 33 4574 2142 2720 14 7616
ROA 1.44 1.68 -0.77 13.23 1.04 0.66 -0.77 2.43 1.40 1.35 -0.03 6.82
Input Prices
PL 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.36 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.27
PFA 3.90 6.15 0.27 36.00 1.49 1.96 0.28 7.17 5.03 7.42 0.27 36.00
PD 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04
Bank-specific variable
EFF 0.93 0.17 0.11 1.00 0.99 0.01 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.24 0.11 1.00
R d /l 1.76 0.88 0.44 6.26 1.72 0.62 0.92 3.84 1.77 1.12 0.44 6.26
Rl/A 0.52 0.18 0.13 0.93 0.53 0.11 0.25 0.78 0.53 0.21 0.13 0.87
M acroeconom ic variable
AGDP 5.43 4.28 -2.39 11.40 6.26 4.79 -1.38 11.40 5.06 4.12 -1.28 8.64
*TR and PL  are measured in mil.SGD. 2005=100
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Table 5-6 Statistical data description -  Thailand
1994-2009 1994-1998 2005-2009
Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max.
D ependent variable
TR 27562 31220 24 177937 39544 41962 1418 177937 25085 25410 126 93000
ROA -0.45 5.28 -34.17 28.16 -1.85 6.89 -34.17 2.87 0.52 1.76 -6.42 4.13
Input P rices
PL 0.51 0.19 0.01 1.28 0.47 0.14 0.11 0.80 0.54 0.20 0.18 1.28
PFA 1.22 3.05 0.06 45.50 0.84 1.98 0.21 17.60 1.18 0.95 0.06 4.73
PD 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
Bank-specific variable
EFF 0.96 0.06 0.23 1.00 0.97 0.03 0.84 1.00 0.95 0.09 0.23 1.00
R d /l 1.29 0.87 0.53 12.94 1.02 0.15 0.53 1.40 1.23 0.32 0.69 2.21
R l/A 0.70 0.15 0.06 0.98 0.82 0.06 0.56 0.98 0.68 0.13 0.29 0.90
M acroeconom ic variable
AGDP 3.46 4.73 -10.51 9.24 1.97 7.69 -10.51 9.24 3.03 2.85 -2.25 5.57
*TR and PL  are measured in mil.THB. 2005=100
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The 5 countries exhibit very much different changing patterns over time. Having 
adjusted inflation, total revenues are only higher in the last 5 years in two countries, 
i.e. Malaysia and Singapore. However, the rates o f return on assets are higher in 
recent years for most of the countries, with the only exception o f the Philippines. The 
bank-specific variables present relatively consistent patterns across countries, that 
efficiencies and loan to asset ratios are lower but the deposit to loan ratios are higher 
in recent year on average. The change in ROA, R d/l and R l/a could be seen as a signal 
of changes in banks’ business from traditional loan making to non-traditional 
activities. The unit prices o f inputs are typically lower in the recent years in Indonesia, 
but tend to be higher in other countries for most the cases. Higher economic growth in 
recent years has been seen in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, but the average 
growth rates were slightly higher in Malaysia and Singapore a decade ago.
6. Empirical results of PR model
6.1 Long-run market equilibrium tests and PR //-statistics
Before applying the PR model to test market competitive structure for each 
country, it is important to identify whether the banking markets in those countries are 
in long-run market equilibrium, since the validity o f the PR //-statistic depends 
crucially on the long-run equilibrium assumption. Equation (5.10) and (5.11) are 
estimated by GLS with cross-sectional fixed effect (FE) unbalanced panel 
estimation91 for each country separately, and Table 5-7 reports the test results of 
long-run market equilibrium for the whole sample period from 1994 to 2009.
91 All estimations in this chapter are conducted in STATA 10.
193
Chapter 5 Market Competitiveness of ASEAN Banking Markets
Table 5-7 Long-run market equilibrium test, E-statistics (1994-2009)
ROA* Indonesia M alaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Intercept -5.5277 -0.3234 -0.7132 -0.1809 -3.6792
(-5.5)*** (-3.39)**’ (-3.02)*** (-1.03) (-8.88)***
Pd -0.0895 -0.0039 0.0086 0.0025 -0.0112
(-5.63)*** (-2.45)** (2.68)*** (1.19) (-2.04)**
Pfa -0.0315 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0032 0.0130
(-2.72)*** (-1.28) (-0.72) (-2.05)** (1.78)*
Pl 0.0235 -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0291
(1.05) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-0.92) (-2.35)**
EFF 1.2001 0.0069 0.0204 0.0059 -0.2337
(7.5)*** (1.37) (2.49)** (1.44) (-1.84)
Rd/l -0.1275 -0.0127 -0.0571 -0.0429 -0.0617
(-4.59)*** (-1.9)* (-6.92)*** (-5.13)*** (-1.76)*
Rl/a -0.1806 -0.0108 -0.0597 -0.0485 -0.0979
(-6.17)*** (-1.57) (-7.57)*** (-6.62)*** (-2.8)***
AGDP, 1.1604 0.0533 0.0867 0.0365 0.3520
(6.82)*** (3.71)*** (2.07)** (1.61) (4.89)***
AGDPt., -0.0448 0.0142 0.0705 0.0036 0.4199
(-0.32) (0.96) (1.87)* (0.13) (5.99)***
OverallR2 0.2267 0.0056 0.2596 0.4637 0.3106
Ho:T|j=0 F(58,568)=1.43**
F(32,329)=
3.44***
F(28,312)=
2.89***
F(7,87)=
2.97***
F(20,229)=
1.34
N 0bs 635 370 349 103 258
Nbanks 59 33 29 8 21
E-statistic -0.0975 -0.0089 0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0273
Ho:E=0 F(l,568)=12.54***
F( 1,329)= 
5.27**
F(l,312)=
0.25
F(l,87)=
0.41
F( 1,229)= 
2.53
Chow-test F(9,559)=5.00***
F(9,320)=
2.57***
F(9,303)=
3.01***
F(9,78)=
5.87***
F(9,78)=
5.87***
' and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly
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Estimation results o f the profit equation generally exhibit the expected sign for 
each variable. When the relationship is statistically significant, banks’ profitability is 
typically negatively related to the input factor prices in most cases. Marginal effects 
of Banks’ average efficiency level are only significant in two countries, i.e. Indonesia 
and the Philippines, and positively affect banks’ profitability. Both deposit to loan 
ratio (R d/l) and loan to assets ratio (R l/a ) are negatively related to banks’ profit, 
implying that banks’ profit decreases with relatively high level o f liability which 
incurs high interests costs, and excessive grant o f loan with lack of diversity in 
business may lead to high exposure to default risk. Both current and past favourable 
macroeconomic environment improves banks’ profit due to high demand for credit 
and better credit risk. The F-test (Ho:r]j=0) for bank-specific effect confirms that the 
cross-bank heterogeneities are highly significant in all countries but one, i.e. 
Thailand.92
The F-statistics estimates for the whole sample period (1994-2009) are also 
reported in Table 5-7, along with a Wald F-test statistic for the null hypothesis that 
H0:F=0. The F-statistic estimates are either less than zero or not significantly 
different from zero, which satisfy the general theory that higher input prices reduce 
banks’ profit or do not affect banks’ profit if  the market is in equilibrium. According 
to the Wald F-test statistics, market long-run equilibrium over the whole period is 
only rejected in two countries, which are Indonesia and Malaysia. In the case of the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the test fails to reject the market long-run 
equilibrium over 1994-2009. However, most o f the member countries in ASEAN are 
characterised as developing countries, o f which the banking market should involve
92 Insignificant F-test statistic suggests OLS estimator is appropriate, but in order to be consistent with 
other results, FE estimates are reported. OLS estimator produces similar results.
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continuous dynamic changes over time. Especially, during the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, ASEAN countries were among the most affected countries, and the series of  
large-scale banking sector structural reforms have significantly changed the structure 
of banking industries in many countries. Therefore, intuitively, the stable long-run 
market equilibrium is very unlikely to exist in any o f the sample countries, even in the 
case o f Singapore, which is the only developed country in this region. A Chow 
structural break test is carried out for each country to test the stability of the 
parameters. A nature structural break time point would be year 2001, when most of 
the countries are recovered from the 1997 financial crises and largely finish the 
banking sector reforms. The structural break test results are reported in the last row of 
Table 5-7, and confirm that all countries in the sample have experienced a significant 
structural change during this period. Therefore, the parameters in the estimating 
equation are not stable over the whole sample period, neither the parameters for the 
E-statistic. The banking markets in pre- and post-crisis period may be both out of 
equilibrium or in equilibrium within each sub-sample, but the assumption of long-run 
market equilibrium for the whole period does not hold.
The market long-run equilibrium assumption is further tested in two sub-periods 
with the year 2001 as a turning point, i.e. 1994-2001 and 2002-2009, and results are 
reported in Table 5-8. In the sub-period profit equation estimations, most o f the 
explanatory variables exhibit expected signs with a few exceptions in input prices but 
only of marginal significance. The bank-specific fixed effects are not significant in the 
first period for Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, but are significant for other 
countries and other periods. According to the Wald F-test statistics, long-run market 
equilibrium is rejected in both periods for Indonesia and Malaysia, and in the first
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period for Thailand. The test fails to reject market equilibrium in both periods for the 
Philippines and Singapore, and in the second period for Thailand, however, given the 
structural breaks, the long-run equilibrium still does not hold for the whole period in 
these countries. These results have further proved that the banking market in ASEAN 
countries are continuously or occasionally off the long-run equilibrium, or have 
moved from one equilibrium to another during the sample period. Therefore following 
the recommendations by Goddard and Wilson (2009), the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
GMM dynamic estimator should be applied in the PR models estimation instead of  
the conventional fixed effect static panel estimator.
Applying the dynamic GMM estimator to PR //-statistic estimation involves 
taking the first-order difference of each variable and hence removing the 
bank-specific fixed effect, and the dynamic adjustments towards long-run equilibrium 
is captured by the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side o f the equation. 
Equation (5.12) is estimated for each country over the entire period with all variables 
expressed in the form of first-order differences, and the corresponding dynamic 
adjusted //-statistics are calculated according to equation (5.13). Table 5-9 summaries 
the results.
The first thing to be noticed in Table 5-9 is that the coefficient estimates o f the 
lagged depended variables, i.e. the “persistence coefficients”, are all positive and 
highly significant in all countries. According to Goddard and Wilson (2009), this 
further proves that the dynamic adjustments are necessary in the estimation, since the 
adjustment towards market equilibrium is not instantaneous but partial. The estimated 
coefficients for input prices have no consistent sign, this is because in the reduce-form
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revenue equation, the marginal effects o f input factor prices could be either positive or 
negative depending on the level o f market power that a bank has, and the overall 
effect o f increase in input prices on the total revenue is exactly what the PR model 
tries to find out and use to determine the degree of competitiveness of a particular 
market.
The coefficient estimates on the three bank-specific variables, EFF, R d/l and R l/a, 
all exhibit positive sign, when the coefficient is statistically significant. It would be no 
surprise that, other things equal, more efficient banks are more likely to generate more 
revenue. However, R d/l and R l/a are o f the opposite signs as they were in the profit 
equation estimation results (Table 5-7 and 5-8), and in fact, one should not predict the 
same effects o f the two ratios on both profit and revenue. The reason is that these two 
ratios involves both revenue (interest income) and cost (interest expenses) in the profit 
equation, but the dependent variable in the revenue equation is gross revenue from 
both traditional and non-traditional banking business, without having any interest cost 
or loan default cost in consideration. Therefore, the Rd/l in the revenue equation is 
merely a measure o f banks’ risk preference, the higher the value for Rd/l the more 
prudential the bank is, and the positive sign suggest that higher revenue is rewarded to 
more prudential banks. Positive sign on R l/a implies that the higher proportion of loan 
in total assets, the higher revenue a bank could generate, and indicates that interest 
income from loans are still the main income source for most banks in ASEAN.
The estimates for current period GDP growth rate are only significant in two 
countries, and it seems that the past macroeconomic conditions, indicated by the 
one-period lagged GDP growth rate, are more relevant and significant in all countries
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but one. Recall the argument that was made in Chapter 3, that the impact of economic 
expansion on banks’ performance could be either positive or negative. Demand for 
financial services tends to grow as economies expand, however immoderate lending 
in economic boom may create potential non-performing loan problems and jeopardise 
the loan repayment in future periods. With a relative sophisticated financial system, 
normally in wealthier countries, banks are more likely to generate stable streams of 
income even the economic growth rate is relatively low. On the other hand, banks that 
operate in a fast-growing but unstable economic environment are not guaranteed a 
high level o f income. In this particular case o f the 5 core member countries of 
ASEAN, it can be seen that higher economic growth rate reduces banks’ total revenue 
in Indonesia and Thailand, which could be explained by the negative effects of 
economic instability; but improves banks’ total revenue in Singapore, thanks to the 
well-developed financial system and relatively stable economic environment. The 
statistical significance o f the past macroeconomic environment brings the reality that 
the repayment o f loans and interests and returns in banks’ other investments does not 
only depend on the economic situation o f the time when it is due to maturity, but also 
the economic situations during the whole life time o f the loan and investment. 
Apparently, it is the latter that is more relevant and continuously advantageous 
macroeconomic environment significantly improves banks’ revenue.
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Table 5-8 Long-run market equilibrium test of two sub-periods, ^-statistics (1994-2001 & 2002-2009)
ROA* I M P  S___________    T
Variable 1994-2001 2002-2009 1994-2001 2002-2009 1994-2001 2002-2009 1994-2001 2002-2009 1994-2001 2002-2009
Intercept -1.1777 -8.6818 -0.2488 -0.2652 -2.0657 0.2459 -0.1272 -0.1423 -4.5706 -0.5350
(-0.62) (-3.36)*** (-1.57) (-2.01)** (-5.24)*** (0.58) (-0.41) (-0.73) (-6.57)*** (-1.45)
P d -0.2719 -0.0381 -0.0092 -0.0012 0.0013 0.0075 -0.0092 0.0031 -0.0191 -0.0170
(-5.13)*** (-3.94)*** (-1.98)** (-0.84) (0.15) (1.08) (-1.24) ( 1 . 1 ) (-1.02) (-3.88)***
P fa -0.0588 -0.0029 -0.0070 0.0023 -0.0074 -0.0043 0.0013 -0.0037 0.0326 0.0065
(-2.2)** (-0.47) (-1.73)* (2.06)** (-2.17)** (-0.97) (0.29) (-1.92)* (1.8)* (1.83)*
P l 0.1117 -0.0128 -0.0020 -0.0075 -0.0056 0.0129 0.0013 -0.0020 -0.1066 0.0066
(2.09)** (-0.97) (-0.28) (-2.81)*** (-0.84) (1.37) (0.79) (-0.61) (-3.58)*** (1.07)
EFF 0.3510 1.0659 0.0328 0.0014 -0.0166 0.0432 0.7366 0.0041 -0.2735 0.0020
(0.55) (15.73)*** (0.45) (0.46) (-0.33) (3.02)*** (1.11) (0.92) (-0.87) (0.04)
R d /l -0.3707 -0.0529 -0.0318 -0.0102 -0.0591 -0.0399 -0.0279 -0.0168 -0.1934 -0.0489
(-5.01)*** (-2.42)** (-1.59) (-2.14)** (-2.05)** (-2.37)** (-0.61) (-1.71)* (-1.73)* (-3.35)***
R l/a -0.3898 -0.1257 -0.0321 -0.0095 -0.0482 -0.0577 -0.0004 -0.0200 -0.2316 -0.0400
(-53)*** (-5.69)*** (-1.4) (-1.94)* (-1.61) (-3.31)*** (-0.01) (-1.74)* (-2.14)** (-2.92)***
AGDPt 0.3010 0.9155 0.0393 0.0367 0.2352 -0.0392 0.0299 0.0226 0.4531 0.0809
(0.91) (1.68)* (1.53) (2.05)** (3.19)*** (-0.6) (0.91) (0.65) (3.45)*** (1.23)
AGDP,.! -0.3150 0.9412 0.0080 0.0173 0.2100 -0.0091 -0.0005 0.0115 0.4903 0.0215
(-1.36) (1.96)** _ (0.36) (0.67) (3.65)*** (-0.16) (-0.01) (0.35) (4.73)*** (0.2)
OverallR2 0.2062 0.2383 0.0529 0.0045 0.0961 0.3172 0.3627 0.0724 0.2943 0.2728
H0:t|i=0 F(51,229) 
=0.71
F(50,287)
=4.55***
F(26,129)
=1.68**
F(29,168)
=2.83***
F(28,126)
=3.20***
F(25,152)
=1.78**
F(7,23)
=1.03
F(7,48)
=3.40***
F( 17,92) 
=1.23
F(19,l 12) 
=4.22***
N0bs 289 346 164 206 163 186 39 64 118 140
Nbanks 52 51 27 30 29 26 8 8 18 20
^-statistic -0.2190 -0.0538 -0.0181 -0.0064 -0.0117 0.0162 -0.0065 -0.0026 -0.0931 -0.0039
H0:E=0 F( 1,229) =10.88***
F( 1,287) 
=10.14***
F(l,129)
=3.82*
F(l,168)
=3.90**
F(l,126)
=1.13
F(l,152)
=1.36
F(l,23)
=0.46
F(l,48)
=0.25
F(l,92)
=5.20**
F (l,l  12) 
=0.23
***’ **’ and * denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly
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Table 5-9 PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics (1994-2009) —  GMM
TR Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Intercept
TRt-1
P d
P fa
P l
EFF
R d/l
R l/a
AGDP,
AGDPt_i
N0bs
Nbanks
//-statistic
Ho:H=0
H0:H=1
-0.7857 -4.2916 -6.7905 -5.9970 -2.7798
(-0.30) (-2.53)** (-2.51)** (-1.51) (-1.3)
0.5998 0.6027 0.5952 0.7442 0.4570
(12.13)*** (20.04)*** (15.57)*** (14.58)*** (13.36)**'
0.2050 0.2371 0.1084 0.1507 0.0464
(6.65)*** (9.18)*** (2.67)*** (3.28)*** (1.67)*
-0.0878 0.1340 0.0916 0.0748 -0.0840
(-3.45)*** (5.82)*** (2.52)*’ (1.86)* (-2.15)**
-0.0658 0.0444 -0.0810 0.0700 -0.2928
(-1.24) (0.81) (-1.25) (1.74)* (-3.8)***
0.7798 0.2220 0.7448 -0.0701 1.3092
(2.34)’* (2.69)*** (5.87)*** (-0.79) (2.06)**
0.2414 0.3601 0.2567 -0.1185 -0.2734
(3.86)’** (3.2)*** (2.26)** (-0.62) (-1.48)
0.3961 0.2129 0.2398 0.0401 0.1305
(5.63)*** (1.84)* (2.24)** (0.24) (0.69)
-1.3751 -0.0180 0.1982 1.1058 -0.8663
(-4.55)*** (-0.08) (0.43) (2.17)** (-2.5)**
2.9587 1.7027 2.1061 0.6926 2.5979
(9.76)*** (7.58)**’ (5.33)*** (1.15) (7.83)***
565 333 314 95 237
59 33 29 8 21
0.1284 1.0460 0.2940 1.1551 -0.6084
chi2(l)= ch i2(l)= chi2(l)= ch i2(l)= chi2(l)=
0.70 36.73*** 1.97 12.47*** 11.60**’
ch i2(l)= ch i2(l)= chi2(l)= ch i2(l)= chi2(l)=
18.33*** 0.07 10.35*** 0.22 70.11***
M-MC PC M-MC PC MMarketcondition
T T T -r , - r
’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly 
M -  Monopoly or perfect collusive; MC — Monopolistic Competition; PC -  Perfect Competition
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The //-statistics are calculated as the sum of input price elasticities and are tested 
against each o f the market type hypotheses in Table 5-1. Unlike what has been 
typically found in studies using static fixed effect panel estimations that the 
H-statistics are normally in the range o f 0 and 1 for most countries , i.e. in favour o f  
monopolistic competition. Having adjusted the dynamics o f transition, the results are 
more diversified. The //-statistics for Malaysia and Singapore are greater than 1 in 
absolute values, but based on the Wald test results regarding null hypothesis Ho:H=l, 
they are not statistically different from 1, therefore monopoly and monopolistic 
competition are rejected but perfect competition cannot be rejected in these two 
countries. Negative H  has been detected for Thailand, and is statistically less than 0, 
rejecting both perfect competition and monopolistic competition, thus monopoly or 
perfect cartel is the best description for Thailand banking market. In the case of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the //-statistics are 0.1284 and 0.2940, which are in the 
range of 0 and 1, however, the hypothesis H= 0 cannot be rejected in both cases. The 
banking markets in these two countries are characterised by monopolistic competition 
but with a very low level o f competition which towards monopoly or perfect collusive 
market.
For purposes o f comparison, the implied Lemer Index was constructed from the 
estimated cost function of Chapter 3 and reported in Appendix B. The results are mixed 
and show confirmation o f the findings from the P-R H-statistics for two countries only 
(Malaysia and Thailand). The Lemer Index being only a partial equilibrium indicator 
will not have the same generality as the P-R H statistic, however for two countries there 
was a common message of improved competitiveness.
93 For example in Claessens and Laeven (2004), the estimates of //-statistic for Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines are 0.62, 0.68, and 0.66 accordingly for the years 1994-2001.
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The first impression one may have is that the banking industries in the 5 core 
ASEAN countries are of very different competitive structures, which cover both the 
most competitive structure and the most uncompetitive one. Using the numerical 
values of //-statistics as a measurement of degree o f competitiveness, the countries 
can be ranked from the most competitive to the least competitive as follows: 
Singapore > Malaysia > the Philippines >Indonesia > Thailand. The notable 
difference in banking market competitiveness between member countries may impose 
difficulties on the process o f banking market integration. Opening up the cross-border 
financial market barriers and allowing free capital movements will definitely 
introduce shocks to the domestic markets. The consequences are difficult to predict, 
banks from countries with competitive banking market may dominate banks from 
countries with less competitive market. The reason is that banks in competitive 
markets are forced to operate on the lowest point o f cost curves, and to implement the 
most efficient production technology and most efficient resources allocation. These 
banks may have the advantages o f crack internal cooperate governance structure and 
better experiences on quick adaptation to new environment. However it could also be 
the other way around, banks with high degree o f market power in one particular 
country may be better capitalised through years o f accumulation o f supernormal 
profits, and may have established solid relation networks with the cooperate sectors 
that the foreign competitors hardly break into. Either way it goes, successful 
integration o f the banking markets should foster competition, and the banking market 
competitiveness should converge toward a common standard for banks to survive in a 
more open environment.
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Differences in market competitiveness of banking sector in member countries 
may also affect the implementation of monetary policies, and hence the future 
monetary integration. As stated in Olivero et al. (2011), increased competition in 
banking market weakens the impact o f changes in monetary policy for two reasons. 
One is that the total credit made available to existing customers by large competitive 
banks is less likely to be affected by monetary tightening on reserves, because the 
lending decisions o f competitive large banks are typically less dependent on the 
availability o f funds from deposits, since they normally have better access to 
additional funds. The other reason is that, the increased competition may reduce 
information asymmetries in the market, and in turn reduce the cost o f switching 
between banks for both borrowers and lenders. Therefore, when there is monetary 
policy tightening, and small banks shrink their loan supply, large banks with better 
additional funds can easily pick up the excess demand for loans and make the 
monetary policy less effective. On the other hand, the sensitivity o f bank loan and 
deposit rates to the changes in monetary policies in a competitive market may better 
transmit the monetary policy and hence help improve its effectiveness. The overall 
effect of banking market competition on effectiveness o f monetary policy will depend 
on whether the negative effect dominates the positive effect or the other way around. 
The concern in the present study is not only on the individual countries, but also on 
the mismatch between countries. For a future monetary alliance, the mismatch of 
member countries’ banking market competitiveness may lead to uneven responses or 
pass-through o f monetary policy from the regional central bank, and could even create 
more heterogeneity across countries invalidating to the original intention o f adopting a 
currency union in the first place.
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6.2 Evolution of banking market competitiveness
Comparing the estimates o f PR //-statistic of each country for the whole sample 
period provides valuable information about the competitive nature of the banking 
market in these countries. Although the dynamic GMM estimator was applied to 
adjust the biases o f //-statistic estimates due to market disequilibrium, a single 
//-statistic for the entire sample period does not provide much information about the 
time evolution o f banking market competitiveness. In this section, the dynamics in 
market competition are captured by conducting a rolling estimation o f a 5-year 
window, and a series o f moving //-statistics are estimated for each country94. Using 
cross-bank fixed effect panel estimator, equation (5.6) and (5.7) are repeatedly 
estimated for moving windows o f 5 years with moving speed o f 1 year, thus 12 
windows in total. The estimations are carried out for each country individually, and 
Tables 5-10- Table 5-14 report the estimations results for each country accordingly.
The rolling estimation results o f reduce-form revenue equations show the 
changing effects o f explanatory variables on banks’ total revenue over time within 
one particular country and differences in their effects cross countries. However, there 
are still some features that all countries sharing in common. The price of deposit (Pd) 
has the most explanatory power among all three input factor prices in all five 
countries, and consistently exhibits positive sign whenever it is statistically significant. 
The positive marginal effect o f Pd itself suggests that increasing the interest margin 
more than proportionally with an increase in the funding price is a common practice 
in most banks o f ASEAN, however, more emphasises should be put on its joint effect
94 It is assumed that there are moving equilibriums from one 5-year window to another, and the 
adjustments between window-equilibriums represent the dynamic adjustment towards the long-run 
market equilibrium.
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with other input factor prices on banks’ total revenue rather than analysing each one 
individually. The other characteristic that is common to all countries is that 
bank-specific efficiency (EFF) level positively contributes to banks’ total revenue, 
and its explanatory power increases over time, becoming relatively more significant in 
the post-crisis period. This is consistent with the typical stylised fact that banks with 
superior operational efficiency tend to outperform less efficient banks.
Other explanatory variables included in the reduce-form revenue equation show 
some changing patterns across time and across countries to various degrees. 
Comparing with the price of deposit (P d ), price o f fixed assets ( P f a )  is less relevant 
and has positive effect on banks’ revenue in most countries and periods, but negative 
effect in Indonesia for all periods and mixed effects in Thailand. Price o f labour ( P l )  
is of the least explanatory power, which are statistically insignificant for most times, 
and exhibits mixed signs in the few cases when it is significant. The unstable effects 
of input factor prices could be due to many reasons, but given the multiple-input and 
multiple-output nature o f banks, it is the joint effect o f all input factor prices represent 
the characteristics o f banks’ behaviour, hence the degree o f competition of the whole 
market.
Apart from the bank-specific efficiency scores, the two other bank-specific 
variables also provide mixed results. The ratio o f deposit to loan (R d /l)  consistently 
has positive effects on banks’ revenue in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in 
all periods and in some periods for Singapore and Thailand, and this is consistent with 
its estimated effect for the whole sample period on average. However, negative signs 
are shown in period 2000-2004 for Singapore and in two period-windows from 1999
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to 2004 for Thailand. It is noticed that these exception periods are just after the 
banking sector structural reforms following the 1997 Asian crisis, and the short-term 
opposite effects from R d /l could be explained, in Singapore and Thailand particular, 
by a possible short-term shrink in loan supply or write-offs o f bad loans during the 
crisis period, both o f which could lead to a increase in the ratio and a decline in 
interest revenues.
The loan intensity ratio (Rua) was estimated to have positive effect on banks’ 
revenue for the whole sample period on average, and this is also the case for most 
5-year window periods in most countries. The only two exceptions happen in the early 
years (1994-1999) for Indonesia and immediate post-crisis period 2000-2004, 
however are all o f only marginal significance at 10% level. The effects of 
macroeconomic conditions in periods o f each moving window are basically consistent 
with the average effect o f the whole sample period on banks’ total revenue. Mostly 
negative effects are observed from the current period GDP growth rate which implies 
high economic growth but relatively unstable environment, and positive effects 
associated with the past economic growth rates which improves the repayment of 
loans and interest as a result of better return on investments. Few exceptions did 
appear but does not change the overall effects for the whole period.
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Table 5-10 5-year window rolling PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics for Indonesia
Variable 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
Intercept -102.975 17.852 19.225 16.233 17.235 22.127 -83.594 -57.301 -71.667 -95.250 -56.025 -24.133
(-3.45)*** (6.27)*** (5.59)*’* (4.5)*** (5.33)*** (2.04)** (-2.21)** (-1.96)* (-3.03)*** (-4.67)*** (-2.51)** (-0.98)
P d -0.038 0.003 0.211 0.325 0.401 0.399 0.547 0.460 0.482 0.372 0.273 0.179
(-0.44) (0.04) (2.38)** (3.4)*** (5.29)*** (6.43)*** (7.05)*** (5.9)*** (8.32)*** (5.37)*** (3.54)*** (2.72)***
P fa 0.026 0.028 -0.046 -0.048 -0.029 0.034 0.041 -0.102 -0.163 -0.203 -0.137 -0.095
(0.6) (0.75) (-0.99) (-1.22) (-0.94) (0.9) (0.86) (-2.26)** (•3.9)*** (-5.27)*** (-3.04)’** (-2.08)**
P l 0.087 -0.076 0.008 0.018 -0.022 -0.069 -0.099 0.051 0.085 0.063 0.045 0.004
(0.87) (-0.94) (0.08) (0.22) (-0.29) (-0.84) (-0.99) (0.49) (0.8) (0.76) (0.5) (0.04)
EFF 1.298 1.442 1.771 0.829 1.674 0.729 1.727 2.261 2.698 5.307 1.673 1.255
(1.5) (1-65) (1.66)* (0.86) (2.46)** (0.99) (2.49)** (3.45)*** (4.2)*** (8.46)*** (4.09)*** (3.19)***
R d /l -0.139 -0.091 0.049 0.012 0.145 -0.018 0.275 0.836 1.275 1.269 0.977 0.044
(-1.08) (-0.82) (0.38) (0.1) (1.37) (-0.16) (2.1)** (6.76)*** (9.55)*** (10.28)*** (7.14)*’* (0.23)
R l/a -0.244 -0.199 0.142 0.108 0.093 0.099 0.417 0.953 1.294 1.244 1.352 0.307
(-1.74)* (-1.7)* (1.12) (0.88) (0.91) (0.89) (2.98)*** (6.86)*** (9.1)*** (9.53)*** (9.48)*** (1.81)*
AGDPt -7.383 -2.754 -2.403 -1.630 -1.778 -2.783 15.183 10.632 8.379 12.055 7.491 -5.321
(-6.67)*** (-6)*** (-4.33)*** (-2.66)*** (-3.23)*** (-1.02) (2.31)** (2.45)** (1.09) (2.71)*** (1.57) (-1.89)*
AGDPm 32.180 1.924 1.318 1.213 1.200 1.220 6.171 4.921 10.269 11.649 7.733 13.616
(4.4)*** (5.53)**’ (3.31)*** (3.44)*** (4.09)*** (2.25)** (3.15)*** (1.2) (2.12)** (2.02)** (1.87)* (3.49)***
OverallR2 0.0023 0.0441 0.0808 0.0549 0.1536 0.0210 0.0883 0.2891 0.3441 0.4904 0.2148 0.1116
HOnirO F(44,101) F(48,145) F(51,151) F(51,157) F(51,159) F(52,156) F(50,154) F(49,156) F(50,160)
F(50,165) F(50,167) F(49,163)
=67.34*** =63.04*** =45.19*** =55.96*** =81.87*** =83.55*** =88.69*** =80.57*** =99.33*** =108.99’** =115.87*** =127.98***
N 0bs 154 202 211 217 219 217 213 214 219 224 226 221
Nbanks 45 49 52 52 52 53 51 50 51 51 51 50
H 0.0743 -0.0455 0.1729 0.2950 0.3494 0.3640 0.4897 0.4090 0.4047 0.2327 0.1819 0.0876
H0:H=0 F(l,101)=0.41
F(l,145)
=0.22
F(l,151)
=2.28
F (l, 157) 
=6.42**
F(l,159)
=13.51***
F(l,156)
=14.54***
F(1,154) 
=18.89***
F(l,156)
=10.55***
F(l,160)
=10.58***
F (l, 165) 
=4.71**
F(l,167)
=2.43
F(l,163)
=0.69
H0:H=1 F(l,101)
=63.17***
F (l, 145) 
=115.08***
F(l,151)
=52.29***
F(l,157)
=36.67***
F(l,159)
=46.84***
F (l,l 56) 
=44.37***
F(l,154)
=20.51***
F(l,156)
=22.02***
F (l, 160) 
=22.90***
F(l,165)
=51.18***
F(l,167)
=49.26***
F(l,163)
=74.54***
Market type M-MC______ M________MC_______ MC_______ MC_______ MC_______ MC_______MC_______ MC_______ MC______M-MC M-MC
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level accordingly; M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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Table 5-11 5-year window rolling PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics for Malaysia_____________________________________________________
Variable 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
Intercept -187.275 16.495 15.636 10.468 14.815 13.355 14.509 -16.084 24.993 -29.039 52.791 38.753
(-8.97)*** (7.38)*** (7.66)*** (4.27)*** (3.81)*** (3.5)*** (2.94)**’ (-2.28)** (1.79)* (-1.02) (1.62) (2.94)***
PD 0.068 0.359 0.200 0.221 0.198 0.202 0.220 0.385 0.395 0.572 0.662 0.571
(0.68) (3.41)*’* (2.59)*’ (3.36)*** (2.74)**’ (2.95)*** (3.27)*** (6.12)*** (5.68)*** (8.22)*** (9.94)*** (7.53)***
PFA 0.025 -0.047 -0.044 -0.033 0.092 0.135 0.174 0.153 0.114 0.013 -0.029 0.013
(0.55) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.49) (1.21) (2.11)** (2.77)*** (3)*** (1.98)** (0.2) (-0.47) (0.26)
PL -0.282 -0.644 -0.134 0.030 0.183 0.145 -0.006 -0.015 0.158 0.242 0.116 -0.171
(-2.52)** (-5.44)*** (-1.23) (0.27) (1.67)* (1.41) (-0.05) (-0.13) (1.37) (1.82)* (1.01) (-1.38)
EFF 3.118 -0.254 2.983 1.604 1.976 1.220 1.013 0.660 0.287 0.536 0.400 -0.012
(2.63)’* (-0.19) (2.74)*** (1.56) (4.26)*** (6.04)*** (5.4)*** (3.77)*** (2.07)** (3.65)*** (2.77)*** (-0.08)
R D/l -0.012 0.340 0.559 0.330 0.705 0.877 0.986 0.823 0.030 0.522 0.194 -0.020
(-0.05) (1.08) (2.04)** (0.75) (1.83)* (2.73)*** (2.83)*** (2.51)** (0.08) (1.26) (1.06) (-0.11)
R l/a  -0.071 0.185 0.453 0.419 0.595 0.790 0.995 0.956 -0.211 0.185 -0.029 -0.016
(-0.18) (0.42) (1.38) (0.94) (1.45) (2.14)** (2.36)** (2.47)** (-0.52) (0.44) (-0.15) (-0.08)
AGDPt -9.651 -1.733 -1.620 -0.818 -1.268 -1.152 -0.994 3.253 -6.088 3.470 -6.481 -1.133
(-10.74)*** (-3.86)*** (-4.07)*** (-2.07)** (-2.17)** (-1.74)* (-1.54) (3.16)*** (-1.97)* (0.95) (-2.03)** (-1.18)
AGDPm 50.813 -0.485 -0.199 0.216 -0.207 -0.009 -0.464 1.993 2.501 4.730 -2.859 -5.391
(9.63)*** (-1.55) (-0.71) (0.72) (-0.54) (-0.03) (-0.72) (3.05)*** (2.98)*** (1.26) (-0.64) (-1.61)
OverallR2 0.2188 0.1007 0.4168 0.1833 0.0107 0.0056 0.0930 0.3178 0.0591 0.1487 0.174 0.1766
u n.„ _ n F(26,57) F(26,83) F(26,90) F(26,88) F(26,86) F(29,84) F(29,85) F(28,89) F(29,90) F(28,93) F(27,94) F(26,94)
™ .n ,-0  = 9 9 3 ] ... =528Q... =61 39-  = 6900-  =95.38 *" =157.61*** =184.35*** =251.04*** =204.93*** =164.41*** =224.70*** =215.36*’
Nobs 92 118 125 123 121 122 123 126 128 130 130 129
Nbanks 27 27 27 27 27 30 30 29 30 29 28 27
H -0.1881 -0.3315 0.0216 0.2184 0.4739 0.4816 0.3881 0.5230 0.6673 0.8281 0.7493 0.4134
HOH-O F^ ’57) F(l,83) F(l,90) F(l,88) F(l,86) F(l,84) F(l,85) F(l,89) F(l,90) F(l,93) F(l,94) F(l,94)
H 0H ' °  =1.46 =4.39** =0.02 =2.30 =12.02*** =13.76*** =5.63** =14.17*** =21.63*** =32.00*** =28.20*** =8.29***
u n .u = , F(l,57) F(l,83) F(l,90) F(l,88) F(l,86) F(l,84) F(l,85) F(l,89) F(l,90) F(l,93) F(l,94) F(l,94)
=58.14*** =70.74*** =48.39*** =29.40*** =14.81*** =15.94*** =13.99*** =11.79*** =5.37** =1.38 =3.16* =16.69***
Market Type M________ M______ M-MC M-MC______MC_______MC_______MC_______MC_______MC MC-PC MC
* ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level accordingly; M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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Table 5-12 5-year window rolling PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics for the Philippines
Variable 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-200'
-112.573 14.017 13.967 10.374 34.743 14.623 0.829 1.521 5.979 36.371 12.274 63.295
(-6.83)*** (1.78)* (1.88)* (1.55) (3.16)*** (3.21)*** (0.19) (0.31) (1.25) (5.51)*** (1.02) (3.87)***
0.534 0.863 0.543 0.397 0.027 0.240 0.210 0.100 0.293 0.172 0.193 -0.138
(3.39)*** (4.3)’** (3.05)*** (2.5)** (0.22) (2.65)** (2.5)** (1.02) (2.5)** (1.6) (1.58) (-1.24)
0.061 -0.020 -0.082 -0.102 -0.113 -0.011 -0.048 0.126 0.274 -0.024 -0.103 -0.094
(1.11) (-0.26) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-1.2) (-0.13) (-0.55) (1.4) (3.67)*** (-0.33) (-1.38) (-1.13)
0.172 -0.052 -0.079 0.117 0.342 0.339 0.257 0.003 -0.325 -0.333 -0.274 -0.170
(1.47) (-0.33) (-0.51) (0.89) (2.55)** (3.02)*** (2.37)** (0.03) (-2.69)"’ (-2.68)’” (-1.62) (-0.88)
1.792 0.538 0.792 1.056 1.764 1.296 0.942 0.184 0.604 0.696 0.552 1.220
(1.34) (0.33) (0.75) (1.19) (2.03)** (1.75)* (2.08)** (0.38) (2.57)** (3.27)*** (2.27)** (4.39)***
-0.064 -0.059 0.216 1.369 3.090 3.536 2.679 0.399 0.466 0.175 0.125 -0.178
(-0.12) (-0.09) (0.38) (2.3)** (5.93)*** (8.3)*** (6.41)*** (1.75)* (1.91)* (0.75) (0.57) (-0.59)
-0.064 -0.030 0.517 1.876 3.236 3.439 2.554 0.188 0.405 0.268 0.352 -0.012
(-0.12) (-0.04) (0.83) (2.91)*** (5.77)*** (7.45)*** (5.67)*** (0.78) (1.51) (1.09) (1.47) (-0.04)
-0.446 0.464 -0.707 -0.302 -4.987 1.147 0.486 0.257 0.187 -3.378 2.954 -2.942
(-0.42) (0.31) (-0.51) (-0.24) (-2.57)** (1.4) (0.68) (0.31) (0.24) (-3.54)*** (1.1) (-1.58)
26.919 -1.063 -0.044 0.350 -0.376 -2.080 1.460 1.292 0.541 -2.440 -3.546 -8.819
(7.32)*** (-0.81) (-0.04) (0.39) (-0.39) (-2.01)** (2.53)** (2.04)** (0.89)
. _ A _ . *** 
(-3.33) (-4.11)*** (-3.21)***
0.1643 0.0072 0.0709 0.3069 0.6425 0.5057 0.4288 0.0483 0.015 0.1247 0.1203 0.4084
F(24,54) F(27,77) F(28,83) F(28,85) F(28,86) F(27,89) F(26,89) F(25,87) F(25,88) F(25,86) F(25,81) F(24,79)
=59.98*** =25.77*** =35.87*’* =47.16*** =39.98*** =52.07*** =65.77*** =66.29*** =93.11*** =79.07*** =59.30*** =50.33***
87 113 120 122 123 125 124 121 122 120 115 112
25 28 29 29 29 28 27 26 26 26 26 25
0.7672 0.7911 0.3830 0.4121 0.2561 0.5688 0.4187 0.2285 0.2429 -0.1851 -0.1841 -0.4022
F(l,54) F(l,77) F(l,83) F(l,85) F(l,86) F(l,89) F(l,89) F(l,87) F(l,88) F(l,86) F(l,81) F(l,79)
=14.38*** =9.22*** =2.94* =3.49* =1.88 =15.05*** =7.07*** =1.43 =1.57 =0.92 =0.95 =2.75
F(l,54) F(l,77) F(l,83) F(l,85) F(l,86) F(l,89) F(l,89) F(l,87) F(l,88) F(l,86) F(l,81) F(l,79)
=1.32 =0.64 =7.62*** =7.11*** =15.89*** =8.65*** =13.63*** =16.33*** =15.21*** =37.53*** =39.11*** =33.45***
MC-PC MC-PC MC MC M-MC MC MC M-MC M-MC M M M
Intercept
Pd
Pfa
P l
E F F
RD/L
R■L/A
AGDP,
AGDPM
OverallR2
H0:r|i=0
N0bs
Nbanks
H
H0:H=0
H0:H=1
Market Typeu* n —T—
’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%  and 10% level accordingly; M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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Table 5-13 5-year window rolling PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics for Singapore
Variable 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
Intercept 7.418 47.418 22.512 11.048 12.293 10.635 11.970 2.653 1.660 19.124 41.092 40.395
(0.33) (5.81)*** (2.81)’* (1.37) (1.34) (1.38) (1.85)* (0.26) (0.17) (0.85) (1.75)* (2.89)***
Pd 0.360 0.497 0.238 0.326 0.122 0.216 0.248 0.324 0.602 0.779 0.829 0.732
(1.81) (1.67) (0.65) (1.76)* (0.76) (2.5)** (3.46)*** (2.19)** (4.97)*** (4.01)*** (4.28)*** (4.05)***
Pfa -0.138 0.082 0.607 0.536 0.374 0.447 0.377 0.301 0.186 0.189 0.168 0.132
(-1.16) (0.99) (1.89)* (2.95)*** (2.93)*** (4.5)*** (6.21)*** (2.92)*** (2.02)* (1.92)* (1.9)* (1.49)
Pl 0.007 0.036 0.127 0.027 0.207 0.259 0.104 -0.192 0.017 0.104 0.057 0.100
(0.34) (1.15) (0.51) (0.17) (1.76)* (2.18)** (0.86) (-0.79) (0.08) (0.56) (0.37) (0.62)
EFF -24.825 -10.546 -24.833 23.063 15.649 3.286 2.218 0.445 -0.104 0.160 0.205 0.072
(-1.27) (-0.32) (-0.83) (1.49) (1.82)* (3.17)— (4.48)’** (0.67) (-0.28) (0.49) (0.74) (0.31)
Rd/l 5.907 1.392 3.106 1.494 0.297 -0.657 -0.896 -0.103 0.977 0.498 0.254 0.394
(3.28)** (0.72) (1.02) (0.9) (0.41) (-1.69) (-2.72)** (-0.18) (1.61) (1) (0.62) (1.03)
Rl/a 6.871 2.147 2.630 1.215 0.778 0.135 -0.136 -0.109 1.052 0.391 0.201 0.647
(3.54)** (0.97) (0.86) (0.8) (1.32) (0.35) (-0.44) (-0.22) (1.45) (0.61) (0.32) (1.31)
AGDP, -2.734 -3.428 -1.602 -0.272 -0.189 0.178 0.360 1.571 0.995 0.181 -3.340 -2.799
(-3.68)** (-3.01)** (-1.03) (-0.36) (-0.2) (0.17) (0.47) (0.96) (0.44) (0.07) (-1.69) (-1.52)
AGDPt-i 3.098 -4.809 -1.578 -0.473 -0.850 -0.833 -1.404 -0.780 0.470 -2.299 -3.456 -3.844
(0.73) (-5.05)*** (-1.28) (-0.44) (-0.71) (-0.87) (-1.47) (-0.59) (0.36) (-0.65) (-0.93) (-1.45)
OverallR2 0.2290 0.0103 0.1054 0.0142 0.0524 0.3058 0.2560 0.2994 0.011 0.0020 0.0212 0.0137
H0-n=0 F(4,4) F(5,9) F (7 ,ll) F(7,15) F(7,19) F(7,22) F(7,24) F(7,24) F(7,24) F(7,24) F(7,24) _ F(7,24)I  I V /  .1 1 }  \ J
=55.23*** =65.35*** =28.12*** =56.75*** =116.08*** =278.56*** =387.13*** =118.55*** =168.93*** =149.69*** =177.69*** =172.38***
N 0bs 17 23 27 31 35 38 40 40 40 40 40 40
Nbanks 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
H 0.2296 0.6152 0.9717 0.8899 0.7034 0.9216 0.7287 0.4328 0.8057 1.0724 1.0540 0.9637
H0H=0 F(l,4) F (l,9) F ( l , l 1) F ( l ,15) F( 1,19) F(l,22) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24)JL XV/ ( 1 1  V/
=0.87 =4.08* =6.94** =6.24** =6.49*’ =20.57*** =23.16**’ =1.99 =8.21*** =10.74*** =14.47*** =12.53***
H0*H=1 F(l,4) F(l,9) F ( l , l l ) F(l,15) F ( l ,19) F(l,22) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24) F(l,24)1  I V /  • L  1  1
=9.84** =1.60 =0.01 =0.10 =1.15 =0.15 =3.21* =3.42* =0.48 =0.05 =0.04 =0.02
Market Type M-MC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC M-MC MC-PC PC PC MC-PC
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level accordingly; M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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Table 5-14 5-year window rolling PR Market competitiveness test, //-statistics for Thailand
Variable 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
-8.735 1.438 -2.983 -1.187 22.928 6.059 4.587 15.088 1.167 67.888 61.057 22.767
(-1.46) (0.36) (-0.59) (-0.19) (2.88)*** (0.65) (0.44) (1.2) (0.08) (2.19)** (2.81)*** (2.14)**
-0.329 -0.403 0.711 0.592 0.046 0.054 0.064 -0.032 0.705 0.465 0.378 0.421
(-1.67)* (-1.24) (4.03)*** (4.09)*** (0.28) (0.47) (0.85) (-0.33) (5.82)*** (3.62)***
. _  .  *** 
(2.92) (3.65)***
0.185 0.023 -0.027 -0.135 -0.129 -0.327 -0.235 0.001 0.137 0.007 0.032 0.213
(2.42)** (0.21) (-0.24) (-1.33) (-1.44) (-3.59)*** (-2.73)*** (0.01) (1.28) (0.07) (0.38) (2.68)***
-0.264 -0.265 -0.142 -0.019 0.058 0.168 -0.078 -0.112 -0.419 -0.223 -0.227 -0.030
(-1.9)* (-E25) (-0.74) (-0.11) (0.39) (1.25) (-0.54) (-0.93) (-2.77)*** (-1.31) (-1.54) (-0.17)
2.004 3.562 3.799 2.655 7.344 4.574 3.791 5.647 3.465 2.507 3.064 1.551
(1.69)* (2.04)** (2 .1 )- (1.49) (2.55)** (1.82)* (1.85)* (3.88)*** (1.59) (2.25)** (3.03)*** (1.83)*
-0.516 0.417 0.890 0.084 -0.258 -0.771 -0.713 0.149 0.630 0.787 0.797 0.903
(-1.23) (0.53) (1.22) (0.12) (-0.5) (-2.11)** (-2.26)** (0.51) (1.78)* (2.21)** (2.24)** (2.57)**
0.066 0.818 1.004 0.227 -0.196 -0.575 -0.553 0.375 0.890 0.941 1.272 0.832
(0.1) (1.11) (1.44) (0.33) (-0.4) (-1.57) (-1.71)* (1.22) (2.5)** (2.74)*** (4.12)*** (2.1)**
-5.127 -2.274 1.098 0.445 -3.014 0.557 0.670 -1.133 -8.305 -10.170 -4.661 -2.129
(-5.61)*** (-2.02)** (1.05) (0.41) (-2.47)** (0.32) (0.46) (-0.75) (-2.58)** (-3.25)*** (-2.02)** (-0.91)
8.946 3.911 2.096 2.273 0.176 0.216 0.381 -0.074 10.679 -1.967 -6.048 -0.351
(4.64)*** (4.59)*** (3.66)*** (3.44)*** (0.23) (0.39) (0.25) (-0.04) (4.06)*’* (-0.37) (-1.09) (-0.09)
0.0711 0.3718 0.1937 0.2001 0.4753 0.2819 0.2850 0.5830 0.0389 0.1333 0.1533 0.0143
F(16,39) F(17,56) F( 17,60) F(17,62) F(17,62) F( 18,62) F(18,61) F( 18,59) F(19,58) F( 19,59) F( 18,60) F(17,62)
=144.61*** =35.53*** =31.25*** =30.24**’ =27.45*** =56.44*** =69.71*** =61.17*** =48.70*** =48.87*** =58.67*** =77.93***
64 82 86 88 88 89 88 86 86 87 87 88
17 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 20 20 19 18
-0.4080 -0.6446 0.5421 0.4386 -0.0249 -0.1060 -0.2486 -0.1433 0.4236 0.2489 0.1828 0.6036
F(l,39) F(l,56) F(l,60) F(l,62) F(l,62) F(l,62) F(l,61) F(l,59) F(l,58) F(l,59) F(l,60) F(l,62)
=3.19* =2.78 =3.53* =2.75 =0.01 =0.34 =1.89 =0.76 =5.14** =1.94 =1.01 =8.65***
F(l,39) F(l,56) F(l,60) F(l,62) F(l,62) F(l,62) F(l,61) F(l,59) F(l,58) F(l,59) F(l,60) F(l,62)
=37.99*** =18.07*** =2.52 =4.50** =17.64*** =37.48*** =47.60*** =48.11*** =9.51*** =17.68*** =20.09*** =3.73*
Intercept
Pd
FA
Pl
EFF
R,D/L
Rl/a
AGDP,
AGDPm
OverallR2
H0:r|i=0
N 0bs
Nbanks
H
H0:H=0
H0:H=1
Market Type M__________M_______ MC-PC M-MC________M__________M__________M__________M_________ MC M-MC M-MC MC
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level accordingly; M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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A Series of PR //-statistics are calculated for each country, based on the moving 
5-year windows and tested accordingly against each o f the market type hypothesis in 
Table 5-1. The Wald test statistics are reported in the separate country results in Table 
5.10-Table 5-14, and for comparison convenience, those //-statistics and the estimated 
market structures are reproduced and summarised in Table 5-15. According to Vesala 
(1995), the magnitude o f //-statistic could serve as a measurement o f the degree of  
market competitiveness, in the sense that higher values o f //-statistics indicate a 
higher level o f competition. The changing patterns in //-statistics over time could also 
be treated as a representative o f changes in degree o f market competition over time.
The results in Table 5-15 clearly shows that the 5 core ASEAN countries have 
experienced very different evolution processes in terms o f banking market 
competitiveness level. For most of the time, Indonesian banking market can be 
characterised by monopolistic competition. The degree o f market competition was 
very low at the beginning, but keeps on improving and reaches a peak with an 
//-statistic o f 0.4047 in period 2002-2006. However, the degree o f competitiveness 
has been weakened again in recent years, and the market structure moves towards 
monopoly or perfect cartel. Banking market competitiveness in Malaysia also show a 
improving trend from zero degree o f competition (monopoly or perfect cartel) in early 
periods to a market that is statistically perfect competitive in the period 2003-2007. 
The improvement in competitiveness is the most significant among countries in this 
region.
Situation in the Philippines is very different from other countries, and it is the 
only country that shows a clear continuers declining trend in banking market
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competitiveness over the sample period, //-statistics in the beginning periods were 
high enough to statistically accept the perfect competition hypothesis, but started 
decreasing around the 1997 Asian crisis and picked up a little after the structural 
reforms, however, followed by a long-term decreasing till the end. As a result, the 
banking market in the Philippines could be described as a monopoly market or perfect 
collusive market for nearly a decade starting from 2001.
The degree o f  competitiveness o f Singaporean banking market is relatively stable 
and maintains a high level o f competitiveness over time. The small value o f  
//-statistic in the beginning period is largely due the extremely small sample size, 
which only contains 17 bank-year observations in 5 years, and therefore does not 
necessarily reflect true market structure of that time. Other periods are mostly 
characterised as perfectly competitive market with only a short period decline in 
competitiveness during the banking structural reform process after the 1997 Asian 
crisis.
The least competitive banking market is the one o f Thailand, which show the 
most monopoly or perfect collusive market type that evidenced by negative values for 
//-statistic. The Thai banking market maintains a level o f competitiveness in general, 
but with a few fluctuations. Interestingly, the most competitive period is 1996-2001, 
which covers the 1997 crisis period and the structural reforms after it, but then the 
market is back to monopoly for a relatively long period until recently an improving 
tendency has been seen.
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The differences in the evolution time paths may be less relevant if they could 
eventually lead each country’s banking market towards a similar competitiveness 
level. Unfortunately, even in the most recent period 2005-2009, the 5 banking markets 
still show high level o f heterogeneity, ranging from perfect competition/oligopoly 
with contestability to monopoly or perfect cartel. Furthermore, there is not even 
obvious evidence for a converging tendency in terms o f banking market competition 
level. The policy implications made earlier in the previous section still hold and have 
been further proved by these more detailed investigations. The trend of financial 
integrations in ASEAN countries since the 1997 Asian financial crisis only improved 
competitiveness in a few countries, and the dispersion in terms o f banking market 
competition is still substantial. The convergence in banking market competition is still 
weak, indicating a low degree o f  integration in ASEAN banking markets.
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Table 5-15 Summary of rolling regression //-statistics and market structures
1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
//-statistic
I 0.0743 -0.0455 0.1729 0.2950 0.3494 0.3640 0.4897 0.4090 0.4047 0.2327 0.1819 0.0876
M -0.1881 -0.3315 0.0216 0.2184 0.4739 0.4816 0.3881 0.5230 0.6673 0.8281 0.7493 0.4134
P 0.7672 0.7911 0.3830 0.4121 0.2561 0.5688 0.4187 0.2285 0.2429 -0.1851 -0.1841 -0.4022
S 0.2296 0.6152 0.9717 0.8899 0.7034 0.9216 0.7287 0.4328 0.8057 1.0724 1.0540 0.9637
T -0.4080 -0.6446 0.5421 0.4386 -0.0249 -0.1060 -0.2486 -0.1433 0.4236 0.2489 0.1828 0.6036
Market Type
I M-MC M MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC M-MC M-MC
M M M M-MC M-MC MC MC MC MC MC MC-PC MC MC
P MC-PC MC-PC MC MC M-MC MC MC M-MC M-MC M M M
S M-MC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC-PC MC M-MC MC-PC PC PC MC-PC
T M M MC-PC M-MC M M M M MC M-MC M-MC MC
M-Monopoly/perfect collusive; MC-Monopolistic Competition; PC-Perfect Competition
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7. Market competition and concentration
This section examines how concentration affects the degree o f competition in 
ASEAN banking market. The structural approaches o f measuring competition links 
competition to concentration, and predicts a positive relationship between 
concentration and banks’ performance, hence a negative relationship to the 
competition level. They emphases on, either the causal relationship from market 
structure (concentration) to banks’ performance through their conduct (the SCP 
paradigm), or the endogenously shaped market structure/concentration as a result of  
higher market share due to superior efficiency (the ESH approach). The concentration 
measurement plays an important role in both o f the two structural approaches but is 
typically ignored in the NEIO non-structural approaches o f measuring market 
competition.
The NEIO approaches identify the degree o f market competition directly from the 
banks’ pricing behaviour without any explicit structural measure. The relationship 
between market concentration and market competitive conditions, however, is not 
clear cut, and not been paid much attention until recent years. The theory of 
contestable markets argues that the degree o f market competition is not determined by 
the existing market structure, but the potential threat o f entry. If the market is 
perfectly contestable, even a monopolist bank would behave competitively, since the 
potential threat o f competition could become actual competition at anytime if  there is 
economic profit existing. On the other hand, a seemingly competitive market with 
large number o f banks could exercise collusive behaviour when there is relatively 
high entry cost. In NEIO theories, competition is not necessarily impaired by
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concentration, and competitive outcomes could be achieved under various market 
structures. To the best o f the my knowledge, Bikker and Haaf (2002) is one o f earliest 
studies that relates the PR //-statistic to concentration indices (Cl), such as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the k bank Concentration Ratio (CRfi, and 
found evidence from a sample of 23 developed countries, supporting for the 
conventional view that concentration weakens competition. Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) also use the 5-bank concentration ratio (among other variables) as an 
explanatory variable in a regression on the PR //-statistic, and the relationship 
between competition and concentration becomes positive in a larger sample o f 50 
countries including many developing and transitional countries.
Market concentration could be measured in many ways, but generally a market 
concentration measurement should reflect elements like the number o f banks which 
measure the “fewness o f banks”, and size distribution o f banks which measure the 
size inequality among banks95. The two most frequently used concentration indices 
(Cl) in banking industry are the k bank Concentration Ratio (CRk) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). These two indices are both sum o f market shares 
of banks, but reflect different information.
The k bank Concentration Ratio sums only the market share o f the k largest banks 
with equal (unity) weight for each bank:
O ft = 2 > ,  (5.14)
/=1
95 Bikker and Haaf (2000) provide an excellent detailed review on various concentration 
measurements.
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where s( is market share o f bank i. The choice o f k is typically arbitrary without
theoretical rules, and in the present study, both 3-bank and 5-bank concentration ratios 
are calculated. The CRk is a decreasing function o f the number o f banks, and in the 
range o f 0 (when there is infinite number o f banks) and l(when the market is entirely 
occupied by the banks included in the ratio calculation). This measurement is simple 
to use, but totally ignores the market share o f small banks that remaining in the 
industry. The argument is that calculation using entire bank size distribution would be 
unnecessary if  a market is dominated by a small number o f  banks, since the market 
behaviour is very unlikely to be affected by the total number o f banks. However, 
ignoring the structural changes o f the industry may lead to misleading conclusions. 
The larger banks may be forced to behave competitively by competitive behaviour o f  
smaller banks (Bikker and Haaf, 2000).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H H I) is a “cumulative” measurement96 of 
concentration, indicating market concentration using the entire bank-size distribution, 
i.e. all banks in the market. Another difference from CRk is that H H I  assigns different 
weights to individual banks by using banks’ own market share as it weight, thus 
greater weights are attached to larger banks if market share is measured based on 
assets. It takes the form:
HHI = ^ s f  (5.15)
/ = 1
which is simply the sum o f squares o f banks’ market shares. The H H I  is also a 
decreasing function o f bank numbers, ranging from 1 In and 1. When there are n
96 The CRk is said to be a discrete measure as it can be considered as on point on the concentration 
curve.
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equal-size banks, HHI reaches its lowest value o f 1 In. The HHI takes all banks into 
account in calculation, and is the most widely used measurement for concentration, 
especially for policy-making purpose.
In order to examine the relationship between NEIO measurements of market 
competition and the traditional market structure measurements in the ASEAN banking 
markets, the PR //-statistics estimates (H) obtained in the rolling regression of 5-year 
windows are regressed on the corresponding time period concentration index (Cl) and 
the natural logarithm o f the number o f banks (.Ln(n)) in the sample97:
H j, = 0o + °\CIjt + 02Ln(n)Jt + cojt (5.16)
where j=  1, 5 denotes each country in the sample, t= 1, 12 denotes each 5-year
window and cojt is the random error term. This test is not doable for each individual
country due to limited number o f observations, but a panel estimation using all 
countries’ data is only meaningful if  they were in a single market.
The inclusion o f number o f banks in the regression is because o f three reasons. 
Bikker and Haaf (2001) illustrated that the concentration indices are “one-dimensional 
measures taking account o f two dimensions”, which are the density and skewness of  
the banking market. The density is normally measured by the number o f banks, and 
skewness is measured by the size distribution o f banks. Describing the market 
structure by using both concentration index and the number o f banks would restore 
this two-dimensionality. Another reason is that both H  s and CT s are estimated or
97 Similar specification can be found in Bikker and Haaf (2002)
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calculated from the available sample rather than the true population. The limited 
sample size may introduce biases in these measures, and including the number o f  
banks in the sample could correct this bias in the regression. The last but not least 
function that the number o f banks variable serves is that it could be treated as a 
natural measure o f entry barrier, and thus a measure o f the potential threat o f 
competition which is the key factor in contestable market theory.
Robustness o f the test is checked by using three different asset-based98 
concentration indices, HHI, 3-largest bank concentration ratio (CR3) and 5-largest 
bank concentration ratio (CR5). The CI’s are calculated on yearly bases for each 
country individually, and the average o f 5-year window averages o f each Cl is used in 
order to match the //-statistics. Table 5-16 represents the average Cl’s o f each 5-year 
window. The values o f CR3 and CR5 are always higher than HHI. This is because 
HHI attaches less weight to smaller banks while CR’s treating them equally important. 
One may notice that the market concentration indices are extremely high for 
Singapore, in some case are close to unity. Given the limited sample size, which only 
contains 8 banks at most and only 4 banks in the early periods, these indices do not 
necessarily represent the true market structure, and this is also the reason why 
including the number o f banks in the regression equation (5.16) is necessary. 
Concentration indices o f other countries do not show dramatic differences between 
countries. HHI’s fluctuate around 0.1000 with the most deviation to 0.1434, the total 
market share occupied by the largest 3 banks are about 40-50% o f the total market and 
55-70% for the largest 5 banks.
98 Calculated based on banks’ total assets.
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Table 5-16 5-year window averages of C l’s
1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009
I 0.1089 0.1205 0.1275 0.1347 0.1401 0.1434 0.1296 0.1198 0.1090 0.1000 0.0956 0.0939
M 0.1042 0.1025 0.0992 0.0987 0.0955 0.0927 0.0911 0.0899 0.0910 0.0944 0.0971 0.1004
HHI P 0.0840 0.0846 0.0859 0.0893 0.0911 0.0928 0.0912 0.0896 0.0864 0.0893 0.0927 0.0961
S 0.3497 0.3525 0.3534 0.3505 0.3458 0.3366 0.3302 0.3252 0.3217 0.3195 0.3205 0.3207
T 0.1289 0.1236 0.1206 0.1193 0.1177 0.1171 0.1173 0.1152 0.1140 0.1123 0.1101 0.1089
I 0.5028 0.5250 0.5350 0.5500 0.5613 0.5707 0.5401 0.5188 0.4924 0.4690 0.4562 0.4517
M 0.4432 0.4470 0.4451 0.4421 0.4366 0.4279 0.4164 0.4086 0.4199 0.4364 0.4512 0.4681
CR3 P 0.3672 0.3751 0.3825 0.4128 0.4204 0.4289 0.4213 0.4130 0.4019 0.4138 0.4269 0.4388
S 0.9907 0.9852 0.9800 0.9724 0.9671 0.9647 0.9642 0.9627 0.9647 0.9637 0.9625 0.9617
T 0.5240 0.5096 0.5025 0.4997 0.4974 0.4958 0.4925 0.4812 0.4732 0.4668 0.4579 0.4560
I 0.6652 0.6790 0.6891 0.6973 0.7052 0.7127 0.6922 0.6709 0.6490 0.6287 0.6194 0.6164
M 0.5792 0.5692 0.5662 0.5699 0.5693 0.5650 0.5574 0.5544 0.5643 0.5809 0.5947 0.6094
CR5 P 0.5436 0.5481 0.5560 0.5854 0.5953 0.6054 0.5996 0.5912 0.5754 0.5875 0.6005 0.6124
S 0.9992 0.9975 0.9959 0.9943 0.9926 0.9917 0.9917 0.9918 0.9921 0.9922 0.9921 0.9918
T 0.7200 0.7058 0.6979 0.6944 0.6886 0.6850 0.6839 0.6743 0.6700 0.6653 0.6605 0.6598
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The results of the various indices show similar ranking among countries. In 
general, the concentration indices for Indonesia and Thailand are slightly higher than 
those for Malaysia and the Philippines. The correlation coefficients between each two 
indices are reported in Table 5-17. HHI and CR3 have the highest correlation 
coefficient, which is of the value 0.9958, and lowest correlation is between HHI and 
CR5, but still has a large magnitude of 0.9801. Although various concentration 
indices measures the market concentration by taking in different information, based 
on the high correlation coefficients, these indices should reflect similar market 
structure for each country.
Table 5-17 Correlation coefficient between concentration indices (Cl)
HHI CR3 CR5
HHI 1.0000 0.9958 0.9801
CR3 0.9958 1.0000 0.9878
CR5 0.9801 0.9878 1.0000
The strong correlation between various concentration indices is a warning 
message that they should not be simultaneously included in the same regression both 
as explanatory variables, which may raise the problem of multicollinearity. Therefore, 
the //-statistic is only regressed on one concentration index, with the natural logarithm 
of number of banks, at once by using fixed-effect panel estimation". Table 5-18 
summaries the estimation results.
99 Experiments on multiple Cl’s have been conducted and confirmed the existence of multicollinearity 
problem.
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Table 5-18 Relationship between competition and concentration (dependent variable is H-statistics)
HHI CR3 CR5
Intercept -4.1548 -4.5421 -5.3885
(-2.49)** (-2.51)** (-2.76)***
Cl -0.8260 0.2299 1.2768
(-0.23) (0.15) (0.74)
Ln(n) 1.4908 1.5337 1.5600
(3.20)*** (3.34)*** (3.47)***
OverallR2 0.1805 0.1565 0.1285
H0:T|i=0 F(4,53)=5.35*** F(4,53)=5.57*** F(4,53)=7.24***
’ ’ and denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level accordingly
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Regression results in Table 5-18 using various concentration indices produce 
somehow consistent results. The coefficient estimates on the three concentration 
indices are either positive or negative; however, none o f them is statistically 
significant, which means market concentration does not have significant impact on the 
level of market competition measured by PR //-statistics. On the other hand, the 
number o f banks is always highly significant no matter what concentration index is 
used, and the effect is always positive under all circumstances. Fixed-effect F-test 
statistics are all significant, confirms the existence o f cross-country heterogeneity and 
the appropriateness o f the estimation method.
Clearly, if  the ASEAN banking market was treated as if  it was a single market, the 
level of competition is not determined or even affected by the market structure. The 
concentration measurements do not have any explaining power on the competition 
measurements. If the existing number o f banks could be treated as a measure of threat 
of entry, and therefore the threat o f potential competition, then clearly, that is the 
threat of potential competition that improves the level o f competition in the ASEAN 
banking market. These relationships are evidence for a “contestable market”, which 
may be good news for further banking market integration in this region. Banks 
already operating in contestable market under the pressure o f potential competitions 
maybe relatively well prepared for adjusting themselves whenever the new 
competition comes in, even the current competition is not at the optimal level. Further 
integration will surely bring the foreign rivals into domestic market and strengthen the 
threat o f potential competition, and to some extent the competition was potential may 
become actual. No matter under what conditions the banks are operating currently, 
they all need to adjust their behaviours towards the competitive level, and the degree
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of competitiveness for the entire ASEAN banking market would be improved 
accordingly.
8. Conclusion
In this chapter, the research focus is on market competitiveness of ASEAN 
member country’s banking market. Applying the non-structural Panzar-Rosse (PR) 
reduced-form revenue model, to each country, the //-statistics are estimated, firstly for 
the whole sample period as an average measure o f banking market competitiveness in 
the one and half decades, secondly for a rolling period window of 5 years to 
investigate the time evolution in banking market competition. The cross-country 
comparison shows that both the static degree o f competitiveness and the dynamic 
evolution process vary significantly from country to country, and the ongoing process 
of ASEAN financial integration has not improved banking market competitiveness and 
the convergence tendency is also weak. The current degree o f banking market 
integration for ASEAN countries is still low in terms o f the competitive structures.
The optimal competitive structure for banking market is still a debatable question, 
due to the trade-offs between economic efficiency and financial stability. When 
neither perfect competitive nor monopoly can dominate the other, the contestable 
market seems like a compromising optimal. Through the investigation on the 
relationships between market competition and concentration under a strong 
assumption o f an existing single market, evidence has been found in favour o f the 
contestable market structure in ASEAN banking markets. This may be a relatively 
positive aspect for further banking market integration. Banks already operating in
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contestable market under the pressure of potential competitions maybe relatively well 
prepared for adjusting themselves whenever the new competition comes in, even the 
current competition is not at the optimal level.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
The regional coordination toward financial integration began in the aftermath of 
the 1997 Asian crisis. Together with significant banking structural reforms in 
individual countries after the crisis, several regional financial integration initiatives 
were launched to promote regional financial stability and economic growth. Arguably, 
a well integrated financial system could improve the efficiency of the economy through 
lower cost o f capital and better allocation of financial resources, and deeper financial 
integration could also improve the financial stability o f the region. Given that most 
ASEAN economies have underdeveloped capital markets, the banking system is still 
the principal vehicle o f financial intermediation. Furthermore the banking system is 
also the principal channel o f monetary policy pass-through, and therefore the degree of 
integration in banking markets is crucially important. Improvement in banking 
integration itself is also important for further real economic, financial and monetary 
integration in the region.
As pointed out by Bayoumi and Mauro (2001), “it may also be easier to integrate 
countries...whose financial systems work in a similar manner”. In addition, Madhur 
(2002) outlined few important constraints in ASEAN that may make the future 
sustaining o f a monetary union difficult, one o f which is the weakness in the financial 
sector o f many countries. Arguably, a healthy and well-balanced financial system 
would help reap the maximum benefits from further monetary cooperation, respond to 
asymmetric shocks, and maintain the financial stability in an open capital market 
environment.
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This thesis examines the impact o f national banking structural reforms and 
ASEAN regional financial integration on the performance in financial markets, 
particularly, in the banking market. It contributes to the literature in three specific ways: 
First, it evaluated the effectiveness o f the national banking reforms and financial 
integration process through the evolution o f bank efficiency and competitiveness. 
Specifically it addressed the question, have the national banking reforms and financial 
integration process improved bank efficiency and banking market competitiveness 
level? Second, it, investigated the convergence properties o f ASEAN bank efficiency, 
which is used as an indicator o f banking market integration at the institutional level. 
Third, it identified the weakness and strengths o f the current ASEAN banking market, 
and draw policy implications for further regional integration toward the ultimate 
ASEAN community 2015.
Chapter 3 examined the cost efficiencies o f ASEAN banks by using the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The cost efficiency scores 
were then used to test for efficiency convergence properties. In Chapter 5, the banking 
market competitiveness is modelled by the new empirical industrial organisation 
(NEIO) non-structural approach, Panzar-Roasse (PR) reduced-form revenue model. 
The degree o f similarity in banking market competitiveness across major ASEAN 
countries is assessed by comparing the estimated //-statistics. In addition, the market 
contestability o f the whole ASEAN banking industry is tested by examining the 
relationship between market competitiveness and market concentration.
In terms o f bank efficiency, ASEAN banking markets were found to be 
converging at the aggregate level, i.e. market o f each country as a whole is converging
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towards a regional best-practice. However, a different inference can be made when 
individual banks were taken into consideration, as no strong evidence has been found 
to support the micro-level convergence. Individual countries’ banking sectors are in 
very different stages o f the convergence process, and the cross-country dispersions o f 
individual bank efficiencies are actually worsening over time. The current competitive 
structure o f ASEAN countries’ banking market was also found to be uneven with 
perfect competition in Singapore and Malaysia but pure monopoly or collusive 
behaviour in Thailand. ASEAN banking markets have also experienced very different 
evolution process o f market structure. Competitiveness o f the banking markets of 
some countries have improved, such as in Malaysia, whereas others are worsened, 
such as in the Philippines. In addition, the dynamics in banking market 
competitiveness did not show any clear trend o f convergence toward a common 
standard. Therefore, the main conclusion o f this thesis is that the banking national 
structural reforms and the financial integration efforts after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis had not significantly improved the convergence trend in ASEAN banking 
markets, as measured by pre- and post-crisis convergence properties. The degree of 
banking market integration is still relatively low.
However, more effective economic and financial integration could be achieved 
through a number o f ways. The positive effect o f foreign ownership on bank efficiency, 
which was found in both the cross-country case and in the single country case, 
indicate that the increase in foreign ownership, associated with the opening up of 
banking markets, may lead to the improvement o f the overall efficiency level o f the 
whole ASEAN banking market and hence their convergence properties. Although the 
policies towards more open financial markets have made the banking markets become
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less protective and restrictive since the 1997 Asian crisis, the current ASEAN banking 
markets do not exhibit sufficient degree of convergence. Therefore further financial 
policy enforcement for cooperation and integration between ASEAN countries are 
still needed. The other positive news is that the ASEAN banking market as a whole 
has been found to be contestable, which implies that, under the pressure of potential 
competition, the existing banks maybe relatively well prepared for adjusting 
themselves whenever new competition arises.
ASEAN may still have a long way to go towards an ultimate monetary union. The 
policy encouragements for further integration should be strengthened but with caution. 
It was noted that the production scale o f the ASEAN banking market at aggregate 
level is just to the right o f the optimum point on the long-run average production cost 
curve, i.e. a mild degree o f diseconomy of scale. This may indicate that further 
banking integration should not encourage further expansion o f the banking market, 
since the cost would increase more than proportionally. However, to moderate the 
increase in costs, banks should diversify more in their business and engage more in 
non-traditional banking business. Since the total cost is less sensitive to the increase in 
output o f non-interest income compared with those from the traditional banking 
activities.
Policy encouragements to improve bank efficiencies and competitiveness should 
also be made by individual countries. However, policies at country-level should be 
more specific and take individual bank issues into account. The emphasis on the 
importance o f individual banks was further investigated in a more detailed single 
country study in Chapter 4, using Indonesia as a sample country to investigate the
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evolution o f bank-level efficiency and its convergence properties, as well as the 
impact o f the major economic events, such as the 1997 Asian crisis on bank 
efficiencies. Bank efficiencies were modelled by using an alternative method of 
non-parametric DEA with Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap method, and the 
empirical results and implications for Indonesian banks were similar with what was 
found in the cross-country study in Chapter 3 using parametric method. Therefore the 
policy implications are robust since using two different methods ends up with similar 
results.
By distinguishing and comparing the arithmetic mean and weighted average o f  
bank efficiencies, it clearly showed that concentrating only on big banks or the 
aggregate banking market, but ignoring small bank properties, may distort the 
awareness o f the actual situation o f a county’s banking market. A major structural 
change was found following the 1997 Asian crisis, with small and foreign banks 
become more efficient after the crisis, but large banks which occupy larger market 
share are relatively less efficient. The worsening dispersion o f bank efficiency within 
one country may be one o f the reasons why the ASEAN banking market as a whole 
lack of micro-level convergence.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis clearly had a major impact on the banking 
markets o f ASEAN countries, governments were active in the banking structural 
reforms in the aftermath o f the crisis, however, the policies seemed not very effective 
in improving bank efficiencies. Furthermore the speed o f convergence within the 
country slowed in the post-crisis period. Successful regional banking market
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integration also requires efforts from each individual participating country, and in order 
to maintain the comparative advantages in an integrated market, participating countries 
may also need to strengthen their own banking system.
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100Appendix A. o-convergence versus ^-convergence
Apply the p-convergence defined in Sala-i-Martin (1996) to bank efficiencies, 
if p-convergence holds across countries/banks / = 1, • • •, N  , the partial correlation 
between growth in efficiency level over time and its initial efficiency level is negative, 
i.e. -1< p<0 in the following equation:
H eff„) = a + (1 + /?) ln(effa_t ) + «„ (A 1)
where u„ ~  i id (0 ,a 2). For estimation convention, manipulating equation A1 yields, 
H ^ - )  = a + /3ln(eff„ _,) + «„ (A l’)
The sample variance o f (log) efficiency in time t is given by
(A2)
where //, is the sample mean o f (log) efficiency . The evolution o f variance can be 
derived from equation A l,
erf = (1 + P )2 of_x + a f  (A3)
This difference equation is stable, only if  -1< P<0, therefore P-convergence is 
necessary for er-convergence. The steady-state variance is
(cr2)* = ------- ^ — r- (A4)
[ l - d  + jff)2]
100 This demonstration follows strictly Young et al. (2008), but with different notations accordingly.
101 When N is large, the sample variance is close to population variance.
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From this equation, we can notice that the cross-sectional dispersion decreases with 
the coefficient p but increases with random shocker2. Substitute equation A4 back 
into equation A3, and yield a first-order linear difference equation with constant 
coefficients:
a? = (1 + p f a l ,  + [1 -  (1 + p f  ](<72) * (A5)
The solution for this difference equation is
a,2 = (cJ2)*+ (l + P )2t[(J20 -(cT2)*] + c(l + P )2t (A6)
where c is an arbitrary constant. The stability o f a 2 is ensured, as long as -1< p<0102, 
since
\\ + P \<  1; lim(l + P )2t = 0, (A7)
1 1 /—wo
and limcr,2 = (cr2)* (A8)
/ - »  00
Therefore, given p-convergence exist, the variance will increase or decrease toward its 
steady-state value depending on the initial variance cr2. If the initial dispersion of
efficiency levels is smaller than the steady-state dispersion level, i.e. when cj\  is 
smaller than the variance of random shocks, cr2, which determines the steady-state 
dispersion, the dispersion will converge towards steady-state form below.
102 Also mentioned in Young et al. (2008), as (1+ P)>0, the approach to steady-state is monotonic.
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Appendix B. Lerner Index
The Lemer indices are derived based on the estimation results o f the 
Cobb-Douglas cost function in Chapter 3, equation (3.3)
In — = P<,+ P\ Iny tl, + p 2ln y 2ll+ p } \n y 3lt + z, l n ^ -  + x 2 In—  + (v„ + p „ )
Put P3U Pm
(3.3)
Where is C is total variable cost, yi is total loans, y 2 is other earning assets and y$ is 
other operating income. The output y$ can be thought o f as the flow counterpart of a 
capitalised stock value for non-interest earnings.
The Lemer index is calculated using only the price and marginal cost o f the first 
output, (LOANS), for the following reasons. The third output, Other Operating 
Income (OYY), is an income flow variable, which represents the non-traditional 
banking business, and contains the price information in the output measure. A 
separate measure o f Other Earning Assets (OEA) is also included in the cost function, 
but on the assumption that banks are normally price-takers in this market, e.g. fixed 
interest rates on bonds103 the bank faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for this kind 
of product.
The marginal cost of producing Loans can be derived by
MCU, = ^  = $ ,{— ) (B l)
y<„
103 Proportion of other kind of investment is relatively small in banks’ asset portfolio for ASEAN 
banks.
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The price information on Loans is not directly available, only Total Interest Revenue 
(TIR) from total earning assets (TEA=yi+y2) is available. To derive the interest rate 
for loan (r^), I use the fact that that the price for total earning assets (P) is a weighted 
average o f the price for each earning assets. The price o f OEA is denoted by (ro) 
therefore,
Divided both sides by TEA gives,
As discussed above, ro is given and equals to the marginal cost o f OEA, and
™* =rLa(ylll) + rm(yu ) (B2)
Equation (B3) can be written as
(B4)
and rearranging the equation to solve for tl,
r u , = P „ i — ) ~ P A — ) 
y , „
(B5)
And the Lemer Index (LN) can now be derived as:
Appendix
The yearly average o f the calculated Lemer Indices for each country is reported 
in Table B -l. The negative values for Lemer index indicate that the banks were 
making losses during that period on loans, and this is a sign of the serious 
non-performing loan problem that existed during the Asian financial crisis. This may 
also imply that surviving, banks needed to generate revenue from other activities. 
Ignoring those non-traditional banking activity, which on average constituted 17% of 
gross revenue over the sample period, may produce misleading results.
T a b le  B - l  L e r n e r  In d ex
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
1994 0.1587 0.1732 0.0183 0.0541 0.3078
1995 0.1264 0.2658 0.0387 0.0441 0.2372
1996 0.1119 0.3028 0.0781 0.2533 0.2416
1997 0.1089 0.3146 0.1472 0.2479 0.1909
1998 -8.1551 0.2856 0.1140 0.2514 -0.3417
1999 -3.5992 0.2721 -0.0820 0.3663 -0.6928
2000 -0.1300 0.3383 -0.2378 0.2769 -0.2985
2001 0.1199 0.3151 -0.2198 0.2213 -0.1516
2002 0.1034 0.1935 -0.4187 0.3761 0.0077
2003 0.1752 0.1771 -0.2961 0.3949 0.1122
2004 0.3102 0.1440 -0.1234 0.3613 0.2849
2005 0.2373 0.1081 -0.0965 0.2758 0.3564
2006 0.2413 0.1410 -0.1176 0.1950 0.2546
2007 0.2656 0.1486 -0.1239 0.1976 0.2338
2008 0.2944 0.2173 -0.0410 0.3282 0.3146
2009 0.3253 0.2170 0.0521 0.4532 0.2967
To compare the Lemer Index with the PR H-statistics, I take the average value of 
each in the pre-crisis (1994-1998) and post-crisis (1999-2008). The results are mixed 
and not consistent. But, the increase in competition from Lemer index is only 
evidenced in Malaysia and Thailand which are consistent with the result from PR 
//-statistics. Results for other countries do not show significant correlations. The
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Lemer index is only a partial indicator for bank’s market power, and the PR 
H-statistics provide more precise information on the measurement o f market 
competitiveness.
T a b le  B -2 C o m p a riso n  be tw een  L e rn e r  in d ex  a n d  P R  / / - s ta t is t ic
1994-1998 1999-2008
Indonesia -1.5298 -0.1982
Malaysia 0.2684 0.2055
LN Philippines 0.0793 -0.1757
Singapore 0.1702 0.2993
Thailand 0.1272 0.0422
Indonesia 0.0743 0.2730
Malaysia -0.1881 0.6155
H Philippines 0.7672 0.1924
Singapore 0.2296 0.9878
Thailand -0.4080 0.0384
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